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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is dedicated to the response of nineteenth-century Russian
writers to the English naturalist Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection. His theory was by no means the next discovery in a series of indistinguishable
scientific discoveries; the fact that its implications touched every aspect of human social
life was lost on no one, despite the fact that Darwin did not discuss human evolution in
any detail. The Origin changed what it meant to be human: what Darwin’s readers took to
be their place in the universe and how they ought to act with regard to both other humans
and other animals. But when the Origin came to Russia, the moral and cosmological
significance of Darwin’s work was grafted onto Russia’s combined historical, social,
economic, political, and religious conditions. With their cultural status as near-prophetic,
moral authorities, Russian writers became the vehicle through which Russians during this
turbulent time accepted, rejected, dissected, rewrote, and grappled with Darwin’s ideas
and their ramifications. This dissertation focuses on the understudied responses of three
writers in particular: the journalist Nikolai Strakhov, the novelist Lev Tolstoy, and the
philosopher Vladimir Solovyov. As I show, despite each writer’s varying background and
response to Darwin’s theory, they all shared similar moral concerns. Initially supportive,
Strakhov changed his mind, once he realized that Darwin’s theory did not support his
own anthropocentric philosophy of organicism. Tolstoy also initially supported Darwin’s
theory, but following his conversion to an idiosyncratic Christianity, he became
convinced that Darwin’s theory was being used to justify immorality and was incapable
vi

of serving as the foundation of an ethical system. Solovyov, on the other hand, was a
lifelong supporter of Darwin’s theory, though in order to accommodate his own
anthropocentrism, he had to downplay its utilitarian and relativistic nature. Ultimately,
Tolstoy and Strakhov share a concern about the implications of concept of the struggle
for existence for morality, whereas Tolstoy and Solovyov worried that the implications of
morality as an adaptation would undermine the foundation of morality. A concern all
three writers nevertheless shared was the use of evolutionary theory to justify moral and
social behaviors – what was then called “evolutionary ethics,” or “Social Darwinism.”
This study contributes the study of how the response to Darwinism varied by country and
the moral concerns that underpin responses to scientific ideas more generally.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The barrel of the pistol pointing straight at his face, the expression of hatred and
contempt in the pose and the whole figure of von Koren, and this murder that a
decent man was about to commit in broad daylight in the presence of decent
people, and this silence, and the unknown force that made Laevsky stand there
and not run away – how mysterious, and incomprehensible, and frightening it all
was! The time von Koren took to aim seemed longer than a night to Laevsky. He
glanced imploringly at the seconds; they did not move and were pale. (Chekhov
228)
Thus the Russian writer and physician Anton Chekhov’s novella “The Duel”
(1891) reaches its climax, as the zoologist Nikolai von Koren takes aim at the former
philology student Ivan Laevsky, in an attempt to put his program of evolutionary ethics
into action.1 Such programs are based on theories of human social development and
maintenance that rely in some way on facts about the evolutionary process. Having come
to the conclusion that Laevsky is, among other things, a congenital philanderer and liar
and therefore incapable of reform, von Koren believes that he has no choice but to carry
out his moral duty to protect humankind and neutralize the danger he believes Laevsky
represents to it by ensuring that he will not procreate (Chekhov 142). Failing to find a
non-lethal alternative, von Koren challenges Laevsky to a duel.
1

I use the term “evolutionary ethics” in place of the standard “Social Darwinism” for a few reasons. First,
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On the day of the duel, Laevsky shoots first and makes a show of firing into the
air. Then, just as von Koren is about to pull the trigger, he is distracted by a bystander’s
outburst and misses (Chekhov 212; 229); unbeknownst to von Koren, the bullet grazes
Laevsky’s neck (Chekhov 231), and thus brings to an end the moral transformation that
had begun in Laevsky the night before as he contemplated the prospect of dying. Later,
on seeing Laevsky’s transformation, von Koren realizes that he had misjudged Laevsky,
who proved to be capable of changing his ways. This realization does not, however,
cause von Koren to reevaluate his convictions about evolutionary ethics. In fact, von
Koren confesses to Laevsky that he maintained these beliefs in spite of Laevsky’s change
(Chekhov 234); he changed his mind only about Laevsky himself.
Thus, far from being an indictment of evolutionary ethics as a whole, “The Duel”
casts doubt, instead, on only the prospects of reliably ascertaining an individual’s
capacity for reform. The fact that it took the fear of dying to bring about this
transformation in Laevsky underscores this difficulty and the dangerous potential of
conclusions drawn without thorough study.2
More generally, “The Duel” illustrates the intuitive immediacy and relevance to
everyday life of such scientific theories as the English naturalist Charles Darwin’s theory
of evolution by natural selection in the late nineteenth-century in Russia. Indeed, the
importance of science to morality was by no means a subject reserved for philosophers.
Chekhov wrote “The Duel” as a wave of evolutionary ethics was sweeping across Europe

2

For more on Chekhov’s fictional use of Darwinism, see Melissa Miller’s “какая роскошь! Darwin as
Artist in Chekhov's Fiction.” The Russian Review 77.3 (2018): 378-395. Print. ; see also Michael C. Finke’s
“Self and Other through the Lens and Science.” Seeing Chekhov: Life & Art. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP,
2005. 99-138. Print.

2

and North America. 3 By dramatizing such pressing questions about the relationship
between science and morality, Chekhov brought them to life, together with all their moral
and practical complexities. In so doing – though Chekhov himself would deny this – he
was performing a civic duty that had become part and parcel of the Russian literary
tradition.
The Cultural Status and Civic Duty of Writers in Imperial Russia
The Russian literary tradition has long embraced a culture of social criticism.
Dating back to the late eighteenth century, Russian writers and publicists wrote criticism,
bemoaning Russia’s state of arrested development. The empress Catherine the Great for a
time even encouraged their critiques (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 289). The role of the
writer radically changed, however, in the nineteenth century when two nascent
conceptions of the writer emerged and intensified the demands of the writer. The first
was developed by the Ukrainian writer Nikolai Gogol (1809-1852) who, in 1847,
published Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends, a collection of letters
and essays that he used, in part, to establish a tradition of Russian writers as prophets.4 As
such, writers took it upon themselves to show their readers the way to spiritual
regeneration and salvation. The other conception was championed by the Russian literary
critic Vissarion Belinskii (1811-1848), who maintained that literature ought to be both
true to life and committed to righting the wrongs of Russian society. In so doing,
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The inspiration for the story came from a friendly disagreement Chekhov had with Vladimir Vagner
(1849-1934), a Russian zoologist and fervent “Social Darwinist” (Finke 107).
4 For more on this tradition, see Pamela Davidson’s “The Validation of the Writer’s Prophetic Status in the
Russian Literary Tradition: From Pushkin to Iazykov through Gogol to Dostoevsky” in The Russian
Review, Vol. 62, No. 4 (2003): 508-536.
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Belinskii elevated the status of social criticism in literature to a civic duty.5 As the
Russian literary critic Dmitrii Mirsky (1890-1939) would later note in his classic The
History of Russian Literature, the ethical obligations that Belinskii demanded of writers
proved immensely influential for the Realist movement of the 1850’s and 1860’s: “Never
did a literary development so exactly answer to the expectations entertained by a leading
critic” (Mirsky 178). Indeed, the works of such Realist writers as Fyodor Dostoevsky,
Lev Tolstoy, and Ivan Turgenev were distinguished by their close engagement with
turbulent events of the day.
Russia underwent a period of profound upheaval following its capitulation in the
Crimean war (1853-1856) to an alliance made up of France, Great Britain, Turkey, and
Sardinia. Tsar Nicholas I, who had ruled since 1825, died in 1855, and his successor
Alexander II (reigned 1855-1881) brought the war to an end, marking the beginning of an
era known as the “Great Reforms.” The defeat in Crimea had underscored the urgent
need for reform in Russia (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 335-336). Alexander II, who came
to be known as the “Tsar-Liberator,” oversaw the 1861 abolition of serfdom as well as
reforms made to Russia’s legal system and military, utterly transforming Russia
(Riasanovsky and Steinberg 370-372).
Many Realist writers, who had grown up under Nicholas I’s stultifying rule, wrote
their most enduring works during the more permissive reign of Alexander II. True to
Belinskii’s call for a civic and realistic literature, these writers reflected and reacted to
Russia’s radically changing social and political landscape. In so doing, leading writers
5

In fact, after reading Gogol’s Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends, Belinskii, who had
long admired Gogol, took issue, in a letter to Gogol, with what he saw as the implications of the prophetic
tradition that Gogol was constructing; he feared that Gogol’s emphasis on religion would exacerbate the
very social ills that Belinskii sought to ameliorate. For more, see: Vissarion Belinsky’s “Letter to Gogol” in
Selected Philosophical Works. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956. 536-54.
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such as Lev Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky came to enjoy enormous moral and social
authority in the eyes of their readers. Indeed, by the 1890’s, after three decades of
writing, Tolstoy’s influence had become such that, as one journalist famously claimed:
“There are two tsars in Russia: Nicholas II and Lev Tolstoy…Nicholas II can’t do
anything to Tolstoy, he can’t shake his throne, whereas Tolstoy undoubtedly shakes that
of Nicholas and his dynasty” (Surovin 168).6
Darwin Goes to Russia
It was also during this period of change that news of the English naturalist Charles
Darwin’s revolutionary work On the Origin of Species (1859) came to Russia. The news
proved brief and vague because the author of the notice had yet to read the Origin.
Copies in English, French, and German soon came to Russia, and Darwin’s ideas were
widely discussed within the scientific community.7 It was not until 1864, though, when
the first Russian translation of the Origin was published, along with several other
Darwinist books, that Darwin’s book became the subject of intense controversy in
Russia.8
The theory of evolution by natural selection that Darwin set forth in the Origin
was not merely the next discovery in a series of indistinguishable scientific discoveries;
“Два царя у нас: Николай II и Лев Толстой... Николай II ничего не может сделать с Толстым, не
может поколебать его трон, тогда как Толстой несомненно колеблет трон Николая и его династии”
(Суровин 168).
7 For more on the early reception of the Origin, see: Samuil Sobol’s “Pervye soobshcheniia o teorii Ch.
Darvina v russkoi pechati” in Biulleten’ Moskovskogo obshchestva ispytaltelei prirody. Otdel
biologicheskii; also see Boris Raikov’s “Iz istorii darvinizma v Rossii” in Istoriia biologicheskikh nauk.
8 Initially, the Russian paleontologist Vladimir Kovalevskii contacted Darwin, requesting to translate his
The Variation of Plants and Animals Under Domestication (1868) (Darwin Correspondence Project, letter
no. 5421). Darwin responded, asking whether On the Origin of Species had been translated into Russian
yet. Darwin knew that Friedrich Rolle’s exposition of the Origin had been translated into Russian, but did
not know that the book itself had been translated and thought it should be translated first (DCP, letter no.
5464). Kovalevsky replied, saying: “Your former book, the “Origin of Species” is translated and printed
some three years ago”(DCP, letter no. 5452).
6
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the fact that its implications touched every aspect of human social life was lost on no one,
despite the fact that Darwin did not discuss human evolution in any detail. The Origin
changed what it meant to be human: what Darwin’s readers took to be their place in the
universe and how they ought to act with regard to both other humans and other animals.
But when the Origin came to Russia, the moral and cosmological significance of
Darwin’s work was grafted onto Russia’s combined historical, social, economic, political,
and religious conditions. With their near-prophetic stature, Russian writers became the
vehicle through which Russians during this turbulent time accepted, rejected, dissected,
rewrote, and grappled with Darwin’s ideas and their ramifications. Writers created their
own “Darwins,” dependent on each individual writer’s particular goals and world views.
Their Darwin-focused texts thus provide a fascinating window into Russian Darwin
reception on the verge of the modernist era.
The Writers and Their Texts
The body of Russian texts written in response to Darwin’s work is considerable.
The works I have chosen to study are by and large understudied texts written by
prominent authors, namely, the journalist Nikolai Strakhov (1828-1896), the novelist Lev
Tolstoy (1828-1910), and the philosopher Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900). They were
members of the same social circle and shared certain underlying concerns about Darwin’s
work and what it meant for human life, though their concerns took varying forms. The
relatively little attention these texts have received has resulted in a scholarly oversight of
the ubiquity of Darwin’s ideas in Russia beyond the scientific community during the
second half of the nineteenth century.

6

In chapter 2, I argue that Strakhov, most famous in the history of science for his
public defense of the naturalist Nikolai Danilevskii’s anti-Darwinist tome Darwinism
(Darvinizm) (1885; 1889) in the late 1880’s, initially hailed the Origin as a pioneering
work of science. At this point, I note, Strakhov had only read a sketch of Darwin’s ideas
and therefore thought that they were more in sync with Strakhov’s ideas than they
actually were. Once Strakhov realized his mistake – that Darwin’s ideas did not in fact
support his anthropocentric worldview – Strakhov became and remained a staunch antiDarwinist for the rest of his life, and, never bringing up his brief period as a Darwinist
again, acted as if it had never happened.
Tolstoy’s own transformation from Darwinist to anti-Darwinist forms the subject
of chapter 3. There I maintain that Tolstoy’s change of heart was driven by moral
anxiety. Initially, Tolstoy was vaguely supportive of Darwin’s work, but after going
through a period of profound moral crisis that resulted in his conversion to an
idiosyncratic Christianity, he could see Darwinism only in terms of the risk that he
thought it posed to morality. He was convinced that not only was Darwinism used to
excuse immoral behavior, but also that any attempt to formulate an ethical system based
on Darwinism was doomed to failure because it was impossible to escape the element of
self-interest that lay at the theory’s core.
In chapter 4, I turn to Solovyov and his peculiar synthesis of Darwinism,
philosophical idealism, and Christianity. I argue that although he was always a vocal
supporter of Darwin’s work, in order to accommodate his own anthropocentrism,
Solovyov was forced to rework the logical structure of Darwinian theory and downplay
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its utilitarian and relativistic nature. I discuss the perhaps surprising adherence to
Darwinian ideas in a philosopher often associated with mystical, religious thought.
In my conclusion, I look at patterns that emerge in comparing and contrasting
Strakhov’s, Tolstoy’s, and Solovyov’s responses. It should come as no surprise given
their presumed status as moral authorities that their responses were marked by a moral
concern. In particular, they shared an underlying concern about the effects that Darwin’s
ideas would have on how we see our place in the universe and how we treat one another.
I conclude by looking to the fate of these ideas and discussions in the new Soviet state, as
I turn to the Russian writer and physician Mikhail Bulgakov’s novella Heart of a Dog
(written in 1925; published in 1968). I examine how Darwinian ideas continued to play
out and transform, with the advent of genetics, in the early 20th century. In particular, I
focus on the fact that Bulgakov chose to emphasize the biological basis of human
behavior at a time when Soviet ideologues claimed that human behavior was largely
learned and therefore fundamentally plastic.
Darwin and the Discovery of Natural Selection
In order to understand properly how Strakhov, Tolstoy, and Solovyov responded
to Darwin’s ideas, we must first establish what those ideas and their implications were.
Although Darwin spent approximately a year writing On the Origin of Species, its
contents were the product of nearly three decades of research. In 1828, having given up
on the idea of becoming a physician, Darwin (1809-1882) went to Cambridge, where he
spent three years listlessly studying to become a clergyman. Then, in 1831, he was
offered the chance to join Captain Robert Fitzroy (1805-1865) on board HMS Beagle as
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Fitzroy’s gentleman companion on an expedition to chart South America. Darwin
accepted the offer.
HMS Beagle set sail on December 27, 1828 and would not return to England until
1836. Because he was not an official member of the crew, Darwin enjoyed the freedom to
make long sojourns to the interior of the South American continent, collecting biological
and geological specimens. When he was not busy on his collecting excursions, he spent
his time reading. Of particular importance to Darwin’s intellectual development was his
reading of the geologist Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (Ruse, Revolution 40-44).
The geological picture that Lyell painted rested on three premises: actualism,
uniformitarianism, and a steady-state view of the Earth. Lyell took for granted that the
same kinds of causes of geological phenomena operate today as did in the past
(actualism), that these causes were of the same degree (uniformitarianism), and that the
Earth is in a constant state of change (a steady-state Earth). This type of thinking, with its
emphasis on laws, proved immensely influential for Darwin as he considered the kinds of
laws that govern organisms and speciation.
It was not until Darwin had returned home, though, that he came to understand the
full importance of the various species he had observed in South America. He was
particularly struck by the differences and similarities he had found among tortoises and
finches from different islands in the Galapagos Archipelago. As Darwin began to
consider the possible cause of such patterns – what we call “evolution” today –, he first
looked to plant and animal breeders for clues as to how such changes could occur. After
he became convinced that evolution could occur under such manufactured conditions, he
realized that he had to figure out how this process could occur in the wild, without
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breeders enabling it. He found the solution in September 1838 after reading the Reverend
Thomas Robert Malthus’ Essay on a Principle of Population (1798). Realizing that the
struggle for resources Malthus described – “the struggle for existence”—could drive
evolution, Darwin wrote a brief essay outlining his thoughts. In no hurry to publish his
work, Darwin then turned his efforts to studying barnacles. He returned to the essay in
1842 and then again in 1844 and expanded it.
It was not until 1858, when Darwin received a letter from the British naturalist
Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) detailing his own ideas on evolution, that Darwin
began to write in earnest what would become the Origin. Wallace had, in effect,
independently discovered the same cause of evolution as Darwin had. (He had even
found inspiration in Malthus’ essay.) Wallace’s brief essay was titled “On the Tendency
of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original Type” (1858). Darwin is usually
given priority for the discovery, though, because he had come to his conclusions about
evolution much earlier and because of his detailed explanation of an evolutionary
mechanism – “natural selection” -- in On the Origin of Species.
Darwin’s Theories
Darwin began the argument he was making for the existence of natural selection
with a discussion of plant and animal breeding. He wanted to account for how the
numerous varieties of such “domestic productions” came to be. The explanation for their
diversity, Darwin thought, lay in what was called “artificial selection” (Darwin, Origin
109):
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The key is man’s power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive
variations; man adds them up in certain directions useful to him. In this sense he
may be said to make for himself useful breeds. (Darwin, Origin 30)
Thus, in letting only the best stock reproduce, breeders improve the stock over the course
of generations. As an example, Darwin notes that by systematically singling out the
individual plants in each generation that produced better, larger, or earlier fruit, and by
planting seeds from only the fruit of those plants, gardeners had recently managed to
improve the quality of strawberries (Darwin, Origin 41-42).
To show that something analogous to artificial selection -- natural selection-takes place in nature, Darwin first had to demonstrate that there is abundant variation in
wild organisms, for there can be no selection without alternatives. Darwin pointed out
that such variation was, indeed, readily found: “[We] have many slight differences which
may be called individual differences, such as are known frequently to appear in the
offspring from the same parents, or which may be presumed to have thus arisen, from
being frequently observed in the individuals of the same species inhabiting the same
confined locality” (Darwin, Origin 45). It is worth noting that Darwin was interested only
in heritable individual variation, having declared: “Any variation which is not inherited is
unimportant for us” (Darwin, Origin 12).
To complete the analogy, Darwin had to convince his readers of a natural
equivalent to the animal or plant breeder that determines which organisms live to
reproduce. To that end, he adopted the premise that there is a universal competition for
limited resources metaphorically called “the struggle for existence.” Darwin described
the conditions of the struggle thus:

11

A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic
beings tend to increase. Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces
several eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and
during some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical
increase, its numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country
could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can
possibly survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one
individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct
species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus
applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in
this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint
from marriage. Although some species may be now increasing, more or less
rapidly, in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would not hold them. (Darwin,
Origin 63-64)
Taken together, the existence of heritable individual variations in nature and the struggle
for existence form the logical structure of his mechanism of evolutionary change -natural selection:
Let it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and close-fitting are the mutual
relations of all organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of
life. Can it, then, be thought improbable, seeing that variations useful to man have
undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful in some way to each being in
the great and complex battle of life, should sometimes occur in the course of
thousands of generations? If such do occur, can we doubt (remembering that
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many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having
any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of
surviving and of procreating their kind? On the other hand, we may feel sure that
any variation in the least degree injurious would be rigidly destroyed. This
preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I
call Natural Selection. (Darwin, Origin 80-81)
That is, the value of any given heritable variation is relative to the local environment in
which it appears. Since all environments are not the identical, whether or not a given
variation proves conducive to survival and reproduction will vary from environment to
environment. However, when heritable individual variations do emerge and give an
advantage in the struggle to survive and reproduce, those variations are more likely to be
“preserved” in the offspring of the next generation. Thus, over the course of generations,
if conditions remain constant, organisms with that variation will increase in number while
organisms lacking that variation – particularly, the rivals to the organisms with the
variation - will decrease. In time, as we will see shortly, the accumulation of such
variations can lead to the production of new species.
Although natural selection was Darwin’s primary mechanism of evolutionary
change, it was by no means his only mechanism. Two other mechanisms have a
prominent place in the Origin: the inheritance of acquired characteristics and sexual
selection. Darwin had adopted the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics (or
“the theory of use and disuse”) from the French naturalist and transformist Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck (1744-1829), and, though Darwin always gave natural selection priority in his
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explanations, he would turn to Lamarck’s theory as a last resort. Lamarck himself called
it his “Second Law” and gave it the following formulation:
All the acquisitions or losses wrought by nature on individuals, through the
influence of the environment in which their race has long been placed, and hence
through the influence of the predominant use or permanent disuse of any organ;
all these are preserved by reproduction to the new individuals which arise,
provided that the acquired modifications are common to both sexes, or at least to
the individuals which produce the young. (Lamarck 113)
Darwin, for example, resorted to the theory of “use and disuse” when explaining
hereditary blindness in cave-dwelling organisms (Darwin, Origin 138).
Sexual selection, on the other hand,--unlike natural selection-- depends, Darwin
maintained, “not on a struggle for existence, but on a struggle between the males for
possession of the females; the result is not death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few
or no offspring” (Darwin, Origin 88). Darwin identified two forms of sexual selection:
“male combat” and “female choice.” “Male combat” consists of a direct struggle among
males for access to mates. Though the best fitted to survive usually leave the most
offspring, Darwin noted that there are sometimes special “weapons” that males use
specifically for such combat, including stags’ antlers and roosters’ spurs (Darwin, Origin
88). “Female choice,” on the other hand, is comprised of an indirect struggle. Darwin
turns, for example, to birds: “The rock-thrush of Guiana, birds of Paradise, and some
others, congregate; and successive males display their gorgeous plumage and perform
strange antics before the females, which standing by as spectators, at last choose the most
attractive partner” (Darwin, Origin 89). In addition to discussing human evolution in his
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1872 book The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, Darwin went into much
greater detail about sexual selection.
How do such mechanisms lead to evolution, to the production of new species?
Darwin attributed speciation to the gradual accumulation of heritable individual
variations. 9 Ultimately, “the small differences distinguishing varieties of the same
species, will steadily tend to increase till they come to equal the greater differences
between species of the same genus, or even of distinct genera” (Darwin, Origin 128).
That is, while natural selection and speciation are distinct processes, natural selection can
lead to speciation. Over time groups within one species accumulate variations and differ
to the point of branching out and becoming distinct species. Darwin describes an
implication of this process as a “truly wonderful fact,” that is, the fact that:
all animals and all plants throughout all time and space should be related to each
other in group subordinate to group…varieties of the same species most closely
related together, species of the same genus less closely and unequally related
together, forming sections and sub-genera, species of distinct genera much less
closely related, and genera related in different degrees, forming sub=families,
families, orders, sub-classes, and classes. (Darwin, Origin 128)
In other words, all organisms share a common ancestor.

9

For all that Darwin did to show that natural selection could produce organisms ever more adapted to their
environments, he failed to explain the origin of species. In part, this failure was due to the fact that Darwin
lacked a clear notion of what constituted a species. It was also due to the fact that he lacked a theory of
heredity. Although the Moravian monk Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) was already conducting his
revolutionary experiments with pea plants when Darwin published the Origin, the paper Mendel published
in 1866, “Experiments on Plant Hybridization,” outlining his experimental findings, was initially ignored. It
got a second life only in the 1890’s when it was rediscovered, over a decade after Darwin’s death.
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Of the foregoing discussion of Darwin’s “theory,” there are certain parts that I
will bring up when I discuss how Strakhov, Tolstoy, and Solovyov responded to
Darwin’s ideas. In particular, I will return to what the eminent German-American
evolutionary biologist and historian of biology Ernst Mayr (1904-2005) described as
component theories that make up the larger theory of natural selection Darwin put forth.
Breaking Darwin’s theory down into such parts will be useful for our purposes because,
as Mayr noted, the fact that these individual components “do not constitute an indivisible
whole is demonstrated by the fact that so many evolutionists accepted some of Darwin’s
theories but rejected others” (Mayr, Growth 505). And indeed, as we will see, Strakhov,
Tolstoy, and Solovyov accepted some parts of Darwin’s theory while rejecting others.
Mayr divided Darwin’s theory into five component parts: what he called
“evolution as such,” “natural selection,” “the multiplication of species,” “common
descent,” and “gradualism.” “Evolution as such” refers to the fact that the world is not
constant; this continual change underlies the struggle for existence and ultimately natural
selection. “Natural selection,” as we have seen, explains how it is that certain variations
present in organisms are useful in the struggle for existence and reproduction and are
therefore preserved, while others are less useful or deleterious in the struggle and are
therefore eliminated. Given enough time, the accumulation of such individual variations
can lead to the appearance of new species or the “multiplication of species.” “Common
descent” describes the fact that these newly formed species and, by extrapolation, all life
on earth share a common ancestor. Finally, “gradualism” describes the rate of evolution.
Because natural selection works on slight individual variations that appear over the
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course of generations, Darwin took it for granted that the time it takes for new species to
evolve by natural selection is immense.
After laying out his “theory” of natural selection, Darwin largely spent the
remainder of the Origin applying natural selection to various fields of biology ranging
from embryology to paleontology. As the English philosopher and historian of science
Michael Ruse has shown, Darwin gave the Origin this structure so as to make his
theorizing conform to what the leading philosophers of his day thought was the proper
way of constructing scientific theories. In particular, Darwin wanted his work to fit the
model of “proper” science that the famous English astronomer John F. W. Herschel
(1792-1871) and the English historian and philosopher of science William Whewell
(1794-1866) had laid out in their writings. Darwin read, met, and admired both thinkers.
For Herschel, the goal of science was to find true causes (causae verae). In
particular, he supported the use of arguments from analogy to establish whether
something is a true cause. He argued that one can show that something is a causa vera
by demonstrating that it is analogous to something else that is known to be a causa vera.
As he wrote in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1831):
Here, then, we see the great importance of possessing a stock of analogous
instances or phenomena which class themselves with that under consideration, the
explanation of one among which may naturally be expected to lead to that of all
the rest. If the analogy of two phenomena be very close and striking, while, at the
same time, the cause of one is very obvious, it becomes scarcely possible to refuse
to admit the action of an analogous cause in the other, though not so obvious in
itself. For instance, when we see a stone whirled round in a sling, describing a
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circular orbit round the hand, keeping the string stretched, and flying away the
moment it breaks, we never hesitate to regard it as retained in its orbit by the
tension of the string, that is, by a force directed to the centre; for we feel that we
do really exert such a force. We have here the direct perception of the cause.
When, therefore, we see a great body like the moon circulating round the earth
and not flying off, we cannot help believing it to be prevented from so doing, not
indeed by a material tie, but by that which operates in the other case through the
intermedium of the string, - a force directed constantly to the centre. (Herschel
149)
Thus, because Darwin lacked evidence about the workings of natural selection in the
wild, he turned to animal and plant breeders and argued for the existence of natural
selection by analogy (Ruse, “Philosophy” 25).
Whewell, on the other hand, propounded a method of theorizing that has become
famously known as a “consilience of inductions.” He formalized this idea in his book The
Philosophy of Inductive Sciences (1840): “the evidence in favour of our induction is of a
much higher and more forcible character when it enables us to explain and determine
cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated in the formation of our
hypothesis” (Whewell 1840). In turning to such disparate fields as embryology and
paleontology, Darwin sought to adhere to Whewell’s consilient ideal by showing that
natural selection was capable of explaining a surprisingly broad array of phenomena
(Ruse, “Philosophy” 26-27).
Finally, it is worth noting that the philosophers’ influence even explains Darwin’s
decision to incorporate Malthus’ “Iron Law of Population” into his theory of natural
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selection. For Herschel and Whewell maintained that the best scientific theories are, like
Newton’s law of universal gravitation, constructed using quantitative laws. Malthus had
shown in his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) that because human
populations tend to increase at an exponential rate, human demand will outstrip food
supplies that can increase only at an arithmetical rate. So formulated, Malthus’ principle
of population gave Darwin the very law that he needed to argue deductively for the
struggle for existence and ultimately natural selection itself (Ruse, “Philosophy” 11; 20).
Note on the Language of Evolutionary Biology
What follows is a history of the term “evolution,” with particular emphasis on
how its English usage compares with that in Russian. So far I have used the word
“evolution” and related words like “evolved” and “evolutionary” to describe Darwin’s
ideas, without qualification. Such usage is, in fact, anachronistic because scientists were
just beginning to use “evolution” to mean species change, during this period and within a
century “evolution” would come to mean any genetic change. It is nevertheless standard
practice among historians to use “evolution” and related words to denote speciation in
discussions of this period. The core of Strakhov’s, Tolstoy’s, and Solovyov’s interests lay
at the evolutionary emergence of humans as a species
Although his name has since become synonymous with the theory of evolution,
Darwin (1809-1882) actually never used the word “evolution” in the first edition of his
On the Origin of Species (1859) though, as scholars have noted (Bowler, “Evolution”
103; Gould, “Revolution” 30), he did use the word “evolved” once.10 It was the book’s
final word: “There is,” Darwin rhapsodized, “a grandeur in this view of life, with its
10

For a popular account of the history of the word “evolution” in English, see, Stephen Jay Gould’s
“Darwin’s Dilemma: The Odyssey of Evolution in Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. New
York: W. W. Norton& Company, 2007.
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several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that,
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so
simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are
being, evolved” (Darwin, Origin 490). Theories of species change, of course, had been
proposed long before Darwin’s, and they had all gone by different names, including the
“development hypothesis,” “transmutation theory,” and the theories of “species change,”
of “organic change,” and of “organic succession,” to name a recent few.11 Darwin himself
preferred his own coinage: “descent with modification,” though few others shared this
preference.
Historically, the word “evolution” had been used to denote not the transmutation
of species, but to refer specifically to the Dutch entomologist Jan Swammerdam’s theory
of embryological preformation, in which an embryo’s development was little more than
an expansion and augmentation of preexisting parts (Richards, Evolution 5). When
Darwin used the word “evolved,” however, as the historian of biology Peter J. Bowler
has documented, he meant it in what was then a more general, vernacular sense of the
word describing “a sequence of events in time, without reference to the concept of the
unfolding of a preexisting structure of design” (Bowler, “Evolution” 102). Tying the
word “evolution” to the transmutation of species was, rather, the doing of Darwin’s
compatriot, the philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), whose use of the word
“evolution” throughout the 1850’s and 1860’s changed the word’s meaning for the whole

11

For more on theories of transmutation before Darwin, see Bentley Glass’ Forerunners of Darwin, 17501859. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1968.
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of the English-speaking world. In fact, Spencer’s efforts were so successful that Darwin
himself even ended up using it, albeit reluctantly (Bowler, “Evolution” 110).12
Ironically, Darwin’s name has nevertheless come to be more closely associated
throughout the world with the “theory of evolution” than with his proposed mechanism of
evolutionary change – natural selection –, with transliterations of “evolution” appearing
in such languages as Spanish, French, Italian, German, and Russian. The Russian
transliteration of the word “evolution” –“evoliutsiia”—as a biological term has, as we
will see shortly, a markedly different history from that of its English counterpart, for it
was not the translation of Spencer’s works that helped the term gain currency in Russian.
Rather, it was the infusion of new Russian translations of Darwinist works and the
botanist Kliment Timiriazev’s translation of the 6th edition of the Origin, in particular,
that the 1890’s saw that ultimately turned the terminological tides in favor of
standardizing usage of “evoliutsiia” in Russia.
Early Usage of “Evoliutsiia” in Russian. – It is worth noting that the loanword
“evoliutsiia” was used in Russia long before it acquired a biological meaning. Indeed,
just as Bowler has noted that the word “evolution” could at the time also be used to
denote a military maneuver in English (Bowler, “Evolution” 99), so “evoliutsiia” was
used in Russian. The writer Andrei Nartov (1737-1813), for instance, wrote in his 1785
Tales of Peter the Great (Rasskazy o Petre Velikom):
The Sovereign, walking along the picture gallery in Mongshezir and
admiring the pictures of the sea, stopped at one depicting four united fleets
12

Richard’s book grew out of a commissioned essay: “Evolution” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology.
The English anatomist Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) undertook what is probably the first attempt to
trace the history of the word “evolution” in English: “Evolution in Biology” in Encyclopedia Britiannica
(1878). “Evolution in Biology” was then reprinted in Huxley’s 1896 Darwiniana.
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-- the Russian, the English, the Danish, and the Dutch. [They had come
together] because of the Swedish pirate ships on the Baltic Sea that were
doing great harm to merchant ships, trying to destroy them, fleets which
this monarch commanded in 1716 with great honor, doing different
evolutions on the sea, and thus showing his skill. (Nartov)13
The Russiasn poet Aleksandr Pushkin (1799-1837) described similar “naval evolutions”
(“morskie evoliutsii”) in his unfinished “History of Peter the First” (“Istoriia Petra I”),
begun in the late 1820’s (Pushkin 57).14
At about the same time, the word “evoliutsiia” alternatively signified a series of
movements in a non-military context. The Russian literary critic Apollon Grigor’ev
(1822-1864), for example, wrote in his “‘Hamlet’ in a Certain Provincial Theater”
(“‘Gamlet’ na odnom provintsial’nom teatre”): “The actor’s pose was like a painting, yet
polished, and I was surprised by the fact that he appeared on stage with a cold because
otherwise I could not explain to myself the incessant evolutions he was making with his
handkerchief” (Grigor’ev 11).15 And seven years later, in 1852, Lev Tolstoy wrote in his
novel Childhood: “‘I was very impatient: I climbed up on my horse, looked at her
between the ears and did various evolutions through the yard’” (Tolstoy, Detstvo 27).16
As we will see shortly, “evoliutsiia” would not acquire a biological meaning in Russian
13 “Государь,

прохаживаясь по галереи картинной в Монгшезире и любуясь на морские картины, ост
ановился при одной, изображающей четыре соединенные флота: российской, английской, дацкой и
голландской ― по случаю шведских разбойнических судов на Балтийском море, купеческим судам
великий вред причиняющих, дабы их истребить, которыми флотами монарх сей в 1716 году команд
овал с превеликою честию, чиня на море разные эволюции, показывая в том свое искусство…»
(Нартов)
14 “Потом ездил он в Гордервик и видел там такие же морские эволюции” (Пушкин 57).
15 “Поза актёра была живописна, но изысканна, и я удивлялся притом, зачем он явился на сцену с
насморком, потому что иначе я не мог себе объяснить его беспрестанных эволюции с платком
(Григорьев 11).”
16 “Я был в сильном нетерпении: взлез на свою лошадку, смотрел ей между ушей и делал по двору
разные эволюции” (Толстой, Детство 27).
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until the late 1870’s, and it was not until the 1890’s that it would begin its rise on the path
to linguistic domination as the leading word for “transmutation” in Russian.
Other Names for “Evolution” in Russian. - Certainly, as the historian of biology
Boris Raikov demonstrated in his multivolume Russian Biologist-Evolutionists before
Darwin (Russkie biologi-evoliutsionisty do Darvina) (1951-1959), there was no shortage
of Russian scientists who speculated about the idea of transmutation,17 and, like their
English analogues, they referred to the idea by various names. Such designations from
before and after the publication of On the Origin of Species included: “razvitie”
(“development.” Literally: “unfolding”) (Mechnikov, Outline 112; Strakhov, “Razvitie”
228; Chernyshevskii “Prilozhenie” 757), “izmenenie vidov” (“change of species”)
(Strakhov, “Perevorot” 1; Korzhinskii 264), “prevrashchenie vidov” (“transformation of
species.” Literally: “turning-again” or “turning over” of species) (Mechnikov, Teoriia 1),
“preobrazovanie vidov” (“transformation” or “re-formation” of species)(“Darvin” 2),
“transformizm” (Mechnikov, Ocherk 101), “pererozhdenie vidov” (“transformation” of
species.” Literally: “rebirth of species”) (Strakhov “Poiavlenie 6”; Pisarev 43),
“transmutatsiia” (“transmutation”) (Korzhinskii 261), and “protsess vidoizmeneniia”
(“process of species change”) (Severtsov, “etnografiia” 19).
Among the pre-Darwinian Russian cohort that could be anachronistically called
“evolutionists”

were

Mikhail

Lomonosov

(1711-1765),

who

spoke

of

the

“preobrashchenie velikoi prirody” (the “transformation of great nature”) (Lomonosov
90); Dmitrii Sokolov (1788-1852), Russia’s foremost 19th-century geologist, who called
it “pererozhdenie zhivotnykh” (“transformation of animals”) (quoted in Raikov 305);
17

For more on the history of pre-Darwinian “evolutionists” in Russia, see: Boris Raikov’s Russkie
biologi-evoliutsionisty do Darvina. 4 vols. Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1951–1959.
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Karl Rul’e (1814-1858), a zoologist and ardent transformist, who often spoke of a
gradual “razvitie” (Rul’e 76)18; and Nikolai Severtsov (1827-1885), a zoologist and
future Darwinian,19 who referred to the theory in Russian variously as “vidoizmenenie”
(“species change”) (Severtsov, “etnografiia” 19)20 “razvitie” (“development”) (Severtsov,
“etnografiia” 32).21
The word for “evolved” that the Russian botanist Sergei Rachinskii used in the
1864 translation of the Origin that he published without Darwin’s knowledge was the
verbal form of “razvitie” (“development”) (Darvin, O proiskhozhdenii 387) (1864).22 23
The first translation of the Origin in Russian could not, for that reason, make any claim to
having the same historical continuity with the word “evolved” and therefore with the later
theory of “evolution,” as Darwin’s work did in the English original. By the same token,
“В основание зоогнозии мы положим тот опытный факт, который лежит в основании всей нашей
науки и который лежит в основании всех отдельных ее частей, факт, не подверженный ни
малейшему сомнению: в природе, в мире явлений нет ничего, от начала существующего, все
последующее образуется из повторения предыдущего с прибавлением нового, все образуется путем
постепенного медленного развития” (Рулье 76).
19 For more on Severtsov’s Darwin-related work, see: Daniel P. Todes’ Darwin without Malthus. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1989.
20 “Прежде бы всего нам следовало определить, что такое видоизменение у животных – но до этого
определения, чтобы сделать его понятным, нужно еще сказать, что такое вид…” (Северцов,
“этнография”19)
21 “На этих данных и была основана теория постепенного развития организмов” (Северцов,
“этнография” 32). Writing in French, Severtsov spoke of “la question de la fixité où de la variabilité des
espèces” (Severtzow, “Notice” 436) and “la théorie de la generation des espèces” (Severtzow, “Notice”
437). The fact that he wrote scientific articles in multiple languages including French and Russian,
combined with the fact that the variety of phrases from the above list all meaning “evolution” suggests that
they were all translations of Western European terms and points to the low status of Russian as a scientific
language. For more on Russian as a scientific language, see: Michael Gordin’s “The Table and the Word”
in Scientific Babel: How Science was Done Before and After Global English, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2015.
22 “Есть величие в этом воззрении, по которому жизнь с ее разнородными силами была вдохнута
первоначально в немногие формы или лишь в одну; по которому, меж тем как земля продолжает
кружиться по вечному закону тяготения, из столь простого начала развились и до сих пор
развиваются бесчисленные формы дивной красоты” (Дарвин, О происхождении 387).
23 As noted above, it was not until April 1867 that Darwin learned of the existence of a Russian translation
of the Origin. A young Vladimir Onufrievich Kovalevskii (1842-1883) had informed Darwin: “Your
former book, the “Origin of Species” is translated and printed some three years ago” (DCP, letter no. 5452).
Before receiving that letter, Darwin had known only that Friedrich Rolle’s summary of his ideas had been
translated into Russian (DCP, letter no. 5464).
18
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Rachinskii also continued the pre-Darwinian tradition in Russia and abroad of referring to
both embryological development and transmutation by the same word, “razvitie” or
“development,” respectively.
Since Rachinskii’s translation, however, did nothing to produce a standardized
term denoting the change of species, both scientists and laymen alike continued to use
various terms for transmutation. For example, in the expositions of Darwin’s theory they
published in 1864 following the appearance of Darwin’s Origin in Russian, the botanist
and leading Russian Darwinist Kliment Timiriazev (1843-1920) used “razivitie”
(“development”) (Timiriazev, “Darvin,” 59), while the radical literary critic Dmitrii
Pisarev (1840-1868) used “pererozhdenie vidov” (“transformation of species”) (Pisarev
43). Frequently, the same writer would even use multiple phrases that meant the same
thing. Nikolai Strakhov (1828-1896), for example, used “pererozhdenie vidov”
(“transformation of species”) (Strakhov, “Poiavlenie” 6; “Priznaki” 166),“izmenenie
vidov” (“change of species”) (Strakhov, “Perevorot” 1) and “razvitie” (“development”)
(Strakhov, “Razvitie” 228). The zoologist and future Nobel laureate Il’ia Mechnikov,
meanwhile, spoke of “transformizm” (Mechnikov, Ocherk 76), of a conviction in the
“izmeniaemost’ organicheskikh form” (“mutability of organic forms”) (Mechnikov,
Ocherk 76), and of the theory of progressive “razvitie” (development) (Mechnikov,
Ocherk 104). The Russian scientific community would have to wait another two decades
before the catalyst appeared that would standardize a term for “evolution” in Russian.
Early Use of “Evoliutsiia” in Russian Science. - The fact that “razvitie”
(“development”) was used to convey both embryological development as well as the
change of species is unsurprising given that even in England at the time that the Origin
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was published Darwin’s theory had yet to become associated with the word “evolution.”
As noted above, it was Spencer who popularized usage of the word “evolution” to mean
transmutation in English. In Russian, however, his writings had no such effect. Spencer’s
works were, of course, both translated and widely read in Russia, as the historian of
science Michael Gordin has demonstrated (Gordin, “Spencer” 14). But as his works were
brought to Russian readers, the individual preferences of Spencer’s translators came into
play. For example, when Spencer’s 1852 essay “The Development Hypothesis” was
translated into Russian in the 1860s, the word “development,” unsurprisingly, was
translated as “razvitie” (“development”). Shortly thereafter, in 1870, his Principles of
Biology (1864) appeared in translation, followed by his Principles of Sociology (1873) in
1876, and although Spencer had used the word “evolution” to mean transmutation in both
of the English editions, neither of his Russian translators used a transliteration of it in
their translations. Aleksandr Gerd, the translator of The Principles of Biology, translated
the word “evolution” as “progress,” perhaps not unjustly given Spencer’s beliefs about
biological progress (Spenser, Biologiia 245; 302), whereas the anonymous translator of
The Principles of Sociology translated it as “razvitie” (“development”) (Spenser,
Sotsiologiia 1). Hence, Spencer’s works could not have popularized the word
“evoliutsiia” in Russian as they had done for “evolution” in English.
The translations of Darwin’s other works published in the late 1860s and early
1870s did not popularize “evoliutsiia” in Russian, either, for even when Darwin did, in
fact, use the word “evolution” in the English original, his official Russian translator, the
paleontologist Vladimir Kovalevskii (1842-1883), used “razvitie” (“development”)
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generally to mean both “evolution” and “development.” 24 Kovalevskii only used a
transliteration of “evoliutsionizm” in his 1874 translation of The Descent of Man
(Darwin, Chelovek 45).25 Nevertheless, by the late 1870s “evoliutsiia” began to appear in
Russian print. The earliest example I have found comes in Kliment Timiriazev’s 1878
book Zhizn’ rastenii (The Life of Plants): “Darwin first pointed out the proximate causes,
pointed out the more general laws of nature that result in gradual development, progress,
or the evolution of the organic world” (Timiriazev, Zhizn’ 230).26 27 In other places
throughout the book, Timiriazev also used “evoliutsiia” interchangeably with “razvitie”
(“development”) (Timiriazev, Zhizn’ 230) and “obrazovanie” (“formation”) (Timiriazev,
Zhizn’ 222; 226; 233). His use of “evoliutsiia” is nonetheless a remarkable development
for Timiriazev, who had used only “razvitie” (“development”) in his 1864 exposition of
the Origin (Timiriazev, “Darvin” 59). Usage of “evoliutsiia” increased so much over the
following years that by the 1880s, the radical critic Nikolai Chernyshevskii (1828-1889)
complained in an unpublished sketch that the word “evoliutsiia” had recently begun being
used in the sciences when “razvitie” (“development”) sufficed (Chernyshevskii,
“prilozhenie” 981).28
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When translating Darwin’s discussions of the theory of “evolution,” Kovalevskii invariably used
“razvitie” (“development”) (Darvin,Chelovek 15; 44; 142; 149; 151; 153) (1874). However, he would use
“usovershenstvovanie” (“improvement” or “perfection”) for the phenomenon itself (Darvin, Chelovek VII;
137)(1874).
25 Due to problems with the censor, Kovalevskii was forced to publish his translation under the
physiologist Ivan Sechenov’s name.
26 “Дарвин первый указал на ближайшие причины, на те более общие законы природы, которые
имеют результатом поступательное развитие, прогресс, или эволюцию органического мира” (230)
27 This was the same year that Huxley wrote his encyclopedia entry. See: “Evolution in Biology” in
Encyclopedia Britannica (1878).
28 Chernyshevskii wrote: “Термин ‘эволюция’ вошел в употребление на памяти людей, которые
теперь уже старики, но еще не самые старые из стариков: лет пятьдесят тому назад он был
неупотребителен. Из этого учения пристрастившиеся к нему заключают, что понятие, обозначаемое
им, имеет совершенную новизну и произвело переворот в науке своим применением к разъяснению
фактов. На самом деле это не совсем так. То понятие, которое выражается ныне словом эволюция,
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Usage of “Evoliutsiia” Standardized. - By the 1890s, usage of “evoliutsiia” had
become increasingly widespread. Because Darwin had died in 1882 and had not had a
major work published since The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals had
appeared in 1872, the renewed discussion of evolution in Russia cannot be attributed to
the publication of new work of Darwin’s. Rather, it was the retranslation of Darwin’s
Origin together with translations of other Darwinist works that helped “evoliutsiia” to
gain a wider currency in Russia. For example, in 1893, Timiriazev published his
translation of T. H. Huxley’s “Evolution and Ethics” (“Evoliutsiia i etika”), which was
followed by the 1896 joint translation of the Origin that he undertook with the zoologist
and fellow Darwinist Mikhail Menzbir, who would, in turn, translate Alfred Russell
Wallace’s Darwinism (1889) in 1898. They both used “evoliutsiia” in their translations,
though in different ways.29
In his translation of T. H. Huxley’s Romanes lecture titled “Evolution and
Ethics,” published in Russian Thought (Russkaia mysl’), Timiriazev’s usage of the words
“evoliutsiia” and “evoliutsionnyi” (“evolutionary”) was not confined to the process of
evolution (Gioksli, 109; 110; 112; 114; 117; 125) or the theory of evolution (Gioksli,
112; 116; 120; 123; 125; 128). He also used these terms to denote the biological
evolution of a particular trait or adaptation, namely, of the “aesthetic sense” (Gioksli
125), as well as what Huxley contended was the cultural evolution of society (Gioksli
126) and of ethics (Gioksli 125).

было давно привычно мыслителям прежних поколений и новизна состоит только в том, что
прежний термин, выражавший это понятие, отброшен, заменен другим” (Чернышевский,
“Приложение” 981).
29 Darwin’s The Descent of Man was retranslated in 1891 by G. Blagosvetlov. He also used “evoliutsiia”
(Darvin, Chelovek 219) (1891).
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Three years later, in their translation of the Origin Timiriazev and Menzbir used
“evoliutsiia” invariably to refer to both the theory and process of evolution (Darvin,
Proiskhozhdenie 157-158; 168; 218; 479). But because Darwin, unlike Huxley, did not
write about the particular evolutionary path that an adaptation took, there was no
occasion for either translator to write about the evolution of anything.30
Finally, in his translation of Alfred Russell Wallace’s Darwinism (1889), Menzbir
invariably used “evoliutsiia” for Wallace’s discussions of the theory of evolution (Uolles
117; 168; 512; 569; 570; 577; 578; 593; 616); and he used it for the most part when
Wallace referred to the process of evolution (Uolles 2; 184; 578; 583; 597). There were,
however, some regular exceptions. For example, whenever the emphasis of Wallace’s
discussion was on the discrete steps of evolution, Menzbir translated “evolution” as
“evoliutsiia” (Uolles 616; 727), whereas whenever Wallace emphasized the continuity
between these steps, Menzbir translated “evolution” as “razvitie” (“development”)
(Uolles 603). Ultimately, Menzbir did not use “evoliutsiia” for as wide a range of
contexts as Wallace had, and despite the substantial overlap between Wallace’s and
Menzbir’s usage, when Wallace described, for example, the “evolution” of physical
conditions, Menzbir translated “evolution” as “smena” (“shift” or “change”) (Uolles

30

Although Darwin used the word “evolved” repeatedly in the sixth edition of the Origin, Timiriazev
rendered the word “evolved” variously in Russian. When Darwin spoke of the stage of evolution of a
particular organ, Timiriazev used “razvivat’sia,” (“to develop”) (Darvin 150); when Darwin wrote about
the fact that species often evolve gradually, Timiriazev used “obrazovat’sia” (“to form”) (Darvin 158)
once, though on the following page he used “izmeniat’sia” (“to change”) (Darvin 159) for a nearly identical
phrase. For the book’s very last word, Timiriazev broke with the tradition Rachinskii had set and used
“voznikat’ ” (“to arise”)(Darvin 327) to convey Darwin’s rhapsody about the ongoing evolution of various
forms.
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647). Thus, for Menzbir the word “evolution” did not apply to describe non-organismic,
environmental changes.31
Following the publication of works such as these, scientists including Mechnikov
and the botanist Andrei Famintsyn (1835-1918) switched to using “evoliutsiia”
(Mechnikov, “Prazdnestvo” 225-227; Famintsyn, “Simbioz” 1). By the 1930s, usage of
“evoliutsiia” was universal among the leading evolutionary biologists and geneticists of
the day including: Iurii Filipchenko, 32 Nikolai Dubinin, 33 Sergei Chetverikov, 34
Aleksandr Serebrovskii,35 Lev Berg,36 Aleksei Severtsov,37 and Georgii Gauze.38 It had
even come to be used in non-biological contexts, just as “razvitie” (“development”) had

31

“Этот сознательный выбор, пользующийся преимуществами последовательной смены
физических условий, и может считаться производителем способнейшего, тогда как естественный
подбор представляет собой тот трибунал, суду которого подвергаются все результаты ускоренного
роста” (Уоллес 647).
32 See, for example, Iurii Filipchenko, Izmenchivost’ i evoliutsiia (1915): “раз простые вариации
оказываются неподходящим материалом для объяснения хода эволюционного процесса, мы должны
теперь обратиться к двум другим типам индивидуальной изменчивости – к мутациям и
комбинациям”(Филипченко 72).
33 See, for example, Nikolai Dubinin, “Genetiko-avtomaticheskie protsessy i ikh znachenie dlia
mekhanizma organicheskoi evoliutsii” about “[эволюционный процесс]” (Дубинин 463), “механизм
органической эволюции” (Дубинин 463), “[эволюция] организмов” (Дубинин 465).
34 See, for example, Sergei Chetverikov’s seminal article “O nekotorykh momentakh evoliutsionnogo
protsessa s tochki zreniia sovremennoi genetiki”: “Настоящая статья и задается целью выяснить
некоторые вопросы эволюционного учения в связи с нашими современными генетическими
понятиями” (Четвериков 171).
35 See, for example, Aleksandr Serebrovskii, “Sovremennoe sostoianie teorii mutatsii”: “Не менее
интересно и отрицательное его решение, так как при намечающемся разочаровании в представлении
о постепенном ходе эволюции” (Серебровский 1254).
36 See, for example, Lev Berg, Nomogenez, ili evoliutsiia na osnove zakonomernostei: “Процесс
эволюции состоит сплошь в образовании новых признаков” (Берг 81).
37 See, for example, Aleksei Severtsov, Etiudy po teorii evoliutsii: individual’noe razvitie i evoliutsiia:
“основным тезисом эволюционной теории является положение, что современные нам животные…
произошли путем ряда постепенных и закономерных изменений от иначе и в общем более просто
организованных предков, живших в прежние геологические эпохи” (Северцов 2).
38 See, for example, Georgii Gauze, “Problema stabiliziruiushchego otbora”: “В ту эпоху, когда
производились эти наблюдения, считалось само собой разумеющимся, что морфозы или
модификации с течением времени превращаются в наследственные различия и что искусственное
создание модификаций является тем самым экспериментальным воспроизведением эволюционного
процесса” (Гаузе 193).
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before. For example, in 1907 the novelist Andrei Belyi described the “technical evolution
of art” (“tekhnicheskaia evoliutsiia iskusstva”) (Belyi 451).
Conclusion. – Unlike the changing translation of “natural selection” in Russian,39
the fact that “evoliutsiia” superseded all other alternative terms as the standard term for
“evolution” was not a matter of linguistic accuracy. Just as “transmutation” could just as
easily have been used to mean “evolution” in English, so “razvitie” (“development”) or
“izmenenie vidov” (“change of species”) could have been used in place of “evoliutsiia.”
The introduction of “evoliutsiia” did, however, not only help to differentiate between
embryological and transmutational development, just as the German evolutionary
biologist Ernst Haeckel had done by introducing the terminological distinction between
ontogeny and phylogeny. It also enabled evolutionary biologists to discuss the evolution
of individual parts of an organism – traits--whereas earlier phrases meaning “evolution”
such as “izmenenie vidov” were used specifically to mean speciation.40
The history of the Russian loan word “evoliutsiia” thus stands in stark contrast to
that of its English counterpart. For although both had been used prior to the appearance of
Darwin’s theory, in non-biological contexts, the semantic shift that caused the word to
39

For more on the history of the translation of natural selection, see, Brendan Mooney’s “Pobeda Klimenta
Timiriazeva kak perevodchika Darvina.”
40 The explanation for how usage of “evoliutsiia” came to be standardized rests, instead, on the material
dissemination of the works that standardized it. For not only did Timiriazev’s group translation have
substantial print-runs –his first edition in 1896 ran 8,000 copies (Vavilov 598) as opposed to Rachinskii’s
third edition published in 1872 with a print run of 1,200 copies – but it would also ultimately be the only
text to serve as a foundation for later revised editions of the Origin in Russian (Konashev 163). New
editions of Timiriazev’s translation appeared in 1898, with a print run of 5,000 (Vavilov 599) and again in
1907 (Guskova 10). Following Timiriazev’s death in 1920, the evolutionary biologist Nikolai Vavilov
assumed stewardship of Timiriazev’s translation and reprinted it in 1935, with a print-run of 35,000 and
again in 1937, with a print-run of 30,000 (Guskova 11). Usage of “evoliutsiia” was also further reinforced
by textbooks because, for example, two of the three leading biology textbooks published between 1905 and
1909 used “evoliutsiia.”40 Thus, it was owing to the translation and retranslation of Darwinist works in the
1890s that promulgated usage of “evoliutsiia” in Russia and thereby set a precedent for usage in textbooks
and by future scientists, ensuring its continued popularity.

31

acquire a biological and specifically transmutational meaning in Russian was a result of
not Spencer’s but Darwinist works including Darwin’s own sixth edition of the Origin,
that popularized, standardized, and spread the word “evoliutsiia” in Russia.
Today “evolution” denotes a change in allele (alternative forms of a gene)
frequencies in a population from one generation to the next or, to use Darwin’s own
terminology, a change in the proportion of small heritable variations in a population from
one generation to the next. “Evolution” thus no longer entails speciation. Such small
heritable variations did not in themselves concern Strakhov, Tolstoy, or Solovyov, but
rather what the moral implications of the sustained accumulation of such variations were
for humans. The history of the term “evolution” therefore highlights the fact that their
concerns were historically attuned to the science of the time.
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CHAPTER TWO
NIKOLAI STRAKHOV: ORGANICISM AND ANTI-DARWINISM
Introduction
As a subject of historical study, Nikolai Nikolaevich Strakhov (1828-1896) has
traditionally been viewed both as a figure devoid of independent importance, whose life
takes on historical value only in relation to his friendships with the literary geniuses Lev
Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky (Gerstein 179; 37) and as an outlier for the beliefs he
held that failed to dovetail with those typical of the conservative, Slavophile circles he
frequented (Gerstein x-xi). First and foremost, Strakhov is known for the work he did as a
journalist. In his essays he concerned himself with mostly spiritual and philosophical
questions, though, unlike his fellow Slavophiles,41 who were unequivocally Christians,
Strakhov carried out his quest for spiritual fulfillment chiefly in developing his own
personal philosophy of holism.
But in the history of science in Russia, and in the Russian reception of Darwinism
in particular, Strakhov’s independent significance is undeniable. For a Slavophile,
Strakhov was uncharacteristically knowledgeable of Western science because before
working as a journalist, he had, in fact, received training in zoology (Rogers,
“Opposition” 498). Thus, as it turned out that Darwinism was promulgated primarily on

41

Though the term was initially used as a pejorative, it came to denote, as the Polish historian Andrzej
Walicki has noted, “a group of ideologists belonging to the conservative nobility, whose outlook became
formed in the late 1830’s in opposition to the trend known as ‘Westernism.’ Moreover, Slavophilism
denoted in this case not so much a feeling of solidarity with brother Slavs as a cultivation of the native and
primarily Slavic elements in the social life and culture of ancient Russia” (Walicki 92).
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the pages of the “thick” literary and sociopolitical journals, Strakhov found himself
ideally situated to take part in the ensuing polemics. These journals, therefore, present a
window into Strakhov’s apparent transformation from a Darwinist in the 1860’s to a
leading anti-Darwinist by the 1870’s, a transformation brought about by Strakhov’s
changing understanding of the role of teleology and progress in Darwin’s theory of
natural selection. The goal of this chapter is to fill in a gap in the scholarship on
Strakhov’s science-related writings by providing the first comprehensive history of
Strakhov’s writings on Darwin’s theory and a fuller account of his transformation. In
particular, I will examine the role that Strakhov’s anthropocentrism played in determining
which parts of Darwinism he could wholeheartedly accept.
1828-1859: Strakhov’s formative years
Nikolai Strakhov was born in 1828 in the provincial Ukrainian town of Belgorod,
near Kharkiv. His mother hailed from Ukraine’s petty gentry, while his father worked as
a clergyman and lecturer at the local seminary (Nikol’skii 215). Strakhov trained briefly
as a mathematician at Saint Petersburg University, but within a year transferred for
financial reasons to the Chief Pedagogical Institute, where he could receive an education
at the state’s expense in exchange for ten years of service as a teacher after graduation
(Gerstein 9).42 He completed his course of study in 1851, whereupon he spent a year in
Odessa teaching physics and mathematics at a gymnasium before being transferred to
Saint Petersburg to teach natural history for the remainder of his service (Nikol’skii 234235).
42

There is a discrepancy in the reported duration of obligatory service, but the error appears to be
Nikol’skii’s. Although he wrote that it lasted eight years (Nikol’skii 234), on the following page he cites an
autobiographical sketch of Strakhov that is now lost, in which Strakhov wrote “After ten years of service, I
not only served out the whole term for a state education, but also upon resignation received a year’s salary
of 630 rubles” (Nikol’skii 235)
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In Saint Petersburg Strakhov eventually began graduate work in zoology
(Gerstein 10), receiving a master’s degree in 1857 after completing his thesis on
mammalian carpal bones. In his thesis “On the Wrist Bones in Mammals” (“O kostiakh
zapiast’ia mlekopitaiushchikh”) he demonstrates a familiarity with recent scientific
developments in Western Europe, as well as his knowledge of an array of scientific
authorities including the French comparative anatomist Georges Cuvier, the English
comparative anatomist Richard Owen, the German physiologist Johann Blumenbach, the
Dutch zoologist Jan van der Hoeven, the French anatomist Henri Blainville, and the
German anatomist Johann Meckel, the Younger.
And yet, as rumor has it, Strakhov bungled the oral defense of his thesis and was,
as a result, unable to obtain the position he sought as a university chair in either Moscow
or Saint Petersburg. He managed to secure work at the Journal of the Ministry of Public
Education, where, to supplement the income he received from teaching, he started
writing the journal’s monthly science column (Gerstein 15). Thus began what would be
an abiding career in journalism.43
1860: Introducing Russians to Darwin
Given Strakhov’s relatively modest scientific credentials, it may come as a
surprise that he is the one who brought word of Darwin’s Origin to Russia. In England,
Darwin’s friend, the eminent geologist Charles Lyell (1797-1875) had played that role.
Lyell gave a public lecture to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in
September of 1859, two months prior to the publication of Origin, in which he announced
Darwin’s forthcoming book and declared his support for Darwin’s ideas (Browne 80).
43

For more information concerning Strakhov’s biography, see: Gerstein, Linda. Nikolai Strakhov.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1971.
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For, as Lyell remarked, it appeared to him that Darwin had “succeeded, by his
investigations and reasonings, in throwing a flood of light on many classes of phenomena
connected with the affinities, geographical distribution, and geological succession of
organic beings, for which no other hypothesis has been able, or has even attempted, to
account” (Lyell 95). Unsurprisingly, in a lecture titled “On the Occurrence of Works of
Human Art in Post-Pliocene Deposits,” the details that Lyell could legitimately provide
about Darwin’s book were scant. No mention was made of Darwin’s proposed
mechanism of evolutionary change.
On the Origin of Species was published in late November of 1859, a full two
months before Strakhov would publish the Russian translation he made and annotated of
Lyell’s English-language report in January 1860, a publication that Strakhov called “the
Appearance of Man on Earth” (“Poiavlevnie cheloveka na zemle”). Nevertheless, he
could not provide any more details than Lyell had four months before, because Strakhov
had not read the Origin yet. In fact, it appears that Strakhov may have read the Origin for
the first time in 1862, as it was the publication of the French edition in the summer of
1862 that led Strakhov to write his first detailed exposition of Darwin’s work, “Bad
Signs.”
Strakhov began his commentary in “the Appearance of Man on Earth” by noting,
“These words, belonging to a naturalist of such authority as Lyell, and the anticipated
work of such a scientist as Darwin, have the greatest importance” (my italics) (6).44 And,
indeed, the title Strakhov chose for his article “The Appearance of Man on Earth”
certainly captured the focus of Lyell’s report, but as Strakhov’s commentary makes clear,
44

What Strakhov knew of Darwin’s scientific reputation and how he learned of it is unclear.
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he was, in fact, primarily interested in Darwin and what had become known in the
English-speaking world as “that mystery of mysteries”: the origin of species (Darwin,
Origin 1). Thus, he sketched for his readers the break that Darwin’s work was making
with the contemporary discourse on speciation, one that was largely and had long been
dominated by anti-transformism:
Actually, until now the popular, typical views of naturalists have been against the
theory of the transformation of species. Cuvier’s authority was a support for this
contradiction. Strict empiricists, people who don’t leave the bounds of the facts
given to them, are always the most daring theoreticians. Beyond the facts they are
prepared to accept anything, prepared to imagine the greatest marvels. The fixity
of species was one such marvel. (6-7)45
In other words, Strakhov attributed, not without a hint of irony, the enduring place
of anti-transformism to naturalists, who in their adherence to a strict empiricism, had
failed to show the same restraint in formulating theories as they had in gathering facts.
One such empiricist was the German paleontologist H.G. Bronn, who had recently
received an award from the French Academy of the Science for his submission to its
prestigious essay competition (6-7).46 After quoting part of Bronn’s submission at length,
Strakhov added that he was unable to see why the “completely unknown force” that
Bronn postulated was “incompatible with the transformation of species, with the theory
Darwin adopted. It is generally obvious that Bronn is in this instance abusing the
45

All unattributed translations of Strakhov are my own.
Bronn would later become Darwin’s first German translator. For more information on Bronn, see, for
example: Gliboff, Sander. H.G. Bronn, Ernst Haeckel, and the Origins of German Darwinism. Cambridge,
MA and London: MIT Press, 2008.
46
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scientific word force. After noticing some phenomenon, we still do not have the right to
now presume that it is the product of some special force” (8).
Strakhov then likened the force that Bronn hypothesized to vital force, which
Strakhov concluded, as he had in his master’s thesis, was an inadmissible hypothesis
(Strakhov, “Wrist Bones” 8-9). To Strakhov, this force seemed no solution at all, but
rather a way to avoid answering the question. He preferred, instead, what he took to be
Darwin’s method, a kind of epistemological reductionism. “According to Darwin,” he
wrote, “the transformation [of species] takes place by the same forces that are at work
now. This here is an explanation, namely the subsuming of certain phenomena under
other more well-known ones” (8). That is, Strakhov praised Darwin for the method he
used - extrapolating that species are produced by the same forces as varieties are, rather
than postulating some special force to explain the origin of species. Admittedly, his
impression of Darwin lacked substance, as he knew only what little Lyell had said in his
report. According to Lyell, Darwin had come to the conclusion that “those powers of
nature which give rise to races and permanent varieties in animals and plants, are the
same as those which, in much longer periods, produce species, and, in a still longer series
of ages, give rise to differences of generic rank” (Lyell 95). Thus, it comes as no surprise
that in the years to come Darwin would be the subject of criticism like that made of
Bronn.
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1862: Strakhov’s Encounter with Darwin’s Theory and a Case of Mistaken
Identity
By the time Strakhov wrote about Darwin’s theory again, in November of 1862,
he appears to have read the Origin. He had begun working at the Dostoevsky brothers’
new journal Time (Vremia), a short-lived Slavophile publication. As its editorial board
had declared in its advance notice, the goal of their ideological program was to bring
about a reconciliation between the Russian peasantry and the educated classes, as they
had, since the time of Peter the Great, become overly Westernized and lost touch with
their native soil (“pochva”) (Biografiia 177-180).
The article Strakhov published in Time was his most substantial treatment of
Darwinian theory yet and thus serves as a point of comparison for his conversion to antiDarwinism. He called this next article “Bad Signs” (“Durnye priznaki”). It is worth
noting that the praise he expressed for Darwin no longer went without qualification, as it
had when his knowledge of Darwin was based solely on Lyell’s report. Indeed, as the late
historian of science Alexander Vucinich points out, Strakhov acknowledged that
“Darwin's theory did not answer all the intricate questions of biological evolution, [but] it
was built on sound foundations” (Vucinich 19-20). But the title Strakhov gave his article,
together with the titles of the English, German, and French editions of the Origin that he
listed at the top of the page, was a misnomer, because overall his review of Darwin was
favorable. In fact, Strakhov’s brief exposition of the Origin apparently showed him to be
an exceptionally orthodox Darwinian.47

47

Even the English comparative anatomist Thomas Henry Huxley and the English co-founder of natural
selection Alfred Russell Wallace – both friends of Darwin and ardent, self-styled Darwinians – did not hold
as orthodoxly Darwinian views as Strakhov apparently did. As Michael Ruse wrote of his disappointing
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Strakhov described Darwin’s book as a “great revolution,” noting that Darwin had
dealt the final blow to the “the metaphysical view of fixity of things” (Strakhov, “Bad
Signs,” 165) that had persisted for so long in the natural sciences. 48 In particular,
Strakhov called attention to the fact that Darwin had untethered the natural sciences from
the essentialist species concept, writing:
In his book Darwin gathered a multitude of facts proving the mutability of
species. With time we hope to speak more on this subject; for now we will limit
ourselves to just the results. Darwin found that species pass from one into another,
that they gradually grow out of one form into another. Thus, from the descendants
of one and the same plant, in various localities, under various conditions, over a
long succession of generations, there may arise a few different plants. Various
species of plants and animals arose gradually as a result of just such a divergence
of one form into a several new ones. Organisms never produce their like in the
exact sense of the word: children always differ from their parents, nor are they
entirely similar to each other. It is from the gradual accumulation of these

attempt to characterize the word “Darwinian” in his seminal book The Darwinian Revolution: “Different
people believe very different things, and the same people believe different things at different times – and
yet rally under the same banner… In the end, I had to be satisfied with some mushy sociological notion. A
‘Darwinian’ was someone who thought of himself as a Darwinian, or some such thing” (Ruse, “Punctuated
Equilibria” 120). Thus, Strakhov, though he did not call himself a “Darwinian” per se, did appear to accept
Darwin’s theory in its entirety.
48

Strakhov’s transformation into an anti-Darwinian is often explained by an appeal to his allegedly longstanding metaphysical beliefs, but, as we see here, Strakhov, in fact, praises Darwin for removing a
metaphysical view from the sciences. See Vucinich, for example, “Strakhov greeted Darwin's theory as a
strong addition to science and a modern world view. Darwin, in his opinion, made two revolutionary
contributions to biology and the modern world outlook: he made biology a solid science based on a
historical view of nature, and he brought an end to the reign of the metaphysical view of organic nature”
(Vucinich 19-20); also, see E. A. Antonov: “Strakhov was in complete agreement with Darwin in his fight
against the metaphysical conception of the fixity of species” (Antonov, “Otsenka” 47).
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differences over the course of many generations that all of the diversity of the
animal and plant kingdoms arose. (Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 166)
Although he offered nothing but praise for Darwin for having established the
mutability of species, Strakhov considered Darwin’s true contribution to be his discovery
of one of the mechanisms of evolutionary change, or, what Strakhov then called “the
theory of the transformation of species” (“pererozhdenie vidov”). “It takes on its full
weight with Darwin only because he succeeded in finding the properties of one of the
laws by which the change of species occurs. The law that he found is called the law of
natural selection or of vital competition” (my italics)(Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 166).
Strakhov thus appears to have accepted the five most central components of
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, as laid out in the introduction. That is,
Strakhov accepted the following aspects of Darwin’s theory: evolution as such, evolution
by common descent, the gradualness of evolution, the multiplication of species, and,
finally, natural selection.
Evolutionary Progress and Evolutionary Ethics
Darwin and Strakhov also shared a belief in evolutionary progress and for both of them
this notion was inextricably tied to human evolution. Admittedly, Darwin had, to all
appearances, left the subject of human evolution virtually untouched in the Origin, saying
only “light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” (Darwin, Origin 488).
But as Michael Ruse has noted, by the time he was writing the Origin, Darwin was
struggling to “preserve–or, rather, strengthen–the notion of advance, while at the same
time stressing even more the tree-like nature of his evolutionary thought,” and ultimately,
he offered “what we might call relative or comparative progress” (Ruse, Monad 151). As

41

a result, Darwin ended up making an implied, unsubstantiated argument in the Origin that
humans represented absolute evolutionary progress (Ruse, Monad 152).49 Unlike Darwin,
though, Strakhov, for some reason, showed no such hesitation on the question of
evolutionary progress in humans, writing:
For our progress and development we acted of course no worse than the plants
and animals. We reproduced enough and constantly led a bitter struggle not only
for the means of existence, but even for other benefits. If one looks at the matter a
little more attentively, then one will easily be convinced that this struggle was for
us even more severe, diverse, and complex than it can be for the animals and
plants. We were always subjected to the greatest struggle for existence and the
law of natural selection constantly found the fullest application. The strong
crushed the weak, the rich the poor, and the greatest benefit was derivable from
the slightest advantage in this battle, a benefit that it alone could receive. Victims
perished by the many. People for whom there was no place at the feast of life, one
way or another ought to have quit the field of battle. Thus, the victors of life and
the beneficiaries always remained the naturally selected (elected) and the progress
made in improving the human race proceeded quickly and unceasingly. (Strakhov,
“Bad Signs” 170)
It is worth noting, though, that when he spoke of Darwin’s theory, the language
Strakhov used was not quite the same as Darwin’s. Strakhov called “natural selection”
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As Peter J. Bowler has written, “Many modern scientists are reluctant to concede that Darwin was a
progressionist, because they themselves reject the concept of progress as being too value laden, and there is
a temptation to assume that the founder of the movement shared our own perception of the theory…Most
historians now accept that Darwin cannot be seen as a nonprogressionist in the modern sense” (Bowler,
Evolution 146).
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the “law of natural selection” (“zakon estestvennogo izbraniia”), and he called the
struggle for existence the “law of vital competition” (“zakon zhizennoi konkurentsii”)
(Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 166). Certainly, Strakhov’s rendering of “natural selection” is
not an unreasonable translation. But his translation of “the struggle for existence” is less
effective; indeed, when the first Russian edition of the Origin was published in 1864, the
official translation of “the struggle for existence” was a literal rendering: “bor’ba za
sushchestvovanie” (Darvin, Proiskhozhdenie 49). Hence, Strakhov was probably
translating not from the English original, but directly from Clémence Royer’s June 1862
French translation of the Origin. Royer had translated “natural selection” as “élection
naturelle” (natural election) and “the struggle for existence” as “concurrence vitale” (vital
competition) (Darwin, De l’Origine LI; 114). Furthermore, she frequently referred to
natural selection as a law (Darwin, De l’Origine LI; 116). Strakhov, therefore, appears to
have made quite literal translations of Darwin’s terminology from the first French edition
of the Origin.50
Darwin, however, was not satisfied with Royer’s translation of the Origin, and for
that reason, he worked with her to make improvements in the second edition of her
translation. In particular, Darwin was frustrated by her translation of the subtitle of the
Origin: “by the means of natural selection or the preservation of favoured races in the
struggle for life” (Harvey 76). In the first French edition, Royer had rendered it: “or on
the laws of progress in organisms” (“ou des lois du progress chez les êtres organisés”).
But Royer had not only taken liberties in her translation of the work’s subtitle, in fact, she
50

It is worth noting that the “ principle of natural selection” had, in fact, already been translated as the
“law of natural election” (“zakon estestvennogo izbraniia”) (828) in an anonymous review article
“estestvennoe izbranie (natural selection) v chelovecheskikh porodakh” (1860) in The Herald of the
Natural Sciences (Vestnik estestvennykh nauk), published nearly two years before the publication of
Royer’s translation, though no mention was made of the struggle for existence.
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also made it clear that she had no reservations about the subjects of human evolution and
evolutionary progress and spent nearly fifty pages in her preface detailing what she
believed to be the social implications of Darwinism. Hence, given the fact that Darwin
had shied away from writing about the topic of evolutionary progress, it was likely
Royer’s preface that led Strakhov to write about it so overtly.
Darwin and Strakhov were also both alarmed by Royer’s introduction, albeit for
different reasons. Darwin was concerned about how Royer had removed the
qualifications Darwin had made about the confidence he had in certain claims (Harvey
68), whereas Strakhov was most disturbed by her evolutionary ethicizing and for that
reason he decided to write “Bad Signs,” devoting the second half of his article to
dissecting Royer’s social theory rather than Darwin’s own work. Because of this
statement, Strakhov is generally considered to be the first Russian to protest what would
come to be known as “Social Darwinism” (Gerstein 156; Rogers, “Opposition” 498-499;
Todes 40; Snetova, “uchenie” 46; Antonov, “Otsenka” 46-47; Vucinich 19-20).51
Strakhov did not object to Royer’s evolutionary ethics because he believed that
humans were not animals or that they were not subject to natural selection. As noted
above, Strakhov did consider man superior to the plants and other animals (Strakhov,
“Bad Signs” 170). But he did not believe man to be exempt from the workings of natural
51

Linda Gerstein was the first to contend that Strakhov was the first Russian to protest Social Darwinism
avant la lettre, in her biography Nikolai Strakhov (1971). More recently, Nina V. Snetova has speculated
that Strakhov may, in fact, have been the first in the world to protest Social Darwinism (Snetova, Filisofiia
186). Both of their claims remain uncertain, however, as they depend on what is meant by “Social
Darwinism” and whether Royer was actually a Social Darwinist, a point on which Royer scholars are
divided. See Joy Harvey’s “Afterword: Clémence Royer and Her Biographers”“Almost a Man of Genius”:
Clémence Royer, Feminism, and Nineteenth-Century Science (1998) for a review of the literature. As
Harvey notes there, it was, in fact, Royer’s belief in Lamarckian evolution that drew her to Darwin’s work
in the first place, but she was also influenced by the social evolutionist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).
Hence, the fact that Royer’s belief in a perfecting drive in evolution can be found throughout her preface
and commentary in the translation makes her status as a social evolutionist or evolutionary ethicist, as
opposed to a social Darwinist, uncontroversial.
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selection. In fact, he went so far as to claim that the struggle for existence was greatest
among humans and had thereby resulted in a degree of evolutionary progress in humans
that was proportionate to the intensity of the struggle for existence that had occasioned it.
Rather, what Strakhov objected to most in Royer’s introduction was that she
appealed to Darwin’s theory of evolution to form a basis for a naturalistic ethics.
Strakhov contended, to the contrary, that humans knowingly set for themselves “another
law, another norm, another ideal than the laws and ideals that nature follows. We knew
that we were breaking with nature and frequently complained about its resistance because
it was not easy to overcome” (Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 170). To all appearances a
committed Darwinian, Strakhov accepted that man was the product of evolution. He may
even have been able to accept that human behavior could be explained by nature. But he
could not accept Royer’s ethical program advocating that humans should follow nature’s
example (Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 172). Rather, he believed that there were limits to what
science can do (Gerstein 155-56; Rogers, “Opposition” 498-499; Todes 40): “in the
present case Mademoiselle Royer attributes to Darwin's theory much greater importance
and knowledge than it actually has” (Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 171).52 And in so doing, by
contending that humans deliberately do not follow the ethical example set by nature,
Strakhov drew an important ethical distinction: simply because a behavior is naturally
occurring, it is not therefore necessarily a good behavior.
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Royer would later argue that she herself did not advocate such a program, but was only illustrating
possible implications of Darwin’s theory (Harvey 78); nevertheless, Gerstein, Rogers, and Todes agree that
Strakhov did not think that formulating ethical prescriptions was within the purview of scientific
knowledge (Gerstein 155-156; Rogers, “Opposition” 498-499; Todes 40).
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Strakhov was certainly not the first to draw such a distinction.53 54 Darwin’s
“bulldog,” the British anatomist Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), would famously
draw the same distinction in his 1893 Romanes lecture, sounding what Michael Ruse has
labelled “a trumpet call to the dismissal of Spencerian-type evolutionary ethicizing”
(Ruse, “Introduction” xxx).55 Huxley proclaimed, “Cosmic evolution may teach us how
the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is
incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we
call evil than we had before” (my emphasis)(Huxley, Ethics 80). That is, facts about
human evolution only describe the origin of human moral sentiments; they cannot in and
of themselves justify ethical conclusions.
Strakhov finishes making this point by observing that the concept of moral
equality transcends biological traits, and is founded not on being biologically identical,
but on a universal human dignity:
Already before the appearance of Darwin's book it was noted that if one looks at
people as animals, then between them there exists much inequality. It was rightly
noted that people differ among themselves by weight, by height, by fullness, by
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For example, the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) had drawn a similar distinction in his A
Treatise of Human Nature (1738). In 1903 the English philosopher George Edward Moore (1873-1958)
would refer to the distinction Strakhov made as the “naturalistic fallacy” in his Principia Ethica (1903).
Such interpretations of Hume and Moore are standard; however, they remain the subject of controversy.
See, for example, Max Black’s “The Gap Between ‘Is’ and ‘Should’” in The Philosophical Review, Vol.
73, No. 2 (April, 1964): 165-181.
54 Whether Strakhov was, in fact, familiar with Hume’s work at the time of his writing “Bad Signs” is
uncertain. Much of the journalistic writing Strakhov did at this time, which was collected and published in
The World as a Whole (1872), indicated a general familiarity with philosophers ranging from Plato,
Aristotle to Locke, Descartes, and Hegel. Thus, it is likely that he knew of Hume, but the earliest mention
that I have found of Hume in Strakhov’s writings, attesting to such familiarity appears in the late 1872 in
the preface Strakhov wrote to his translation of the French historian Hippolyte Taine’s De l’Intelligence
(1870) titled “On the purely-empirical method” (“O chisto-empiricheskom metode”).
55 As John van Wyhe recently showed in “Why there was no ‘Darwin’s Bulldog,’” Huxley’s nickname did
not gain currency until after Huxley’s death.
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leanness, by muscular strength, by skin color, by a greater or lesser keenness of
the senses and even by a greater or lesser intelligence. If the idea of the equality
of people existed despite these and other, even more important differences, then
this equality was recognized by no means in a zoological sense, but from the point
of view of something completely special, strange, mysterious, secret: people think
that they are equal precisely as people, and not as animals. This mark of human
dignity belongs to everyone alike, a sign seemingly elusive, immeasurable and not
definable by any clear properties. It was, however, so important, so great and
essential in people's eyes that it concealed all of the obvious differences that
separate the most ignorant of negroes from the most educated of Europeans.
(Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 171)
Strakhov ended his article by drawing his readers’ attention to the national origin
of Royer’s evolutionary ethics, to a “curious fact of Western-European education”
(Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 172). For him evolutionary ethics was a European phenomenon.
It was likely that Strakhov had, for that reason, come to title his article “Bad Signs,” for it
was just such visions of ethical naturalism that Strakhov believed to be indicative of a
civilization in decline (Strakhov, “Bad Signs” 172) or what the Russian historian Nina
Snetova has called “a crisis of humanism in Western society” (Snetova, “uchenie” 45).
Thus, given the fact that Strakhov had decided to write “Bad Signs” only after the
publication of the French edition of the Origin, the article appears to be at least as much a
review of Royer’s evolutionary ethicizing introduction as it was of the Origin.
However, the fact that Strakhov published the article in such a Slavophile journal
as Time makes more ideological sense, not as an exposition of Darwin’s theory, but as a
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critique of Royer’s evolutionary ethics. Indeed, her attempt to justify social stratification
based on biological criteria was anathema to Time’s pochvennichestvo (return-to-the-soil
movement), for such a program would have stymied the educated classes’ rapprochement
with the recently freed Russian peasantry.
Ironically, though, Strakhov probably would not have claimed to have accepted
Darwin’s theory to the extent that he did, had he not encountered the Origin first in
Royer’s French translation. Indeed, it is quite possible that Strakhov did not, in fact, read
the French edition of the Origin in its entirety, but read only Royer’s preface and
Darwin’s introduction, for the only quote of Darwin that Strakhov provided came from
Darwin’s introduction; otherwise, the little that Strakhov did say about Darwin’s theory
could have come from Royer’s brief discussion of it. Nevertheless, as we will see shortly,
the notion that mankind represented the height of evolutionary progress was crucial to
Strakhov’s apparent acceptance of Darwinian theory. But, again, Darwin himself had, in
fact, said little about evolutionary progress or mankind in the Origin; rather, it was Royer
who had emphasized it in both her mistranslation of the book’s subtitle and in her
preface.
Responses to “Bad Signs”
“Bad Signs” did not go unnoticed by critics. One author wrote jeeringly in the
progressive The Contemporary (Sovremennik) that Strakhov had discovered a “bad sign”
in that:
Ms. Royer not only translated Darwin’s book on the origin of organic species, but
even dared to provide her translation with a long preface and notes and to express
a few of her views. Yes, this is a bad sign; and what if Russian women were to
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start discussing the materials that occupy Mr. Strakhov, if they take it into their
heads to talk about the planets, about Hegel, to translate Kuno-Fischer, Taine, and
so on; what are people who aren’t women going to do, that is, our two honorable
friends? (“Obzor zhurnalov ” 256)
More substantive, albeit still uninformed, responses to Strakhov’s article
followed, but all the same “Bad Signs” fared poorly among critics. It drew harsh
criticism, for example, from the Russian journalist and translator Piotr Bibikov (18321875), who is most well known for his translation of Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of
Population. Bibikov responded to “Bad Signs” immediately, writing “Sentimental
Philosophy” (“Sentimental’naia filosofiia”) in December of 1862, yet the article itself
was not published until 1865 when Bibikov published a collection of articles that
previously could not be published for various reasons. He wrote in defense of Royer’s
evolutionary ethics, though it is unlikely he had actually read either Royer or Darwin.56
He labeled Strakhov’s position “sentimental philosophy” because Strakhov did not make
any scientific objections, but based them on poetry, morality, and patriotism (Bibikov
107). Such criticism was, to Bibikov, a sign of anti-intellectualism (Bibikov 112).
Further, he found the fact that Strakhov had praised Darwin while criticizing Royer
inconsistent, for, as Bibikov saw it, Royer’s conclusions followed directly from Darwin’s
theory and yet, Strakhov had not raised any objections to it (Bibikov 113).
In turn, the sociologist and political theorist Nikolai Mikhailovskii (1842-1904)
joined in and responded to “Sentimental Philosophy” in July of 1869, by writing “The
Analogical Method in the Social Sciences”(Analogicheskii metod v obshchestvennoi
56

Judging by Bibikov’s paraphrasing of Strakhov’s exposition of Darwin’s theory, together with his
reliance on Strakhov’s translations of both Royer and Darwin, it appears unlikely that Bibikov had himself
read either Darwin or Royer.
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nauke). His discussion of Bibikov’s response to Strakhov’s article made up only part of a
more general discussion of the relationship between the natural and social sciences.
Mikhailovskii appeared to side with Bibikov while admitting to having read neither
Royer’s preface nor Strakhov’s “Bad Signs.”57 Indeed, the author agreed with Bibikov’s
assessment that Royer’s conclusions did, in fact, follow from Darwin’s and that
Strakhov’s appeal to emotion was not appropriate to a scientific debate. Nevertheless,
Mikhailovskii found the emotions that drove Strakhov’s response admirable, if
unrealistic. He suggested the type of response he thought would be more effective than
expressing indignation. Using the fact that humans inevitably choke when breathing
“sulfuric acid” as a metaphor for an incontrovertible fact of nature, Mikhailovskii
recommended directing one’s indignation not at “the properties of sulfuric acid, but at the
circumstances that force people to choke in it” (Mikhailovskii 51). In just the same way,
he contended that “having acknowledged the dominance of the strong, the healthy, and
the smart as a law of nature, you start to look for the laws of cooperation, by which the
presence of the weak, the sick, and the stupid would be eliminated, that is, not by denying
the law of competition, you try to only take the ground out from under it” (Mikhailovskii
51). That is, he sought a less overtly distasteful means to achieve the same end.
Mikhailovskii concluded his article, though, apparently conceding to Strakhov: “[There]
is no morality in nature. What is moral is thus done by choice; what is natural is done by
necessity, - these are two different categories. Man must combine them for himself.
Finding them combined in nature is impossible, but if it were possible, then nature would
turn out to be deeply immoral” (Mikhailovskii 53).
57

Further, judging by the fact that he used “estestvennoe izbranie” to mean “natural selection,” which he
had gotten from Bibikov, who, in turn, had gotten it from Strakhov, it is unlikely that Mikhailovskii had
read Darwin yet, either.

50

Another response to “Bad Signs” came from a young Il’ia Mechnikov who wrote
“A Few Words about the Contemporary Theory of the Origin of Species” (“Neskol’ko
slov o sovremennoi teorii proiskhozhdeniia vidov”) for Time. In reality, though, “Bad
Signs” had served as only a pretext for Mechnikov to write about Darwin’s theory; he
made no mention of Royer (Mechnikov, “Theory” 193).58
1864-1865: Humans, Organicism, and Education
In addition to being the most substantial article that Strakhov would write as a
Darwinian, “Bad Signs” was where Strakhov staked out some of the themes that he
would revisit in the years to come. He took up writing about Darwin’s theory again in
1864, but after 1865 did not write in detail on the subject again for the remainder of the
decade. During that period from 1864 to 1865, Strakhov brought up Darwin’s theory in
four articles that were eventually republished in his first two books. But these were not
articles about Darwinian theory per se: Strakhov touched on Darwin’s theory only
tangentially. These articles stand out all the more because they came at a time that
Darwin’s theory was, at last, becoming a topic of discussion for a wider audience. 1864
saw an influx of Russian translations of scientific works. Foremost among them was the
first Russian translation of the Origin; works popularizing Darwin’s theory quickly
followed. For example, a young Timiriazev (1843-1920) published a series of such
popularizations including a couple of articles titled “Darwin’s Book: its Critics and
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Time would never get a chance to publish Mechnikov’s article because following the publication of
Strakhov’s political article “A Fatal Question,” the government closed the journal down for good. As
punishment, the censors forbade Strakhov to put his name on the editorial board of any journal. Strakhov’s
career would be, as a result, marred by uncertainty for years to come. By 1864, Strakhov was working with
the Dostoevsky brothers again, this time at Time’s successor journal Epoch (Epokha). But the new journal
would close in early 1865, proving to be even more short-lived than its predecessor. Strakhov would begin
work as the unofficial editor-in-chief at Notes from the Fatherland (Otechestvennie zapiski) before the end
of the year.
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Commentators” (Kniga Darvina, ee kritiki kommentatory) (1864) and a book titled A
Brief Outline of Darwin’s Theory (Kratkii ocherk teorii Darvina) (1865). This was the
beginning of a career as Russia’s leading defender of Darwinism that would culminate in
a lengthy written polemic with an anti-Darwinian Strakhov in the late 1880’s. But it was
not until sometime after this period from 1864 to 1865 that Strakhov began to reevaluate
Darwin’s theory.
In one 1864 essay “Where to Look for a Solution?” (“Gde iskat’ resheniia?”),
Strakhov briefly analyzed the issue of the relationship between what he called the
“question of man” (vopros o cheloveke)59 and the natural sciences, and whether they
were competent, as it were, to answer such a weighty question. But this time it was
Huxley who inspired Strakhov’s article. Huxley was gradually becoming a subject of
public discussion at the time. His name frequently appeared alongside Darwin’s (Zaitsev
16; Pisarev 38, 42; Antonovich 103-105) and Huxley’s book Evidence as to Man’s Place
in Nature (1863) had appeared in two different translations in 1864.60 Darwin’s name,
however, came up only in passing, as Strakhov noted the part that Darwin’s theory had in
generating the controversy concerning the “question of man” (Strakhov, “Solution” 317).
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Unless specified otherwise, I will use “man” and “mankind” interchangeably with “human” and
“humankind,” respectively, just as Huxley, Darwin, and Strakhov did when distinguishing between humans
and the other animals.
60 See, for example, Zaitsev, V. “Bibliograficheskii listok.” Russkoe slovo. v. 6. January 1864. 15-34;
Pisarev, Dmitrii. “Progress v mire zhivotnikh i rasteniy.” Russkoe slovo. v. 6. September 1864. 1-46;
Antonovich, M. A. “Teoriia proiskhozhdeniia v tsarstve zhivotnom.” Russkoe slovo. v. 101. March 1864.
63-107. Huxley’s name was transliterated two different ways. The first translation was: T. G. Gioksli’s O
polozhenii cheloveka v riadu organicheskikh sushchestv. Translated by Andrei Beketov. Saint Petersburg:
Tiblen, 1864. The Second was Tomas Genrikh Gukslei’s Mesto cheloveka v tsarstve zhivotnom. Translated
by Iurii Gol’dendakh. Moscow: Katkov, 1864.
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What irked Strakhov in particular were Huxley’s word choices; Huxley’s writing
seemed to him neither clear nor scientific. Strakhov listed the various titles of recently
published works by Huxley, the German naturalist Karl Vogt, and the German botanist
Matthias Schleiden, who in their works sought to “find man’s place in nature, or to
determine the position of man in nature, or, finally, to explain the relation of man to
nature” (Strakhov, “Solution” 318). Such titles, Strakhov thought, only obscured the
matter because there were no sciences that dealt with nature in such a general and
abstract manner (Strakhov, “Solution” 319).
But by the end of the article, their phrasing turned out to be irrelevant because
Strakhov returned to the line of reasoning he had first developed in “Bad Signs.” He
found that the question of man --of the difference between man and the animals-“transcends the sphere of the natural sciences” (Strakhov, “Solution” 319). To Strakhov,
it was how people treated each other that really mattered: “when we measure, as they say,
the dignity of man, then we are taking not the skull, skin, hair, etc. for starting points of
division, but completely different features. We judge by the mind, heart, character, and
without the least doubt, we give priority to the dignified man of the yellow race over bad
people of the white race” (Strakhov, “Solution” 325). The most important differences
were, in Strakhov’s eyes, those of moral and social behavior, not biology. He made no
claim here of having solved the “question of man,” but he concluded that there was a
more pressing question, namely: “what part can – and even necessarily ought – the
natural sciences take in solving the question of man?” (Strakhov, “Solution” 326).
Strakhov took up the issue of man’s place in nature again in 1865 in “What Can
the Natural Sciences Say in Response?” (“Chto mogut otvechat’ estestvennye nauki?”).
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Now, though, Strakhov was no longer content with his conclusion that mankind’s most
important qualities related to its capacity for morality. Instead, he returned to second line
of thought he had begun developing in “Bad Signs” and thus he began to speak of
mankind as Huxley whom he had so recently criticized did. What made man such an
exceptional animal, Strakhov was now willing to stipulate, was his status as a “thinking
organism” (Strakhov, “Response” 337). To be sure, as Strakhov forthrightly
acknowledged, science at that point could not explain the biology of thought, but he
readily speculated that the explanation of mankind’s dominion over nature and the origins
of its capacity for thought could be found in evolution:
Darwin found that organisms evolve by the law of natural selection [podbor]. If
one takes that perspective, then it turns out that man is the most selected for being
in nature, the being before which all other beings, the organic ones, just like the
inorganic ones, retreat and are defeated in the struggle for existence…If the
struggle is the engine of evolution, then it could be said that man is the limit of the
Darwinian struggle because there the battle ends, he is the ruler, for whom there
are no rivals, to whom all submit alike. (Strakhov, “Response” 337-338)61
Thus, Strakhov had maintained a belief that man was the height of evolution since he had
written “Bad Signs.” Now, though, he attempted to reify this conviction of evolutionary
progress in terms of the capacity for thought. And Darwin’s theory of evolution, Strakhov
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From the passage above, it appears that by 1865 Strakhov had, at least, found others’ using the
translation of “natural selection” (“podbor”) that Rachinskii had normalized in his 1864 translation of the
Origin, even if there is no definitive evidence that he himself had not read the Russian edition yet.
Interestingly, though, he still referred to natural selection as a “law,” as he had in “Bad Signs.” (World as a
Whole, Strakhov 337) The last time he used his own translation was in March 1865 in the preface to his
first book On the Method of the Natural Sciences and Their Meaning in General Education (1865).
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thought, was able not only to explain the origin of man, but also to account for his
superiority to the animals (Il'in; Antonov, “Kharakter”).
Darwin’s name also came up sporadically in a series of articles called “On Simple
Bodies: a Critique of the Theory of Elements” (O prostykh telakh: kritika teorii
elementov) (1865). There Strakhov returned to the idea of common descent in an article
titled “The Necessary Path of Science” (“Neobkhodimyi khod nauki”). Now it became
clear that the theory of common descent appealed to Strakhov’s nascent philosophy of
“wholeness” (Antonov, “Kharakter”): “The species of animals and places, which were
once considered absolute particulars, independent of form, as recognized now thanks to
Darwin, to have gradually evolved from one another. Thus, the wholeness of the world,
despite its diversity, is being proven more and more clearly” (Strakhov, “khod” 507).
That is,
According to Darwin's theory, it turns out that the similar-ness of organisms,
which the defenders of the fixity of species considered a form of classification, is
the actual relatedness of plants and animals to each other. The so-called
transitional forms, which the systematists had so often pointed out, are the actual
transitions from one form to another, and so on. (Strakhov, “khod” 508)
Strakhov’s philosophy of “wholeness” (tselost’) was a kind of organicism, a philosophy
more commonly known now as “holism.” One of the most important features of
organicism, as Ernst Mayr noted, is that it “emphasizes relationships” (Mayr, Growth 67).
Indeed, it is just this very related-ness contained in Darwin’s theory of common descent
that appealed to Strakhov.
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When Strakhov published his second book The World as a Whole, in 1872, it
included an introduction he had written for it where he explained what he meant by the
concept of “wholeness” that he had gradually articulated in his writings over the last
decade. The concept was made up of two different notions. The first stated:
The world is an orderly whole, or, as they say, a harmonious, organic whole. That
is, the world’s parts and phenomena are not simply connected, but are jointly
subordinate

(sopodchiniony);

they

represent

the

proper

ladder,

pyramid…hierarchy of beings and phenomena. The world, like an organism, has
parts that are less important and more important, higher and lower; and the
relationship between these parts is such that they represent a harmony. They serve
one another, form a single whole in which there is nothing superfluous or useless.
(Strakhov, “Predislovie” VII)
Thus, on the one hand, essential to Strakhov’s organicism is the idea of a world that is
made up of interacting and interconnected parts that form a hierarchy. Though these parts
may change over time, each part has its own value and, together, these changing parts
will ultimately achieve a harmony that is perpetually being renewed. On the other hand,
the value of each part varies hierarchically; the closer to the top of the hierarchy a part is,
the more valuable it is. Predictably, given what he has previously said about evolutionary
progress, the second notion and the most valuable part for Strakhov is mankind: “Man is
the height of nature, the core of existence. In him there is to be found the greatest mystery
and the greatest wonder of the universe” (Strakhov, “Predislovie” VII).
Although Darwin’s theory of common decent could easily be integrated into
Strakhov’s organicism, the nature of Darwin’s mechanism – natural selection – would not
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be so easily reconciled. In fact, many of Strakhov’s later criticisms of Darwin stemmed
from his organicism. In particular, it was Strakhov’s anthropocentrism that ultimately
drove his anti-Darwinism.
Naturally, Strakhov’s philosophy of “wholeness” calls to mind Ivan Kireevskii’s
notion of the “integral personality” (“tselaia lichnost’ ”) and Aleksei Khomiakov’s
concept of “sobornost’” because of their shared emphasis on “wholeness” and shared
conceptual origin in German idealism. But Strakhov’s philosophy differs radically in its
scope and purpose. Although Kireevskii’s concept of “integral personality” was largely
an anti-rationalist theory of the human psyche and Khomiakov’s “sobornost’” was a
sociological and epistemological theory aimed at unifying the individual and the
collective, both theories predicted that Christian faith and the Russian Orthodox Church
would give rise to the “wholeness” their theoreticians sought. The philosophy Strakhov
developed, though, was largely about the nature of the universe and made no such place
for religion.62
The most noteworthy article that Strakhov wrote during this period, his 1864 “The
Natural

Sciences

and

General

Education”

(“Estestvennye

nauki

i

obshchee

obrazovanie”), stands out in Strakhov’s writings because the positions he took contrasted
starkly with the essays he would soon produce as an anti-Darwinian. It is unsurprising,
given his years of experience teaching natural history to Gymnasium students, that
Strakhov supported the idea of incorporating the natural sciences into general education.
Acknowledging nonetheless that the natural sciences at present were not infallible,
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For more on Kireevskii’s and Khomiakov’s views, see: Walicki, Andrzej. “The Slavophiles,” A History
of Russian Thought from the Englishment to Marxism. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1979. 92-114.
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Strakhov turned at the end of the article to Darwinism as a science that was still young,
but showed promise:
The only objection that can be made against introducing the natural sciences into
general education is, of course, that these sciences still have not achieved that full
state of being finished and rigorous polishing that, for example, elementary
geometry or the grammar of, say, Latin, have. It is impossible not to see that
much is still only being established in the natural sciences and has yet to be
completely established and take a strict form. To be convinced of this, one just
has to remember the recent appearance of Darwin’s theory. (Strakhov,
“Education” 29)
Strakhov contended that while Darwinism was only in its infancy, and thus materials
suitable for instruction were scarce, it was still at the forefront of the natural sciences.
The benefits to be gained from teaching the natural sciences, he insisted, outweighed any
inconveniences. In particular, the natural sciences were important because of their
objectivity:
The objects of their teaching are external objects; therefore they are diverse,
complex, broad, scattered in space, and stretched in time. Therefore, teaching
them demands not sitting, but walking, moving in space; in the same way, it
cannot take place at any time, but has to be adapted to the times of the
phenomena. From all this, of course, it is more correct to draw a conclusion in
favor of the natural sciences than against them. They lead man out of his internal
world and connect them to the external world…In our sad countries subjectivity is
developing powerfully; the dead sleep of nature, which is called winter, chases us
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into ourselves, and in this sleep and silence we grew accustomed to living,
functioning, and studying. 63 [The natural sciences] will destroy our solely
subjective state; they will counterbalance it with their influence and will thus
contribute to a fuller and more harmonious development of spiritual strength.
(Strakhov, “Education” 31)
Strakhov included “The Natural Sciences and General Education” (“Estestvennye nauki i
obshchee obrazovanie”) in his first book, On the Method of the Natural Sciences and
Their Meaning in General Education (O metode estestvennykh nauk i znachenii ikh v
obshchem obrazovanii) (1865). Upon this second printing, he included a footnote
containing his 1862 exposition of Darwin’s theory in full (Strakhov, On Method 178182). He did not include, however, his critique of Clémence Royer’s evolutionary ethics.
Further, in the book’s preface, Strakhov hinted at what would prove to be an
enduring source of anti-Darwinian criticism: the mechanistic orientation of the sciences.
Although he accepted the value of mechanistic thinking, he was convinced that a
complete picture of nature could not emerge from such atomistic thinking alone:
“Darwin’s book, for example, was written entirely according to these [mechanical]
categories. There is, of course, no trouble here; for the application of mechanical
categories ought to be everywhere brought to the end, to the possible limits; the issue is
just that an understanding of nature doesn’t end with this application” (Strakhov, On
Method XI). In fact, Strakhov went so far as to suggest that Darwin misunderstood his
own mechanism: “It is remarkable however, that the law of Darwin, the law of natural
selection (izbranie), although Darwin himself looks at it from a mechanical point of view,
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It is unclear from the text, which countries Strakhov had in mind.
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is obviously an immanent law of organic nature: the organisms in it are beings that work
themselves out, as it were, using accidents for their improvement” (Strakhov, On Method
XI).
Thus we see that during the period from 1862 to 1865, Strakhov has, on the
whole, remained a fairly avid supporter of Darwin’s theory, though he was becoming
increasingly critical of certain aspects of the theory. From the beginning, when Strakhov
wrote “Bad Signs,” he seemed to fully accept Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection, only noting that it did not solve all of the riddles of the natural world. He still
held this view when in 1864 he wrote “the Natural Sciences and General Education,”
advocating the introduction of the natural sciences, in general, and Darwin’s theory, in
particular, into the general school curriculum. And Strakhov did so, noting that while the
findings of the natural sciences were subject to revision, their inclusion together with the
emphasis the natural sciences have on the objective natural world was important to a
balanced spiritual development, especially at a time when the value of subjectivity,
Strakhov thought, was being overemphasized.
For the most part, Strakhov’s writings after “Bad Signs” served only to confirm
his apparent support for various aspects of Darwin’s theory. For example, in “What Can
the Natural Sciences Say in Response?”, he reiterated his belief that humans represented
evolutionary progress, though now he further refined this belief by tying it to what he
considered mankind’s unique capacity for thought. Strakhov also thought that Darwin’s
notion of common descent complemented his own holistic philosophy.
The most well developed criticisms Strakhov had made, on the other hand, were
not of Darwin’s theory itself, but of its being used to form the basis of moral judgments.
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As noted above, though, Darwin’s theory was not, to Strakhov’s mind, beyond reproach,
and it was in the preface to his 1865 book On the Method of the Natural Sciences and
Their Meaning in General Education that the beginnings of Strakhov’s dissent from
Darwin’s theory started to show. He faulted Darwin for limiting himself to a mechanistic
point of view, that is, for looking at organisms only in terms of their parts. But Strakhov
thought of natural selection in “organic,” or holistic, terms and believed that the
organisms themselves ought to be viewed as parts of a greater whole and that natural
selection worked to improve organisms for their own good and put them in harmony with
that whole.
As becomes apparent only after his transformation, the praise Strakhov had
expressed for Darwin’s work in “Bad Signs” was, at least in part, the result of a
misunderstanding caused by Royer’s French translation of the Origin.

Indeed, her

preface and mistranslation of the Origin’s subtitle overstated the role that the notion of
evolutionary progress played in Darwin’s conception of natural selection. It was the
implications that a mechanistic understanding of natural selection has for the notion of
evolutionary progress that turned Strakhov into an anti-Darwinian.
Strakhov would not write on the subject of Darwin’s theory again until 1871. This
lull in Strakhov’s Darwin-related writing coincided with the Tsarist government’s
temporary ban on so-called “‘subversive’ scientific works” that included the Origin
(Rogers, “Opposition” 487). Following the revolutionary Dmitrii Karakozov’s attempt on
Tsar Alexander II’s life in 1866, the government had enacted the ban because it saw a
connection between revolutionary thought and Darwinian theory (Rogers, “Opposition”
488). Hence, very little was published during this period that made any mention of

61

Darwin, regardless of the author’s attitude toward Darwin and his theory. Mikhailovskii’s
article “The Analogical Method in the Social Sciences” was one of the very few
exceptions. Once the ban ended, though, the works on Darwinism that the censor allowed
to be published became preferentially hostile.
1866-1872: Becoming an anti-Darwinist
During the interval from 1866 to 1871, Strakhov formed what would prove to be
enduring friendships with the naturalist Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevskii (1822-1885) and
the novelist Tolstoy (1828-1910). Strakhov had met Danilevskii while at the university,
but he befriended him only in 1868, when Danilevskii came to Russia’s capital in search
of a publisher for his manuscript of Russia and Europe (Rossia i Evropa)(1869).
Strakhov approached the editor of Pan-Slavist journal Dawn (Zaria) where he worked at
the time and, interceding on Danilevskii’s behalf, convinced the editor to serialize
Danilevskii’s book in 1869 (Gerstein 108).
In its pages Danilevskii set forth a theory of what he called cultural-historical
types that he used to predict that Russia was destined by history to take its place at the
head of a political federation made up of all the Slavic states and become the next great
dominant civilization in the world. But the impression Strakhov gave of the importance
of Danilevskii’s book in the introduction he wrote for it was much more benign:
“Danilevskii’s whole theory can be regarded as an attempt to explain the place of the
Slavic world in history…Due to their exceptional place among other peoples…. the Slavs
are destined to change the views of history rooted in Europe, according to which nothing
can come from the Slavic world” (Danilevskii xlii).
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It was also during his brief time at Dawn that Strakhov caught Tolstoy’s attention.
In the journal’s first issue, Strakhov published what would become his best-known work
of literary criticism: an article on Tolstoy’s War and Peace. A further article, “The
Woman Question” (“Zhenskii vopros”) (1870), interested Tolstoy so much that the author
penned a long and enthusiastic letter to Strakhov, on March 19th, 1870, though the letter
would go unsent

(Tolstoy, PSS 61: 306). Ultimately, Strakhov initiated the

correspondence, with a request to Tolstoy on behalf of Dawn, asking Tolstoy to be a
contributor (Gerstein 126). Tolstoy politely declined, but he invited Strakhov to visit him
at his home at Iasnaia Poliana (Tolstoy, PSS 61: 314), and the two men met at last in
1871.
Strakhov’s next article on Darwin came in early 1872, at a turning point in the
history of Darwin reception in Russia. “A Revolution in the Sciences” (“Perevorot v
nauke”) (1871) demonstrates Strakhov’s new approach to Darwin, serving indeed as the
opening volley in Russia’s late nineteenth-century anti-Darwinian crusade (Vucinich
104), in which Strakhov would find eager allies in both Tolstoy and Danilevskii.
When exactly Strakhov had this change of heart and became a staunch antiDarwinist is unknown, but it may have taken place as early as 1867-1868, even though
Strakhov would not publish his first anti-Darwinian article until early 1872. Writing to
Tolstoy in March 1872, Strakhov confessed:
And here is why my book about the origin of things has taken a pause. I had
found the time and had started reading. I read Darwin, Caspar-Friedrich Wolff,
had started on Spencer and on Bulterov, when N. Ia. Danilevskii suddenly
appeared and said that he was going to write about Darwin. I decided to defer to
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him and gave him my books, but I see that he is lazy and it seems that I will have
to take up the matter myself after all? (Perepiska 14-18)
Presumably, it was to that end that he wrote his next article, “The Revolution in the
Sciences” (1872).
The historian Alexander Vucinich describes an uncorroborated episode that took
place in 1870 when Strakhov allegedly went with the Slavophile historian Mikhail
Pogodin (1800-1875) to the Ministry of Education to speak about the threat that Darwin’s
theory posed to the values of the tsarist autocracy. Dmitrii Tolstoy (1823-1889), the
Minister of Public Education, proved to be a willing listener.
In 1871, Minister Tolstoy came to a long-anticipated decision about new statutory
regulations for gymnasiums. He made the “classical” gymnasium with its focus on
classical languages, as opposed to the natural sciences that included Darwin’s theory,
“the only direct institutional path to university education” (Vucinich 103-104). Thus, this
reform went against the earlier reforms of 1848, which had brought the natural sciences
into the gymnasium curriculum. “The growth of nihilism and revolutionary opinion
among Russian youth in the late 1850s and 1860s,” as the historian of science James
Rogers explains “led the Tsarist government to once again offer classical education as an
antidote to the allegedly subversive influence inherent in the study of the natural
sciences” (Rogers, “Opposition” 488). Ironically, if his visit to the Ministry of Public
Education did, in fact, take place, Strakhov now sought to undo the very reform that had
enabled him to work as a natural history teacher in the 1850’s in the first place.
And Strakhov would have thus reversed the position he had taken in his 1864
article “The Natural Sciences and General Education.” Whereas earlier Strakhov had
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advocated not only the introduction of the natural sciences into general education, but of
Darwinian theory in particular, now he allegedly called for banning Darwin’s theory
altogether from that same curriculum. Nevertheless, regardless of whether Strakhov had,
in fact, met with Minister Tolstoy, Strakhov did express similar, new opinions in his first
anti-Darwinian article, “A Revolution in the Sciences” (1872), Strakhov’s most
substantive article on Darwinian theory since “Bad Signs”. Like “Bad Signs,” it proved to
be as much a moral critique as it was one of science. The article came in the wake of
three different translations of Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1871) (Strakhov,
“Followers” 135), which, together with the translations of the Origin, Strakhov would
describe in 1873 as incapable of being “comfortably read in Russian” (Strakhov,
“Followers” 145-146). He began his article by trying to account for the sudden success of
Darwin’s theory and how the mutability of species had come to be seen as a respectable
theory by scientists. As he saw it, no scientific discovery could account for this
acceptance:
Cuvier’s doctrine [of the fixity of species] was not destroyed by gradual
investigation, by new facts, by new discoveries that made clear its inconsistency.
It gave way suddenly, as opinions do that are held on faith, and not on scientific
grounds. The facts didn’t change, our data have not grown; but a new opinion did
appear, a new faith, and the old doctrine had to make way. The speed with which
Darwin’s theory attracted followers does not in the least correspond to its intrinsic
worth. (Strakhov, “Revolution” 117)
In other words, evolutionism had become a viable theory owing to extra-scientific causes.
It had only been, Strakhov maintained, scientists’ slavish deference to authority that had
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allowed Cuvier’s theory to remain unchallenged for so long (Strakhov, “Revolution”117).
But the spread of materialism in Europe had facilitated the rejection of Cuvier’s theory in
favor of Darwin’s. For it resonated with the new generation of scientists’ belief in
materialism or what Strakhov called more generally “nihilism” (Strakhov, Revolution”
134). Thus, Strakhov contended that the Darwinian revolution “took place not in strict
accordance with the development of the science, but was driven by external influences. It
is not the science that suddenly changed direction, but the naturalists” (Strakhov,
“Revolution” 134).
Although Strakhov did not approve of the influence that social factors had in the
development of science, he acknowledged that the history of science would not make
sense “if it were guided by logic alone” (Strakhov, “Revolution” 121). Rather, he
contended that science was guided by the moral beliefs that the scientists of a given
country share:
Every people and every epoch prefer a given doctrine not on the strength of its
logical development, but owing to a certain moral inclination thereto. Thus, the
English remain to this very day skeptics and empiricists; but the same doctrine
that had the feature of skepticism and empiricism in England, having been
transferred to France, becomes materialism and sensualism, and in Germany turns
into idealism. (Strakhov, “Revolution” 121)
Strakhov went so far as to claim in passing that Darwin’s theory itself bore the marks of
its nation of origin, and he seized on the opportunity to promote Danilevskii’s new book:
The subject of the role that nationality plays in science is brilliantly developed by
N. Ia. Danilevskii in chapter six of his book (Russia and Europe, SPB. 1871.).
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There he points out, among other things, that Darwin’s theory, just like Hobbes’
view of government and Adam Smith’s of political economy, bears the stamp of
the English moral character. (Strakhov, “Revolution” 121)
English materialistic science is thus unpalatable to Russian mores. It is worth noting,
though that earlier it had not been Darwin’s, but Royer’s nationality that Strakhov had
hitherto pointed out as he popularized Darwin’s theory a decade earlier. Now, though, he
maintained that he was unconvinced by Darwin’s theory, as he found it to be both
morally and scientifically unsatisfying. Granted, he was willing to accept that Darwin’s
predecessor Georges Cuvier’s theory was incorrect. But he protested that Cuvier’s theory,
at least, made moral sense. Darwin’s theory, on the other hand, stripped the organic world
of that moral meaning and in its place left only randomness:
The changes to which organisms are subject, owing to numerous unknown causes,
are either advantageous or disadvantageous for organisms. This advantageousness
or disadvantageousness is a completely random occurrence for each being; it
depends on a combination of external circumstances, among which an organism
lives, and on the combination of other organisms that are living with it. And it is
on this entirely random advantageousness or disadvantageousness of variation
occurring in the organism that all of the diversity of animal and plant life depends.
Advantageous variation remains, becomes established, and forms new species;
disadvantageous variation is eliminated. This process is called the struggle for
existence. (Strakhov, “Revolution” 127)
Thus, in calling attention to the fact that variation is undirected, Strakhov inaccurately
saw the Darwinian struggle for existence as “random” (Snetova, “uchenie” 49; Rogers,
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“Opposition” 499). That is, an adaptation (adapted feature) does not increase adaptedness
in a vacuum, but only relative to a particular environment. Indeed, Strakhov could not
help but perceive the struggle for existence as random, nor was he alone in this
confusion; as Ernst Mayr has noted, this is a feature of natural selection that proved to be
particularly troubling for Darwin’s contemporaries, who were primarily Newtonians, as
“[They] could see only a single alternative to teleological determination, this being
accident” (Mayr, Growth 519).
And like many of Darwin’s contemporaries (Mayr, Growth 519), Strakhov found
this non-teleological aspect of natural selection most disturbing morally, as he came to
consider the implication that human evolution was not, in fact, inevitable (Snetova,
“uchenie” 49; Antonov, “Otsenka” 53-54; Antonov, “Kharakter”): “Thus man finally
evolved; his structure and everything in him that we call beauty, nobility, spirituality are
only a reflection of certain chance occurrences that don’t follow any laws and don’t form
any whole, and amongst which the animal kingdom evolved” (Strakhov, “Revolution”
128).
Strakhov did nevertheless understand the effects of according undirected variation
such an important role in the theory of natural selection: “Its strength,” Strakhov
contended “is that it makes phenomena random and makes it unnecessary for them to be
explained from a more elevated source; it denies such a source. There is nothing clearer
and simpler with any question than rejecting the very basis of the question; then, the mind
puts itself at ease, not seeing any task before it” (Strakhov, “Revolution” 129). Its
weakness, on the other hand, was that it turned the evolution of any trait into an open
question. In particular, Strakhov focused on the question of human evolution,
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acknowledging that “even if [such a Darwinian conclusion concerning man] were
completely founded, it cannot satisfy us until the theory explains to us precisely what
changes species had undergone, by what laws differentiation took place, and precisely
how the surprising adaptations and the surprising characteristics of organisms that we
know were received and not some others” (Strakhov, “Revolution” 131).
Strakhov understood that Darwin had yet to provide a satisfying explanation of
inheritance (Strakhov, “Revolution” 132), but for Strakhov the problem was not as simple
with regard to humans as it was for other organisms. Although, he did, in fact, want to
know the actual evolutionary history of mankind (Gerstein 158-159; Antonov, “Otsenka”
53-54), to Strakhov’s mind, the difficulty arose because of man’s unique qualities:
man is a completely special being in nature: he has the rudiments of
characteristics that fundamentally diverge from animality, and consequently his
origin, no matter what it is, is the greatest wonder, such a leap, such a revolution,
the equal or likes of which is not to be found in all of the remaining history of
terrestrial nature. (Strakhov, “Revolution” 132)
Strakhov sought an evolutionary explanation of how so unprecedented a creature as man
could emerge, but at the same time he wanted that explanation to be fundamentally
different from that relating to other organisms, one that accorded man the special place in
the universe that Strakhov thought mankind deserved.
Strakhov ended his article by turning briefly to the topics of extinction and
mechanism, subjects he would reprise periodically throughout his anti-Darwinist period.
Here Strakhov argued that Darwin had wanted to avoid giving a so-called “organic”
explanation of extinction and had therefore given a mechanical one in its place. That is,
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Strakhov believed incorrectly that Darwin had deliberately conceived of death as
randomly occurring, noting:
Of course, any organism may be killed violently, and probably a large part of
them die just so. But such a death is a chance event, not stemming from the
organization and development of the organism, and therefore, if all organisms
were to die thus…it wouldn’t be necessary to explain why an organism dies after
a given time without any external cause, without any change in external
conditions. Darwin, in order to avoid the necessity of an organic explanation of
the extinction of species, accepts for them everywhere a mechanical death.
(Strakhov, “Revolution” 133)
In other words, Strakhov claimed that by treating death as a chance occurrence, Darwin
had made an organism’s morphology and development unrelated to its manner of death,
and thereby avoided having to provide a cause of death. That Strakhov took the role
played by death in natural selection to be random is unsurprising, given the fact that he
understood undirected variation to be random. Indeed, Strakhov sought a different kind of
extinction, one in which “Certain phases of life were outlived, so to speak; they
disappeared, not crowded by anything, but by themselves” (Strakhov, “Revolution” 134).
That is, Strakhov was looking for an explanation of extinction that was compatible with
his organicism. He wanted extinction to both be brought about harmoniously and, in so
doing, bring about harmony. As Michael Ruse notes of organicism in general, “the
competition at the heart of Darwin’s vision of change is considered deeply upsetting and
in some respects offensive. Of course there is death and destruction, but it is ameliorated
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by the essential oneness of everything, the push for harmony and cooperation” (Ruse,
“Organicism” 99).
Strakhov’s Transformation
As we have seen, Strakhov would ultimately never offer a direct written
explanation of why he had become an anti-Darwinian. But to judge by “The Revolution
in the Sciences,” Strakhov’s first anti-Darwinian article, he was uneasy about Darwin’s
theories of common descent and natural selection and what they meant for his belief in
human exceptionalism.
To be sure, Strakhov had long believed humans to be exceptional animals (Il’in);
this was central to his organicism. In 1862, he had seemingly accepted what he then
called Darwin’s “discovery”: the “law” of natural selection. And he had also seemed to
accept Darwin’s theory of common descent. At the same time, however, Strakhov had
maintained that humans, as the result of the severest struggle for existence, represented
evolutionary progress. At that point, Strakhov had reserved his criticism almost
exclusively for Darwin’s French translator Clémence Royer. He had appeared to be able
to accept the scientific merit of Darwin’s discovery without also accepting any of the
moral conclusions that Royer sought to derive from it. Indeed, as Daniel Todes observes,
“[Strakhov] had no difficulty praising Darwin while criticizing ‘Social Darwinism’”
because he believed that “humans chose ideals and established social laws independent of
natural law” (Todes 40).
In the intervening years between “Bad Signs” and “A Revolution in the
Sciences,” Strakhov had continued to believe that mankind represented evolutionary
progress (“What Can the Natural Sciences Say in Response?”), while also accepting
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Darwin’s theory of common descent (“On Simple Bodies”). He had first registered
dissent from Darwin’s ideas in his 1865 preface, when he had taken issue with Darwin’s
looking at nature from a “mechanical point of view,” but he had expressed no misgivings
about the role of chance in natural selection. Rather, he had noted that organisms “work
themselves out, as it were, using accidents for their improvement” (Strakhov, On Method
XI). But something changed after 1865. And clearly, by 1871, his moral concerns about
Darwin’s theory had become so grave that he approached the Minister of Public
Education, and, in effect, recanted his earlier support for Darwinian ideas. Indeed, now he
allegedly even sought to remove Darwinian theory from general education entirely.
By 1872, Strakhov had begun to explore natural selection and its implications in
greater detail in his writings. By then he had also come to understand that the raw
material of natural selection – variation – is, according to Darwin, undirected and is not
adaptive a priori. Thus, Strakhov realized that, according to Darwin’s theory – even if
Darwin did not always adhere to the conclusions of his own theory–, the features humans
so value, such as beauty, nobility, and spirituality, had evolved only because of their
value to survival and, ultimately, reproduction. But because Strakhov was more interested
in emphasizing the differences between humans and the other animals than their
similarities, he could not help but find a Darwinian explanation of human evolution
unsatisfying. Strakhov was not opposed, in principle, to the theory of common descent.
Rather, the fact that Darwin’s theory of common descent was the product of undirected
variation

culled

by

natural

selection

simply

morally

offended

Strakhov’s

anthropocentricism (Rogers, “Opposition” 499; Gerstein 158; Snetova, “uchenie” 49;
Antonov, “Otsenka” 53-54; Il’in). Indeed, as Antonov notes:
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Strakhov could not agree that man is a chance occurrence or even a mistake of
nature on the same level as lichen and mold. His views on nature, especially on
the organic world and man, are characteristically teleological. In connection with
this, he came out against Darwin’s theory and his followers, according to which
the design found in nature is a product of a chance equilibrium of battling forces.
He believed in the highest ideal design of the whole organization and
development of the world. (Antonov, “Kharakter”)
Thus, Strakhov sought a progressive component that would confer inherent value
on mankind, a component that undirected variation could not provide (Rogers,
“Opposition” 498; Antonov, “Otsenka” 53-54). What he wanted, instead, was an
orthogenetic theory of evolution – one stipulating that evolution is driven by an
immanent perfecting principle – like Karl Nägeli’s (Mayr, Growth 529). More broadly,
Strakhov’s search for such an anthropocentric theory formed part of his organicist
philosophy. To be sure, organicism does emphasize the related-ness of all things. But
another important tenet of Strakhov’s philosophy was, as Nina Snetova has noted, that
“The world … presents a system which is hierarchical in structure. Man is at the highest
level of this hierarchy, the master of all nature. In accordance with organicism, Strakhov
presents an anthropocentric picture of world” (Snetova, Filosofiia 334-335).
Thus, Strakhov had turned from drawing a distinction between Darwinism and
evolutionary ethics to criticizing what he saw as the moral implications of Darwinism
itself. In 1862, Strakhov had criticized Royer and portrayed her as an omen (“Bad Signs”)
of the coming moral decay in Western European. By 1872, the very fact that Darwin’s
theory had gained currency in Europe was proof that it had been infected by materialistic

73

nihilism. Ironically, though, Strakhov was not alone in his moral criticism of Darwinian
theory; in fact, he had numerous European allies (Gerstein 155). Critics and defenders
alike were able to accept the fact of evolution, just not Darwin’s explanatory mechanism
(Mayr, Growth 514). Indeed, Strakhov was no creationist (Il’in). He accepted evolution
or, as he called it, “the change of species” (Snetova, “uchenie” 48; Il’in; Rogers,
“Opposition” 498); he just could not accept Darwinian evolution (Snetova, “uchenie” 48;
Il’in).
But the fact remains that Strakhov had expressed his unambiguous support for
Darwin’s theory in “Bad Signs,” published in late 1862, and continued to view the theory
positively until, at least, 1865. The part of Darwin’s theory that was crucial to Strakhov’s
acceptance and later rejection centered on the idea of evolutionary progress and how it
could justify anthropocentrism. But, as we have seen, though Darwin did, in fact, believe
in evolutionary progress, he said little about it, not to mention humans, in the Origin.
Hence, it appears more likely that the idea of evolutionary progress occupied such a
prominent place in Strakhov’s understanding of Darwin’s theory precisely because he
understood the theory in terms of the French translator Royer’s introduction and her
mistranslation of the Origin’s subtitle. Furthermore, it still remains unclear whether
Strakhov had actually read the French translation prior to writing “Bad Signs.”
To be sure, Strakhov was aware, to some degree, that what he called “accidents”
played a role in evolution, but, even as late as 1865, he still saw them as inevitably
resulting in progress, a kind of targeted progress that, admittedly, Strakhov forgivingly
thought Darwin had missed because of his mechanistic focus. It was precisely this
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eagerness to see Darwin’s theory in organic terms that allowed Strakhov to accept it for
as long as he did.
With Strakhov’s disillusionment came the realization that Darwin was just
another materialist. Indeed, Strakhov was also a materialist, but, as he saw it, Darwin’s
materialism was purely reductionistic and therefore a kind of nihilism, whereas he
subscribed to one that embraced both mechanistic-reductionistic as well as organicist
thinking. To Strakhov, the reductionistic picture of the world was, if not entirely
immoral, at least, thoroughly amoral. If variation in organisms arises only by chance and
that variation is determined solely by its value to survival and reproduction in the
interminable struggle for existence, then there is not and will not be any harmony. Nature
is indifferent and humans are therefore not special or destined to exist. Another organism
could just as easily have come to occupy what Strakhov saw as man’s place in the
universe.
Had Strakhov understood Darwin in 1862 as he did in 1872, he would have
roundly condemned him with the “Western European” Royer in the article he wrote for
Time. But unlike “Bad Signs,” the critical position Strakhov took with regard to Darwin
in “The Revolution in the Sciences” was not out of place in the Slavophile publication
Dawn. In fact, the position he articulated was that of a general and orthodox Slavophile.
For he claimed that the morality of a particular country gave direction to its science.
Thus, the fact that Darwinism had spread throughout Europe implied a common moral
thread tying Europe together, one that did not include Russia. In so doing, Strakhov
placed Darwin’s theory in an insurmountable opposition to the mores of Russians in
general and its scientists in particular and thereby suggested that any attempt Russia
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makes to model itself on another country, not to mention a Western European country, is
bound to fail.
Not long after the publication of “A Revolution in the Sciences,” in March of
1872, Strakhov exchanged a series of letters with Tolstoy. Although their friendship had
begun with Strakhov’s article on War and Peace, the two shared an antipathy to Darwin’s
theory that led Tolstoy to take an interest in Strakhov’s non-literary articles as well. In
particular, Tolstoy had read and admired Strakhov’s “A Revolution in the Sciences.”
The experience that Tolstoy had with Darwinism was remarkably similar to
Strakhov’s. Each had initially favored Darwin’s theory in the 1860’s, only to become a
staunch opponent by the 1870’s. But, as I will show in the next chapter, aside from their
general interest in separating humans from the rest of the animals for purposes of ethical
judgments, the hostility they expressed about Darwinian theory in their writing had very
little in common.
1873-1874: Undirected Variation, English Culture, and Extinction
Strakhov published his next article on Darwinism “Followers and Opponents”
(“Posledovateli i protivniki”) in the Slavophile journal The Citizen (Grazhdanin) in 1873.
It was largely a continuation of “A Revolution in the Sciences.” In fact, these two articles
would appear together in the second volume of The Fight with the West in Our Literature
(Bor’ba s Zapadom v nashei literature) (1883). It was the publication of third edition of
Rachinskii’s translation of the Origin (1873) that had given Strakhov the pretext to write
the article, but he touched on the subject of Rachinskii’s translation only briefly,
remarking “Darwin is translated and published here with such a carelessness that
strangely contradicts the great respect apparently accorded him by both translators and
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the public. Of all the translations and editions we do not know one book of Darwin’s that
could be comfortably read in Russian. The translation of On the Origin of Species can
still be considered the best” (Strakhov, “Followers” 145). Admittedly, the translation was
not beyond reproach. Strakhov listed various examples of phrasing that struck him as
unnatural to the Russian ear in addition to some examples of Rachinskii’s awkward
attempts to avoid using loan words (Strakhov, “Followers” 146).
Strakhov used the rest of “Followers and Opponents” to revisit themes from “A
Revolution in the Sciences.” The thrust of his argument remained unchanged: chance
could not produce the exquisite design found in nature. Now, though, rather than blame
the scientific community, Strakhov turned his attention to Darwin himself. Although
Strakhov acknowledged that Darwin enjoyed great popularity at the time, he claimed that
Darwin wrote unintelligibly and gave no indication of how his ideas related to those of
his precursors. As a result, Darwin had generated a great confusion in his readers, laymen
and scientists alike, who began defending what they mistook to be Darwin’s theory.64
The types of confusion varied. Strakhov thought, for example, that Darwin had given his
books misleading titles. The Origin, he thought, would have been more aptly called “a
tract on the extinction of species,” as it did not “explain any origin” (Strakhov,
“Followers” 136). Strakhov’s most substantive criticisms, though, were of a more
scientific nature.
Taking a well-known scientist and Darwinist to illustrate the confusion that
Darwin’s works had wrought, Strakhov singled out the German biologist Ernst Haeckel
(1834-1919), whose understanding of Darwin’s theory he considered “terrible in its
64
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crudeness” (Strakhov, “Followers” 136). In particular, Strakhov took issue with what he
took to be Haeckel’s mechanistic interpretation of Darwin’s theory.65 For, again, as
Strakhov understood it, Darwin’s theory was, in fact, an organic one. In a further
criticism, Strakhov insinuated that Darwin was primarily motivated by fame because, he
thought, Darwin would have defended his theory against such interpretations “if he cared
about the precise sense of his theory, and not about fame alone, not just about acquiring
followers, no matter who they are” (Strakhov, “Followers” 138). Strakhov concluded:
The main weight and sense of Darwinian theory consists in the negation of the
goal-directed nature of organisms, in the assumption that this goal-directed nature
came from an accumulation of accidental variation that proved to be
disadvantageous for the beings in which the variation occurred. Growth and
heredity are not explained in this theory, but are assumed as given phenomena
from which one must explain the remaining phenomena. (Strakhov, “Followers”
141)
And to ensure that no one misunderstood his point, Strakhov refined it still
further, noting that “Simple-minded readers often think and say that Darwin proved or
discovered or refuted something; but nothing of the sort can be said about him; he only
introduced to the field of the natural sciences his view, the idea of chance” (Strakhov,
“Followers” 142). Strakhov also cited the eminent embryologist and anti-Darwinist Karl
Ernst von Baer (1792-1876) to refute Darwin’s theory. Von Baer had affirmed, “it goes
without saying that something goal-directed and profound can never arise from chance
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particulars, but from the very beginning ought to be conceived as something whole,
though capable of improvement” (Strakhov, “Followers” 145).
Thus, Strakhov had returned yet again to the topic of the role that chance plays in
Darwin’s conception of natural selection. The points he made differed little from those he
had made in 1872 in “ A Revolution in the Sciences.” Now, however, Strakhov had
begun to rely explicitly on the arguments that others had made in an attempt to refute
Darwin’s theory. At the same time his own arguments had become more personally
pointed.
By April of 1873, Strakhov had already written half of his next article on
Darwin’s theory (Perepiska 29-32). He finished “On the Development of Organisms”
(“O razvitii organizmov”) in September of 1873 and published it the following year in the
Muscovite journal Nature (Priroda), a popular science periodical founded by the Russian
zoologists Sergei Usov (1827-1886) and Leonid Sabaneev (1844-1898). It was the last
article he would write on the subject for the rest of the decade.
Strakhov returned briefly to the subject of the influence of extra-scientific factors
on the development of science, which he had first discussed in 1872. Now, though,
Strakhov took an interest in Darwin’s extrapolation of English culture to zoology. He
maintained that the mutability of species was not a theory new with Darwin, and that
Darwin’s theory did not build on the work of his predecessors, but rather “was built on
notions that had no power in science and which Darwin had preconceived from the
intellectual and moral life in which he lived as a member of his people” (Strakhov,
“Development” 190):
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The selection (podbor) of plants and animals is an affair with which the English
occupy themselves more diligently and more skillfully than all other peoples, and
Darwin thought that the forms in nature are worked out in just the same way as
racehorses on a stud farm or monstrous varieties of pigeons by amateureccentrics. Competition is the law by which not only English trade and industry
move, but also almost all of English life; and so Darwin sees everywhere in nature
only a struggle for existence, a competition to the death. Advantage is the highest
goal, the highest practical ideal for the English; and so Darwin does not find any
meaning in all of the organs of animals and plants, in all of the traits of their
organization, besides an essential advantage, namely, the survival of evils leading
to extinction. (Strakhov, “Development” 191)
Here Strakhov finally made explicit what he had implied in “A Revolution the Sciences,”
namely, that Darwin’s science was fully a product of his cultural environment. On the
whole, though, Strakhov’s criticisms of Darwin in “On the Development of Organisms”
were less personal and nationalistic and more scientific than they had been in “Followers
and Opponents.”
Strakhov spent the rest of the 1873 article discussing heredity and variation,
subjects that he had previously mentioned only in passing. While discussing heredity,
Strakhov relied greatly on the Swiss anatomist Albert von Kölliker’s criticism of Darwin.
Further, to refute Darwin’s claim to having explained the “origin of species,” Strakhov
turned to Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734-1794), one of the founders of embryology and a
champion of epigenesis. For Strakhov was convinced that the key to explaining evolution
would be found by understanding embryological development, noting: “If organisms
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upon multiplication are subjected to a certain process of change, then this process must
be similar to the process of change that takes place in every organism in its individual
development” (Strakhov, “Development” 226). In fact, Strakhov, like many of his
contemporaries, including Darwin, believed that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny: “the
epigenesis of any complete organism presents to us in a short time and in broad strokes a
picture of the development to which all its ancestors of a direct line were subjected,
beginning with the first single-cellular organism. The whole chain of generations forms a
general history of development…” (Strakhov, “Development” 227-228).
Strakhov believed that it was during ontogeny that variation arose and evolution
took place:
[One] needs to see in epigenesis the primary explanation of the origin of species;
just as in an embryo one organization transitions to another, so species must have
transitioned from one into another. All the diversity of the traits and functions of
organisms must have arisen in them just as definite traits and functions arise in
every embryo. In the paleontological development of organisms the same forces
and causes must have acted that act in embryos in the present. (Strakhov,
“Development” 228)
Thus, Strakhov argued that Darwin’s theory was incapable of providing
any insight into the workings of evolution, for “[the] most detailed paleontological
research and the most prolonged matings and selections of horses and pigeons will give
us only the results of the process” (Strakhov, “Development” 228). Nor did Darwin
explain the origin of species. To Strakhov’s mind, Darwin had only tried to explain
extinction, and with limited success:
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[Actually], he explained only the negative aspect of the paleontological history of
organisms; he showed only that species can disappear in the struggle for
existence; but how they arise, from where the forces appear that ought to flourish
in this battle, and on which the whole meaning of the struggle depends, to this he
gave vague and entirely unsatisfactory answers. (Strakhov, “Development” 229)
Thus, Strakhov failed to see the creative power of natural selection and saw only its
ability to eliminate inferior variations.
“On the Development of Organisms” and “Followers and Opponents” marked yet
another turning point in Strakhov’s writing. In these two works, unlike his earlier articles,
Strakhov relied on the authority of various European scientists in his criticism of Darwin.
In particular, he quoted Wolff, von Kolliker, and von Baer – all German scientists – at a
time when he was focusing on the influence of English culture on Darwin’s work and
how that culture was at odds with Russian morals and culture. Perhaps, aside from the
fact that Strakhov could use them to support his argument, the three were appropriate to
cite because each scientist had substantive connections with Russia. Wolff and von Baer
had worked there for decades, whereas von Kolliker appears to have been elected a
member-correspondent of the Saint-Petersburg Academy of the Sciences. Indeed, the
historians of science Boris Raikov and James Allen Rogers included Wolff and von Baer
in their historical studies of Russian science.66
After “On the Development of Organisms,” Strakhov did not write another article
on Darwinism for more than a decade. Having unexpectedly secured various nonjournalistic sources of income, Strakhov took a break from writing articles on Darwin’s
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theory and began focusing his anti-Darwinian efforts on editing Danilevskii’s slowly
gestating tome Darwinism (Darvinizm) (1885; 1889). Until 1887, Darwin’s name would
appear only in Strakhov’s personal correspondence. And even then, Strakhov would say
little new about Darwin’s theory. By 1873, most of Strakhov’s original criticism of
Darwin was behind him.
1874-1889: Strakhov, Religion, and Danilevskii
This period of Strakhov’s anti-Darwinism is dominated primarily by his
correspondence with Danilevskii and his defense of Danilevskii’s Darwinism. But there
is an incident that bears mention, for it raises questions as to what Strakhov’s religious
commitments were, if, indeed, he had any, and how they might bear on his rejection of
Darwin’s theory. In 1877, Strakhov paid a visit with Tolstoy to the Optina Monastery, a
renowned pilgrimage site, where they met with the famous elder Father Amvrosii and
Father Kliment. Just days later, Strakhov’s young friend Pavel Matveev also visited the
monastery. According to a letter Strakhov wrote to Tolstoy, Fathers Amvrosii and
Kliment had spoken at length to Matveev about their visit. Matveev reported to Strakhov
that they had described Strakhov as one whose “unbelief” is “deep” (Matveev 154).
Indeed, when Matveev published a full account of the visit, in 1907, he revealed that
Father Kliment had called Strakhov a “bibliophile” (“knizhnik”) saying that the only
interest Strakhov had shown him was in the collection of books there: “books interest him
more than anything else… [Strakhov] is a lost soul, for whom faith is only a matter of
poetry” (Matveev 154-155). Strakhov’s visit to the Optina Monastery was thus not the
pilgrimage one might have expected.
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In general, the information that is available for reconstructing a picture of
Strakhov’s religious life is marred by contradictions.67 For instance, just as his dear friend
Vasilii Rozanov had written in the 1890’s, insisting that Strakhov was and always had
been a believer (Rozanov, izgnanniki 347), Strakhov can be seen describing himself as a
“nonbeliever” in a letter to Tolstoy (Perepiska 403-406). Clearly, there was something
about Strakhov that made Rozanov and Nikol’skii think of him, perhaps mistakenly, as
religious at a time when he self-identified as a “nonbeliever.” It may have been
Strakhov’s religious upbringing or the fact that he had written extensively about topics of
religious importance such as morality and spirituality. And yet, as it turns out, the
question of whether or not Strakhov was religious is irrelevant, as it had no observable
effect on his reception of Darwin’s theory.
Naturally, Strakhov was aware that Darwin’s theory had implications for religion.
In “A Revolution in the Sciences” he had remarked that Cuvier’s belief in the fixity of
species was derived from a belief in God as the Creator of the universe (Strakhov,
“Revolution” 125-126); and in “On the Development of Organisms” he had claimed that
“the only idea that Darwin understands completely from the science before him is what
he calls the idea of “special creation,” that is, the doctrine that every species of animal
and plant was created separately” (Strakhov, “Development” 193). Nevertheless,
Strakhov made no attempt to defend belief in God or religion and was, as noted earlier,
willing to accept that Cuvier’s theory was incorrect. Furthermore, the fact that Strakhov’s
anti-Darwinist writings from the 1890’s when he self-identified as a “nonbeliever” were
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consistent with those of the early 1870’s suggests that even if Strakhov had experienced a
loss of faith, his criticism of Darwin does not appear to have been based on that faith.
Correspondence with Danilevskii
Page for page, Strakhov wrote about Darwin’s theory more during the period
from 1874 to 1889 than any other period. But most of what he wrote was in defense of
his friend Danilevskii’s Darwinism and not to articulate his own thoughts on the theory.
The insights into Strakhov’s views on Darwin during this period come, rather, from his
correspondence with Danilevskii. On the whole, their correspondence touched little on
Darwinian theory per se; what little Strakhov did say about Darwin’s theory amounts to a
repetition of views he had already conveyed in print. For example, in a letter dated March
3rd, 1884, after debating the relationship between theorizing and experimentation,
Strakhov returned to the ideas about heredity that he had discussed just a decade
previously, in “On the Development of Organisms” (Strakhov, “Pis’ma” 130). Strakhov’s
correspondence does, however, clarify the personal nature of the dislike he felt for
Darwin, for in his first letter to Danilevskii Strakhov confessed:
Inestimable Nikolai Iakovlevich, I have not been an admirer of Hegel for a long
time; but, by God, the progress of humankind will be very poor, if such minds are
to be despised and forgotten. I harbor the greatest contempt for Darwin, Mill, and
other such favorites of the current time. Just as in the last century, the French
forgot their Descartes and the Germans their Leibnitz and became infatuated with
English philosophy, so now continental Europe has grown tired of thinking and
English views are spreading through it, those of the densest people. You remarked
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once that the English are devoid of refined taste; they are also devoid of any
philosophical talent. (Strakhov, “Pis’ma” 128)
This letter and the casual insult it contains reveal Strakhov’s exasperation with Darwin
and the admiration he had received, but, as Strakhov was certain, did not deserve. It is
worth noting that, earlier, Strakhov had thought of Darwin’s theory as a product of his
cultural milieu, but unlike his previous, qualified and articulated criticism to the effect
that English science was simply inimical to Russian moral values, here Strakhov’s
offhand remark shows the degree to which he thought of the controversy over Darwin’s
theory in national and political terms.
Otherwise, their correspondence serves primarily to illustrate the fundamental
ways in which Strakhov disagreed with Danilevskii about Darwin (Gerstein 159; Il’in).
For example, in a letter from April 5th, 1885, Strakhov responds to Danilevskii:
Regarding Darwinism, [your] chapters on different and useless traits in the
structure of organisms seemed wrong or not completely right. Proving uselessness
is, in essence, impossible; one can negate and refute the utility that Darwin or
someone else indicates, but in order to refute necessity in general, for all life, for
the essence of some organism, for that, one needs to know that essence, to know
the whole meaning, the whole scope of life, for which we can make no
guarantees. General negative positions always come out unconditional, but the
unconditional in thought is possible only a priori. (Strakhov, “Pis’ma” 136)
Clearly, one cannot assume that Danilevskii’s and Strakhov’s views on Darwinian theory
were identical (Antonov, “Otsenka” 52; Gerstein 159; Il’in). Nonetheless, both men
criticized the role that chance played in Darwin’s theory (Rogers, “Opposition” 499), and
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many of the arguments that Danilevskii marshaled in Darwinism had analogues in
Strakhov’s writing (Rogers, “Opposition” 499; Todes 167). But with the exception of
Danilevskii’s own logical analysis of Darwin’s theory, the arguments contained in
Darwinism were not original with Danilevskii; rather, the work was a composite of
criticisms that had been made by Western European thinkers (Rogers, “Opposition” 497;
Gerstein 159; Vucinich 137).
Initially, Strakhov had expressed his support for Danilevskii’s efforts in writing
and by working as the editor of Darwinism (Strakhov, “Pis’ma” 129-132; Strakhov
“Pis’ma” 462-463; Rogers, “Opposition” 497; Gerstein 159). But Danilevskii died on
November 19th, 1885, just as the first volume of Darwinism was being published. Upon
publication, the book went almost without critical notice, so it fell to Strakhov to promote
it (Rogers, “Opposition” 499; Gerstein 160; Il’in). His efforts began with an article in
early 1887. To generate controversy, he gave it a bold title: “A Complete Refutation of
Darwinism” (“Polnoe oproverzhenie darvinizma”) and included a few quotes of
Danilevskii’s in which he criticized the leading popularizer and defender of Darwinism in
Russia: Kliment Timiriazev.
The article proved to be a rousing success in advertisement: Timiriazev replied,
continuing the debate. And in response to Timiriazev’s own article, Strakhov wrote yet
another article titled “The Darwinists’ Perpetual Mistake” (“Vsegdashniaia oshibka
darvinistov”). It was only then that Strakhov admitted that he had accomplished his
primary goal of drawing attention to Danilevskii’s work:
I have to admit to my readers a small trick. In my article “A Complete Refutation
of Darwinism,” I insistently referred two or three times to comments of N. Ia.
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Danilevskii’s about Professor Timiriazev. I did that intentionally… My primary
and torturous concern was to draw the attention of our scientists to N. Ia.
Danilevskii’s book, so that they would read it and look at what it brings to
science. (Strakhov, “Perpetual Mistake” 66)
Strakhov’s efforts to draw attention to Darwinism went on for two more articles. The
next time, though, Strakhov was responding to an article written by another proDarwinian Andrei Famintsyn (1835-1918), “N. Ia. Danilevskii and Darwinism: Did
Danilevskii Refute Darwinism?” (“N. Ia. Danilevskii i Darvinizm: Oprovergnut li
darvinizm

Danilevskim?”) Strakhov’s response, “A.S. Famintsyn’s Judgment on

Danilevskii’s Darwinism” (“Suzhdenie A. S. Famintsyna o Darvinizme N. Ia.
Danilevskogo”) like his previous two articles, offered no insight into Strakhov’s thinking
about Darwin’s theory, as it largely repeated his defense of Danilevskii. Strakhov even
wrote an article titled “The Argument Resulting from N. Ia. Danilevskii’s Book” (“Spor
iz-za knig N. Ia. Danilevskogo”) (1889), in which he recounted his experience of
promoting and defending Danilevskii’s book.
1892: Heredity and Teleology
The next time that Strakhov wrote about Darwinism was in 1892. “The Course
and Character of Contemporary Natural History” (“Khod i kharakter sovremennoi
estestvennoi istorii”) was published in the third volume of The Fight with the West. The
forthcoming second edition of Strakhov’s World as a Whole had given him the
opportunity to reflect on the developments in biology that had taken place since the first
edition was published (Strakhov, “Course” 93). But instead of broaching new aspects in
his section on Darwinism, Strakhov returned to familiar topics such as the role that
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authority plays in the development of the sciences and mechanistic explanations in
science. He touched on Darwin’s theory only briefly.
Noting the effect that Darwin’s theory had had on the natural sciences, Strakhov
wrote: it was “enormous, albeit obviously wrong,” for it “apparently solved the whole
mystery of the organic world… explained the origin of the various forms of organisms
together with their essential characteristic – a designed nature (Strakhov, “Course ” 105).
But Strakhov found it strange that despite all of the previous morphological work that had
been done to answer the question of design, none of it had figured in Darwin’s theory.
Instead, Darwin had turned to organisms’ interactions with their environment to explain
adaptation:
Ordinarily, however, Darwin’s merit is seen to be not in [morphology], but in that
he founded a new teleology, prompting naturalists to study the relationships of
organisms to each other and to the external world. Scientists left their offices and
began observing the workings of life in nature, the struggle of every living being
with conditions and with other living beings. There was discovery after discovery,
and we learned what need and advantage the construction of organisms of any
kind of trait represents, even the most trivial, the meaning of which earlier we
hadn’t even suspected. Thus, as it were, a whole special science was born that
they love to call by the fine name of biology. (Strakhov, “Course” 107)68
Strakhov thus conceded that Darwin had transformed biology. He even acknowledged the
merit of the work done in this new biology: “All these investigations [inspired by
Darwin’s theory], of course, are both interesting and useful.” Nevertheless he maintained
68
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that “[such investigations] dodge the direct tasks of organic morphology; they don't solve
them, only go around them” (Strakhov, “Course” 107). Thus, Darwin’s theory was to
blame for the fact that biology no longer sought to explain “the designed nature that
every organism possesses, like the harmony of all its parts and its whole development,
like the realization of the type towards which it tends. But rather [biologists] examine
only the advantages and disadvantages of [an organism’s] construction in collision with
surrounding chance events” (Strakhov, “Course” 107). Again Strakhov faulted Darwin
for mechanizing biology; he still insisted that the natural world be studied holistically.
But he also joined Darwin’s critics in taking up the topic of hereditary variation. Strakhov
contended that as long as the source of variation and the mechanism of the hereditary
transmission of that variation remained unknown, the question of functional morphology
had only been partly answered:
Let us be completely assured that the white color of the rabbit in winter saves it in
the white snow from keen-sighted predators; this does not solve the problem of
what are the cause and the very process of this change in fur color. Darwinian
biology states that it was an accident that is transmitted by heredity and reinforced
by long selection. But where is the explanation here? If we don’t even pay
attention to the fact that inheritance is largely a mysterious phenomenon, and,
consequently, referring to it essentially doesn’t explain, but rather obscures the
matter, then we should still ask how and why did that first rabbit turn white at the
beginning of winter, that rabbit with which we begin our explanation?69 Only
when we compose for ourselves some notion of this process will it be possible to
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discuss what significance it has for the animals and how it is connected with the
other functions of its life. (Strakhov, “Course” 107-108)
Strakhov also wrote a brief preface to the second edition of World as a Whole. He
spoke candidly there, calling Darwinism a “delusion” and returned to themes he had first
developed twenty years earlier in “A Revolution in the Sciences.” Strakhov claimed,
without justification, that Darwin’s theory was not “a success in the science on
organisms, but a deviation from the straight path, and, no matter how interesting the
particulars are that naturalists put together on this divergent path, sooner or later they will
have to return to the proper paths of investigation and undertake anew the great work that
they had intended avoid (Strakhov, “Predislovie” XVI). Naturalists would eventually,
Strakhov thought, have to return to the work that had come to a halt because of Darwin’s
theory.
He contended, “under the rule of Darwinism, naturalists don’t see the higher
meaning of these investigations and ignore them” (Strakhov, “Predislovie” XVII), but
rather content themselves with the “superficial” explanation provided by the notion of
chance. Finally, Strakhov, gave his readers an idea of what he understood not only by
“proper science,” but also “evolution”:
[For] one who looks at the matter correctly, every step [in a series of evolutionary
transitions] is a manifestation of a creative principle that constructs organic forms;
consequently, a every such series of forms is filled with the deepest enlightenment
in all its particulars. In just the same way, we suppose that we found the use of
some organ, the meaning of a given part for a given whole. For the Darwinist this
is a chance goal-directed nature that has no relation to the internal development of
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an organism; a true teleologist sees here how an organism tends to realize its
general goal, sees the response of a self-building being to external agitation and
circumstances. (Strakhov, “Predislovie” XVII)
Now, twenty years after publishing “A Revolution in the Sciences”, Strakhov still wanted
a progressive, teleological element that undirected variation was incapable of providing.
But now when he spoke of the harmony brought about by evolution, he did so in almost
mystical terms. In keeping with his organicism, he maintained that such a teleology and
“deeper” order did, in fact, exist; Darwinism’s mechanistic thinking had just clouded the
issue because such thinking had no place for them in his explanatory framework.
Although Darwin had described the process of evolution as taking place at the level of
the population, Strakhov saw it as an innate drive permeating every single organism.
Conclusion
Strakhov had certainly become a more prolific writer in his anti-Darwinian
period. But he was most prolific when he was writing in memory and defense of
Danilevskii; he wrote more during this period than in his other Darwin-related writings
altogether. After becoming an anti-Darwinist, Strakhov wrote only four of his own
articles. Their contents varied little despite the fact that his penultimate work “On the
Development of Organisms” and his final work on Darwin’s theory “The Course and
Character of Contemporary Natural History” were separated by almost two decades.
At one time, the subject of mankind had pervaded Strakhov’s writings. In both
“Bad Signs” and “How Man Differs from the Animals,” Darwinian theory upheld
Strakhov’s organicist conviction of human exceptionalism. And it was the realization that
humanity is the product of undirected variation and thus that Darwin’s theory did not, in
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fact, support his anthropocentrism, which drove his underlying criticism in “A
Revolution in the Sciences.” After 1872, he made no mention of human evolution or of
humans as emblems of evolutionary progress. But the source of variation, its undirectedness, and the workings of heredity, topics that Strakhov had previously left unmentioned,
now came to the fore and stayed there. Darwin’s theory of natural selection had thus
superseded his theory of common descent as the primary target of Strakhov’s criticism. In
switching from criticizing the implications that undirected variation had for human
evolution to criticizing the source of variation itself, Strakhov had begun to criticize not
what Darwin had explained, but what he had not.
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CHAPTER THREE
LEV TOLSTOY: CHRISTIAN ETHICSAND ANTI-DARWINISM
Introduction
The Russian nobleman Count Lev Tolstoy (1828-1910) is known first and
foremost for his contributions to world literature: through his novels War and Peace
(1869) and Anna Karenina he joined the ranks of literary giants. During his lifetime,
though, he also did less well remembered humanitarian work that conferred on him the
status of moral leader to the nation. For example, he took a large part in the relief effort
for the famine that afflicted Russian from 1891-1892. Tolstoy’s status as an international
celebrity put him largely beyond the Tsar’s reach and thus enabled him to speak truth to
autocratic power: he laid the blame for the famine squarely at the Tsar’s and the
Orthodox Church’s feet. This was just one in a series of confrontations that Tolstoy had
with them in the years following his conversion to an idiosyncratic Christianity. Only
years later, he would use the proceeds of his final novel Resurrection (1899) to help fund
the emigration and resettlement of a persecuted religious minority – the Dukhobors
(literally, “spirit-fighters”) – in Canada. His criticism of the Orthodox Church in
Resurrection proved to be a last straw, resulting in Tolstoy’s excommunication. The
example he set as an unflinching defender of morality was an inspiration to moral
authorities including Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) and later Martin Luther King Jr.
(1929-1968). From the time of his conversion until the day he died, nothing was exempt
from the scrutiny of Tolstoy’s moralizing gaze. Though Tolstoy had no formal scientific
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training, science in general, and Darwin’s new theory of evolution in particular, came in
for unrelenting and critical examination. Unsurprisingly, they were found morally
wanting.
Tolstoy and the Historical Record
The moral panic that Tolstoy felt late in life because of Darwin is well
established. To take a well known story, the Count left his ancestral home at Iasnaia
Poliana in 1910, at the age of eighty-two, following a quarrel with his wife. Within a
week, he contracted pneumonia and had to stop at the Astapovo railway station. From
there he was taken to the stationmaster’s house, where he spent his last days bed-ridden
(Bartlett 412). Tolstoy suspected he was dying, so, being too sick to write, he dictated to
his daughter Alexandra what would be his penultimate letter. He implored his son
Seryozha:
[To] think about your life, about who you are, what you are, what the
meaning of human life is, and how every rational person should live it.
The views you have acquired about Darwinism, evolution, and the
struggle for existence won’t explain the meaning of your life and they
won’t give you guidance in your actions, and a life without an explanation
of its importance and meaning and without the unfailing guidance that
follows from it, is a pitiful existence. Think about it. I say this, on what is
probably the eve of my death, because I love you. (Tolstoi PSS 81: 300)70
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All translations of Tolstoy’s correspondence are my own.
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Despite the fact that Tolstoy’s antipathy to Darwin is so well known and Tolstoy’s life
has been so well documented, the historical record suffers from a distinct lack of basic
information as to whether Tolstoy had, in fact, read Darwin and how well he knew and
understood Darwin’s work. For example, the only book by Darwin that was found in
Tolstoy’s personal collection at Iasnaia Poliana was The Journey around the World and
to South America (Puteshestvie na korable “Bigl’”) (1895), though certain books are
known to have been given away or lost. There was even a the fire that occurred when
Iasnaia Poliana was briefly occupied by Nazis during the Second World War (Turner
108). Furthermore, when Tolstoy did write about Darwin, his discussions were brief and
idiosyncratic. For example, Tolstoy rarely called Darwin’s theory one of “natural
selection.” The only example I have found of Tolstoy’s using the word “selection”
(“podbor”) comes from Anna Karenina (Tolstoi, PSS 19).71 Rather, as we will see, when
he spoke of Darwin’s theory, he called it the “law of the struggle for existence.” Thus, as
the literary critics Anna Berman and Richard Gustafson note, questions arise and remain
unanswered not only as to whether Tolstoy ever read the Origin or Descent or whether he
had only read about them in the thick journals (Berman 335), but how well he understood
them (Gustafson 21). The goal of this chapter is to provide an assessment of Tolstoy’s
understanding of Darwin’s ideas and the degree to which his ability to accept them
changed with respect to developments in his own thinking. In particular, I examine
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Tolstoy used what was then the standard translation of “selection”: “podbor.” As noted in the previous
chapter, “podbor” was the rendering Rachinskii used in his translation of the Origin, first published in
1864. The fact that Tolstoy used “podbor,” however, establishes only that he was familiar with the Russian
discussion of Darwin, not that he had, in fact, read the Origin. Indeed, Tolstoy kept himself abreast of
scientific developments through Strakhov, who had begun using “podbor” in 1865.
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Tolstoy’s initial ambivalence as to the relevance of Darwin’s theory to determining moral
responsibility; the growth of this ambivalence into a panicked certainty that Darwinian
theory undermined the very foundations of such responsibility; and, ultimately, the
conviction that only through a morality founded on Christian principles are humans
capable of realizing their potentially selfless nature.
1859-1869: The Early Years
When Tolstoy first encountered Darwin’s work still remains unclear.

It is

unlikely, however, that Tolstoy read Darwin before 1862. A polyglot, Tolstoy could have
read the book in multiple languages, and by 1864, the Origin was available in at least
four: following its 1859 publication in England, the Origin was translated into German in
1860, into French in 1862, and into Russian in 1864. Tolstoy’s mastery of French and his
native Russian is undeniable. His proficiency in German and English in the early 1860s
is, however, ambiguous.72 Tolstoy, thus, most likely read the Origin in French or Russian
and therefore no earlier than 1862.
The earliest evidence documenting Tolstoy’s familiarity with Darwin comes in his
War and Peace manuscripts. The revisions Tolstoy was making at the time Darwin’s
name appears are estimated to have occurred in the late 1860s (McLean 15). The
passages Tolstoy was reworking did wind up in the second epilogue that was published,
yet no mention of Darwin made it into the final draft – a fact that could be explained by
the contemporaneous ban on works about Darwin’s work.
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A. V. Knowles describes Tolstoy’s 1861 trip to England and the troubles he had with English while
there in “Some Aspects of L. N. Tolstoy’s Visit to London in 1861: An Examination of the Evidence” in
The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (January, 1978): 106-114. Tolstoy himself writes
to the publisher Mikahil Katkov about an article by Karl Vogt that he had his sister-in-law translate from
the German into Russian (Tolstoi, PSS 68; 69).
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In one reference, Darwin was listed together with other leading thinkers of the
time, such as the Russian physiologist Ivan Sechenov (1829-1905), the German
psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), and the English historian Henry Buckle
(1821-1862), all of whom Tolstoy vaguely described as “working in the service of the
new truth” about the malleability of character (Tolstoi, PSS 15: 315).73 The fact that
Tolstoy used the word “istina” instead of “pravda” to mean “truth” indicates that Tolstoy
thought their work had or was capable of having real, objective value. Indeed, as the
literary critic Hugh McLean has indicated, Tolstoy appears to have viewed Darwin here
quite favorably (McLean 15). As we will see, though, at the time that he was writing War
and Peace Darwin’s work proved to be largely irrelevant to Tolstoy’s larger exploration
of free will, determinism, and moral responsibility.
The second mention of Darwin that Tolstoy made in his War and Peace
manuscripts much more clearly illustrated this point: “The question of what this I is,
whether it can exist outside of time – are philosophical questions. But the question of
how freedom is limited by time is first of all a historical question. History looks at man in
time, and what for physiology (Sechenov, Vogt), for zoology (Darwin) is impossible, is
undoubtedly and inevitably resolved by history” (Tolstoi, PSS 15: 314).74 Thus, even

“Но в астрономии истина взяла свое. Так точно в наше время истина подвижности личности
должна взять свое. С разных сторон идет сложная упорная работа в пользу новой истины. Все науки
работают в ее пользу. Зоология (Дарвин), физиология (Сеченов), психология (Вунт), философия
(неразобр.), история (Бокль). Истина есть только отсутствие заблуждений, есть только новое
удобство мышлений, и потому она всегда проста, ясна и доступна, и вся трудность
восторженствования ее состоит только в победе над заблуждением” (Толстой, ПСС 15: 315).
74 Если человек, я мое, может выйти из условий времени, то я это будет иметь абсолютную свободу.
Я свободно, но вне времени. Во времени же оно имеет бесконечно малый момент. Вопросы о том,
что есть это я, может ли оно быть вне времени – суть вопросы философские.
73

Но вопрос ограничения свободы врменем есть первый вопрос исторический. История рассматривает
человека во времени, и то, что для физиоло(ии) (Сеч(енов), Фохт), для зоолог(ии) (Дарвин) есть
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though Darwin’s name is nowhere to be found in the final draft of the novel that was
published, when Tolstoy spoke of zoology, he, at least, had Darwin in mind, and he
considered Darwin’s work unsuited and irrelevant to his discussion of free will.
War and Peace, Free Will, and Dostoevsky’s Underground Man
Tolstoy began writing what would become War and Peace in 1863 and by 1865
portions were appearing in installments under the title “The Year 1805.” But by the time
of their publication, Tolstoy had already started to change his mind about the course of
the novel. In 1869, during this period of revision, the second epilogue Tolstoy wrote for
the novel began to take shape.
The first half of Tolstoy’s second epilogue consists of a philosophical discussion
about history and the nature of political and military power, and the attempts various
historians have made to understand history in terms of that power. In the second half, to
be discussed here, Tolstoy turns to the question of free will, arguing that removing the
assumption of free will from the study of history would revolutionize the field and make
possible the discovery of historical laws.
The actual relationship between determinism and free will that Tolstoy articulated
in the second epilogue was, as numerous scholars have demonstrated, borrowed from
Arthur Schopenhauer’s The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (1840) (Eikhenbaum
79-82; Berlin 51; Walsh 572-575; Love 42; Orwin 150-151). Yet, as we will see, Tolstoy

невозможность, несомненно и неизбежно разрешается историей. История не может допустить
иного. А она, именно она настаивает на рассмотрении событий с точки зрения свободы произвола
А(лександра) и Н(аполеона) и своего.
Предметом истории являются массы, действующие для неизвестных нам целей по закону
необходимости. И предметом изучения становятся не произволы людей, не достижение
выдуманных нами целей, но изыскание соотношений между явлениями – законов
(Толстой, ПСС 15: 314).
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not only refined and updated the argument by taking contemporary scientific
developments into account; he also published War and Peace in book form at a time
when the question of free will and determinism was a topical subject of controversy in
certain literary and sociopolitical journals. His attention to the topic, therefore, sheds light
on an important trend in Russian thought in the 1860s.
In particular, a protracted literary polemic had taken place between the radical
novelist and literary critic Nikolai Chernyshevskii (1828-1889) and the novelist and
conservative journalist Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881) during the first half of the 1860s.
In 1860, Chernyshevskii published in the liberal

75

journal The Contemporary

(Sovremennik) two articles that are now known collectively as “The Anthropological
Principle in Philosophy” (“Antropologicheskii printsip v filosofii”). There he sought to
demonstrate that scientific findings could be used to answer moral questions. Whether or
not humans have free will and, if not, whether we bear moral responsibility for our
actions was one such question. Chernyshevskii sided with the determinists, writing: “all
the phenomena of the moral world originate from one another and from external
circumstance in conformity with the law of causality, and on this basis all assumptions
that there can be any phenomena that do not arise from preceding phenomena and from
external circumstances are regarded as false” (Chernyshevsky 94).
The will, of course, was no exception, for it was nothing other than “a link in a
series of phenomena and facts joined together by [a] causal connection” (Chernyshevsky
95). For Chernyshevskii, the fact that the universe is governed by laws of nature rules out
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Generally speaking, liberals challenged the status quo, which conservatives sought to maintain.
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the very possibility of free will.76 He is thus a determinist and, furthermore, what could
be anachronistically called an “incompatibilist,” because he believes that determinism is
true and views the possible answers to the question of whether humans have free will as
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In other words, either human behavior is not
subject to laws of nature, and humans therefore have free will, or their behavior is subject
to such laws, and therefore they do not have free will: having free will is not compatible
with being subject to the laws of nature. By contrast, “compatibilists” hold that if
determinism is true, it is compatible with free will and “libertarians” believe that
determinism is not only incompatible with free will, but is also not true.77
Furthermore, given our lack of free will, it makes no sense to speak of moral
responsibility. For the latest science has, Chernyshevskii insists, overturned the
prevailing view that “‘in one case a man performs a bad action because he wanted to
perform a bad action; and in another case he performs a good action because he wanted to
perform a good action.’ [The latest science] says that the bad action, or the good action,
was certainly prompted by some moral or material fact, or combination of facts, and that
the ‘wanting’ was only the subjective impression which accompanies in our minds the
rise of thoughts or actions from preceding thoughts, actions or external facts”
(Chernyshevsky 94). That is, our actions are the products of numerous causes beyond our
control; our minds simply try to make sense of our behavior --its causes and its effects--in
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That Chernyshevskii was a determinist and therefore denied the possibility of free will is uncontroversial
among scholars. See, for example, Irina Paperno’s “Recapitulation: Marriage” in Chernyshevsky and the
Age of Realism; Joseph Frank’s “Notes from Underground” in Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time; Derek
Offord’s “Dostoyevsky and Chernyshevsky” in The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 57, No. 4
(October, 1979): 509-530; and James P. Scanlan’s “The Case against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky’s
‘Notes from Underground,’” in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 60, No. 3 (July, 1999): 549-567.
77 For a recent overview of the debate about free will, see: Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk
Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
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terms of what we “want.” Thus determinism is also incompatible with moral
responsibility. Chernyshevskii even went so far as to claim that knowledge about human
behavior, together with the fact of determinism, could be used to alter living conditions
so that they would bring out only the good in people (Chernyshevsky 99). That is, science
could make us better people.
Such claims were foremost among Dostoevsky’s targets in his 1864 Notes from
Underground (Zapiski iz podpol’ia).78 Irked by Chernyshevskii’s seemingly unbounded
optimism about science’s potential to solve the moral problems of everyday life,
Dostoevsky produced a character whose primary purpose was to expose the futility and
dangers of such a program: the anonymous “Underground Man.”
The narrator begins his monologue by declaring:
I am a sick man…I am a wicked man. An unattractive man. I think my
liver hurts. However, I don’t know a fig about my sickness, and am not
sure what it is that hurts me. I am not being treated and never have been,
though I respect medicine and doctors. What’s more, I am also
superstitious in the extreme; well, at least enough to respect
medicine…No, sir, I refuse to be treated out of wickedness. Now, you will
certainly not be so good as to understand this. Well, sir, but I understand
it. I will not, of course, be able to explain to you precisely who is going to
suffer in this case from my wickedness; I know perfectly well that I will in
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For more on their polemic, see, for example, Joseph Frank’s “Notes from Underground” in Dostoevsky:
A Writer in His Time; Derek Offord’s “Dostoyevsky and Chernyshevsky” in The Slavonic and East
European Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (October, 1979): 509-530; James P. Scanlan’s “The Case against Rational
Egoism in Dostoevsky’s ‘Notes from Underground,’” in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 60, No. 3
(July, 1999): 549-567; and David Bethea and Victoria Thorstensson’s “Darwin, Dostoevsky, and Russia’s
Radical Youth” in Dostoevsky Beyond Dostoevsky.
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no way ‘muck things up’ for the doctors by not taking their treatment; I
know better than anyone that by all this I am harming only myself and no
one else. But still, if I don’t get treated, it is out of wickedness. My liver
hurts; well, then let it hurt even worse! (Dostoevsky, Notes 3-4)
Emerging from this tirade is the picture of a man consciously bent on self-destruction,
and this opening proves to be just the first of many such seemingly inexplicable
moments. Eventually, the narrator begins formulating a model of human nature, one that
both explains his own behavior and exposes what he believes to be a faulty assumption in
the model Chernyshevskii set out in “The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy.” His
own behavior therefore serves as an illustration of Chernyshevskii’s error.
Despite appearances to the contrary, the narrator does not for a moment deny the
reality of determinism. 79 Indeed, he is, like Chernyshevskii, a determinist and
incompatibilist. “Once it’s proved to you,” he says scornfully, “that you descended from
an ape, there’s no use making a wry face, just take it for what it is” (Dostoevsky, Notes
13). All the same, he contends that though he may not be able to change the laws of
nature, such powerlessness does not entail that he has to submit to them without
objection. For that reason, the literary scholar Gary Saul Morson has called him an
“antideterminist” (Morson 92).
Frustrated, the Underground Man even concedes that, our persisting moral
intuitions notwithstanding, the fact of determinism makes the concept of moral
79

As was the case with Chernyshevskii, the fact that Dostoevsky was a determinist is accepted among
scholars. See, for example, Gary Saul Morson’s “The Hazards of History” in Hidden in Plain View, Joseph
Frank’s “Notes from Underground” in Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time, and Jane Barstow’s
“Dostoevsky’s ‘Notes from Underground’ versus Chernyshevsky’s ‘What Is to Be Done?’” in College
Literature. Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1978), 24-33.
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responsibility incoherent, writing: “Before your eyes the object vanishes, the reasons
evaporate, the culprit is not to be found, the offense becomes not an offense but a fatum,
something like a toothache, for which no one is to blame, and, consequently, what
remains is again the same way out – that is, to give the wall a painful beating”
(Dostoevsky, Notes 18). Unlike Chernyshevskii, however, the Underground Man does
not believe that people act badly simply out of ignorance, and that were people to be
shown what was truly in their best interests, they would start acting better. No, “all these
beautiful systems,” he declares, “all these theories that explain to mankind its true,
normal interest, so that, striving necessarily to attain these interests, it would at once
become good and noble – all this, in my opinion, is so far only a logical exercise!”
(Dostoevsky, Notes 22). He continues, “[For] man is so partial to systems and abstract
conclusions that he is ready intentionally to distort the truth, to turn a blind eye and a deaf
ear, only so as to justify his logic” (Dostoevsky, Notes 23). Thus, the narrator is casting
doubt on an empirical assumption Chernyshevskii had made about the importance of our
sense of freedom to human nature.
The Underground Man is afraid that, instead of showing humankind the error of
its behavioral ways, science will only show man the truth of determinism and undermine
the important role of choice in humanity’s sense of identity --“that in fact he has neither
will nor caprice, and never did have any, and that he himself is nothing but a sort of piano
key or a sprig in an organ; and that, furthermore, there also exist in the world the laws of
nature; so that whatever he does is done not at all according to his own wanting, but of
itself, according to the laws of nature” (Dostoevsky, Notes 24).
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The Underground Man then begins to contemplate the effect that such
information would have on mankind’s sense of purpose and identity. The problem is not
the truth of determinism itself, for he is willing to grant that the scientific discoveries
only need to be made and “all human actions will then be calculated according to these
laws, mathematically, like a table of logarithms…and entered into a calendar; or, better
still, some well-meaning publications will appear…in which everything will be so
precisely calculated and designated that there will no longer be any actions or adventures
in the world” (Dostoevsky, Notes 24). Furthermore, he even admits that such discoveries
are, in principle, possible and that in time they will become a reality because “it’s vile
and senseless to believe beforehand that there are certain laws of nature which man will
never learn (Dostoevsky, Notes 27).
What concerns him, though, is that the idea of choice is central to mankind’s
identity. Our sense of choice “preserves for us the most important and dearest thing, that
is, our personality and our individuality” (Dostoevsky, Notes 28-29). Man will even go so
far as to want what is injurious to him, if only to insist on getting his way (Dostoevsky,
Notes 31). Indeed, he will risk everything “with the sole purpose of confirming to himself
(as if it were so very necessary) that human beings are still human beings and not piano
keys…” (Dostoevsky, Notes 30).
Thus, the Underground Man contends that we as humans find meaning in
understanding our lives as a series of choices for us to make. Knowing that we will come
to decisions that are not made of our own free will thus deprives us of that meaning. Such
knowledge – that our behavior is determined and, in particular, that we tend to act in our
best interests – will inevitably cause us to irrationally mount a futile, metaphysical
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rebellion against the fact of determinism and even go so far as to act self-destructively to
feel in control of our lives. However, as Gary Saul Morson has noted, the Underground
Man is well aware that his spiteful, self-destructive actions do not, in fact, “demonstrate
his freedom; they demonstrate only the inadequacy of the most naïve models of human
behavior” (Morson 91). That is, the Underground Man entertains no hopes of “breaking”
the laws of nature; rather he hopes to draw critical attention to the fact that
Chernyshevskii’s idealized model of human behavior and overly optimistic program of
social reform ignore the unknown effects that the very knowledge of determinism could
have on human behavior.
War and Peace: The Second Epilogue
Unlike Chernyshevskii and Dostoevsky, when Tolstoy delved into the question of
free will and determinism, he looked as it were to history to test his hypotheses. The very
fact that the question of whether humans have free will has gone unsolved for so long is,
Tolstoy thought, because the field of history is, in effect, the study of human behavior
and is practiced by humans themselves: unlike the physicists’ particle of matter, humans
can and do intervene and claim that they have free will. The field of history has, as a
result, been marred by historians’ continual failure to solve the question of whether
humans have free will.
Like both Chernyshevskii and Dostoevsky, Tolstoy was an incompatibilist. For,
as he declared: “if there is just one law that governs the actions of men, then there can be
no free will, for the will of men would have to submit to that law” (Tolstoy, War 1200).
But the problem has resisted being permanently solved owing to a discrepancy between
our third-person knowledge and our first-person experience. We humans know, Tolstoy
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maintains, that our behavior is determined, but our conscious experience is characterized
by an irreconcilable sense of freedom. As Tolstoy remarks,
A series of experiments and arguments shows each man that as an object
of observation he is subject to certain laws, and man submits to them and
never fights against the law of gravity or of impermeability, once he
knows them. But that same series of experiments and arguments shows
him that full freedom which he is conscious of in himself, is impossible,
that his every action depends on his constitution, his character, and the
motives that influence him; yet man never submits to the conclusions of
these experiments and arguments. (Tolstoy, War 1201)
Despite knowing this to be true, humans cannot and do not accept it:
However many times experience and argument have shown a man that in
the same conditions, with the same character, he would do the same thing
he did before, he, when he sets out for the thousandth time, in the same
conditions, with the same character, on an action that has always ended the
same way, undoubtedly feels no less certain that he can act as he pleases
than he did before the experience. (Tolstoy, War 1201-1202)
That is, we humans always believe -- to the point of absurdity-- that we “could
have done otherwise.” Our conscious experience makes us simply incapable of coming to
terms with what we rationally know to be true: our behavior is subject to the laws of
nature. Thus, Tolstoy, like Chernyshevskii and Dostoevsky, believed at this time our
behavior to be so subject and was, therefore, as is generally acknowledged, a determinist
(Morson 90-92; Walsh 572; Barnhart 45; Berlin 51). Furthermore, knowing that
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determinism is true, together with his belief in incompatibilism, Tolstoy insists, has farreaching implications. Indeed, what is to become of any notions of moral responsibility if
human behavior is determined? At the same time, the fact of determinism nonetheless
does not explain how our conscious experience still appears free.
Tolstoy worried that this apparent freedom -- what he called the “other side of the
question” – would not get the scientific attention that it deserved. For those Tolstoy
jeeringly called “the advanced people” had taken recent developments in science on the
question of determinism to obviate the need to study our subjective experience of
apparent free will. It is at this point that Tolstoy turns to Darwinism:
The soul and freedom do not exist, because the life of man is expressed in
muscular movements, and muscular movements are conditioned by
nervous activity; the soul and freedom do not exist, because at some
unknown period of time we descended from the apes – they say, write and
print, not even suspecting that thousands of years ago all religions and all
thinkers not only recognized but never tried to deny that very law of
necessity 80 which they now try so zealously to prove by means of
physiology and comparative zoology. (Tolstoy, War 1203)
That is, even if the work done in the natural sciences further confirms and refines our
understanding of determinism, it does not address how it is that our subjective experience
appears free.
It is worth noting that while Tolstoy wrote favorably, if vaguely, of Darwin in his
manuscripts, the language he uses here in the second epilogue does not entail that he

80

By the “law of necessity” Tolstoy means “causality.”
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accepted Darwin’s theory, let alone the Darwinian idea of man’s simian descent.
Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, Darwin did not take up the topic of human
evolution until The Descent of Man, published in 1871, two years after Tolstoy wrote the
second epilogue. Thus, Tolstoy, like Dostoevsky, was, rather, presumably referring to
Huxley’s Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (1863), a work inspired by the Origin.
Again, as noted previously, two translations of Huxley’s book had appeared in Russian in
1864. However, it is also possible that both Russian writers could have been referring to
the German naturalist Karl Vogt’s Lectures on Man: His Place in Creation and in the
History of the Earth, published in Russian translation between 1863 and 1865, or to the
German botanist Mathias Schleiden’s The Antiquity of the Human Race, the Origin of
Species, and the Place of Man in Nature, which was also published in Russian in 1863.
Both writers were supporters of Darwinism and both of their works on humanity’s place
in nature were inspired by the Origin (Montgomery 82-83; 107).

Without more

information, though, it is impossible to say which of these Darwinist works Tolstoy and
Dostoevsky had in mind.81
However, any reservations Tolstoy had on the subject were not intractable on
principle. Indeed, as Tolstoy wrote:
If men descended from the apes at an unknown period of time, that is as
comprehensible as that men descended from a handful of earth at a known
period of time (in the first case the x is time, in the second the descent),
and the question of how the consciousness of man’s freedom can be
81

Although the list made of the contents of Dostoevsky’s personal library does not include copies of any
works by Huxley, Vogt, or Schleiden in any language (Biblioteka), such literary scholars as David Bethea
and Victoria Thorstensson have taken Dostoevsky to be referring to Huxley’s As to Man’s Place in Nature
(Bethea and Thorstensson 46).
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combined with the law of necessity to which man is subject cannot be
resolved by comparative physiology and zoology, for in the frog, the
rabbit, and the ape we observe only muscular and nervous activity, while
in man both muscular and nervous activity and consciousness. (Tolstoy,
War 1203)
Hence, like Strakhov, whom he would meet after publishing War and Peace, Tolstoy
showed an interest not only in knowing that humans have evolved, but also in knowing
the particular path that their evolution took. Such information would make the idea of
man’s simian descent more palatable; otherwise, the immensity of the time necessary for
such evolution, as an abstraction, would make the idea inconceivable. Tolstoy also
echoed a claim here that he had made in his manuscripts, asserting that the field of study
best suited to studying humankind and solving the question of free will is history.
Because zoology treated humans as just one organism among many, it was incapable of
treating humans as unique. Darwin’s work was therefore irrelevant to the study of free
will and determinism.
As Tolstoy looks to the field of history for answers, though, rather than discuss
man’s apparent experience of free will, he subtly changes the topic to how humans judge
moral responsibility based on the degree to which an act is perceived to have been
performed freely, without constraint.
When evaluating an action, we see it, as Tolstoy claims, in terms of both freedom
and necessity: “The ratio of freedom to necessity decreases or increases depending on the
point of view from which the action is examined; but this ratio always remains inversely
proportional” (Tolstoy, War 1204). Thus, as one’s actions become increasingly
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constrained, one’s moral responsibility for those actions decreases proportionally. For
example:
A drowning man who clutches another and drowns him, or a hungry
mother, exhausted from nursing her baby, who steals food, or a man
accustomed to discipline who stands in a firing squad and kills a
defenseless man on command, appears less guilty, that is, less free and
more subject to the law of necessity, to someone who knows the
conditions these people were in, and more free to someone who does not
know that the man was himself drowning, that the mother was hungry, that
the soldier was in a firing squad, and so on. (Tolstoy, War 1204-1205)
Enlarging on Schopenhauer’s account of moral responsibility, Tolstoy further
contends that our intuitions about moral responsibility follow from an evaluation of three
factors: “(1) The relation of the man committing the act to the external world, (2) to time,
and (3) to the causes producing the act” (Tolstoy, War 1205). That is, in abstraction, an
act appears absolutely free and one’s moral responsibility for that act complete. But once
an act is considered in all its particularities, it begins to appear less free and one’s moral
responsibility diminishes proportionally. “(1)” entails that knowing that a man is
drowning, as opposed to standing on dry land, or has a family to support, as opposed to
lives alone, adds to our perception that his actions are less free and he is for that reason
less morally culpable (Tolstoy, War 1205). “(2)” entails that the more recently an action
takes place, the freer it will appear. As the timescale increases since an event took place,
the event itself looks more fixed and less avoidable. Hence, one may sense that an event
that took place moments ago could have been avoided, whereas an event that took place
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years ago does not (Tolstoy, War 1205-1206). Finally, “(3),” a more general form of
“(1),” entails that the more one knows about the person performing an act and the events
leading up to that act, the less freedom and moral responsibility one attributes to him. For
example, knowing that criminal was raised by criminals is a mitigating factor in our
determination of his guilt (Tolstoy, War 1206-1207). 82 Thus, Tolstoy concludes:
“Responsibility appears greater or less, depending on a greater or lesser knowledge of the
conditions in which the man whose action is being reviewed found himself and on the
greater or lesser span of time from the committing of the act to the judging of it, and on
the greater or less understanding of the causes of the act” (Tolstoy, War 1207).
Thus, when Tolstoy entered the debate on free will and determinism, he was in
complete agreement with Chernyshevskii and Dostoevsky about the truth of determinism:
having free will is not compatible with human behavior’s being subject to the laws of
nature. They were also all ardent determinists and believed as incompatibilists that the
fact of determinism left no room for moral responsibility. Their points of disagreement
only became apparent when considering the practical implications of this information.
Chernyshevskii optimistically believed that humans would change their ways and
act better once the truth of the matter became known to them. Dostoevsky, on the other
hand, depicted a character whose model of human nature predicted that when we humans
realize that we have no free will, they will become distraught and go to irrational lengths
so as to feel in control of our fate. Tolstoy’s conclusions, however, are neither as
optimistic as Chernyshevskii’s nor as pessimistic as Dostoevsky’s.

82

Speaking of moral responsibility, Tolstoy makes no determinations about legal responsibility.
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For Tolstoy, following Schopenhauer, articulated an explicit distinction between
our knowledge of determinism from a third person, or scientific, perspective and our
subjective experience of free will from a first person perspective. Until, for example,
more detailed information came to light, the fact that humans and the apes share a
common ancestor was practically irrelevant to behavior; Darwin’s work was therefore not
pertinent yet. Such knowledge only further substantiated the truth of determinism.
Admittedly, Tolstoy was much less clear about whether or not he accepted such
components of Darwin’s theory as common descent and the multiplication of species. As
his description of Darwin’s work in his manuscripts indicates – he used the word “istina”
(“ absolute truth”) -- he simply admired the work Darwin was doing. The fact that
Tolstoy spoke highly of Darwin’s work, yet insisted that it was morally irrelevant stands
out all the more because Tolstoy justified his later antipathy to Darwinism on the grounds
that it represented a direct threat to morality.
Until such a time when science can explain our conscious experience of apparent
free will, Tolstoy was content with the notion of proporational moral responsibility
outlined above. Indeed, determinism was by no means as powerful and threatening a truth
for Tolstoy as it was for Dostoevsky. For that reason, Tolstoy felt justified in continuing
to hold humans morally responsible for their actions, though, as he was quick to point
out, our everyday notions do, in fact, take into account extenuating circumstances or, that
is, factors beyond our control that nonetheless determine our actions. Hence, as the
number and degree of the constraints on one’s actions increase, together with our
knowledge of them, the portion of one’s moral responsibility for those actions decreases
proportionally.
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1869-1892: The Making of an anti-Darwinist
This period marks the time when Tolstoy’s views on Darwin’s theory underwent a
radical change. Before the publication of War and Peace, Tolstoy had said little about
Darwin’s theory, and what he did have to say was, at best, vaguely positive, though he
found Darwin’s work irrelevant to his own concerns. After he published War and Peace,
Tolstoy’s attitude to Darwinism grew into a pointed antagonism, culminating in an essay
he wrote in 1893 in which his views on Darwin’s theory were the diametric opposite to
those he held in the late 1860’s. By then, Darwin’s theory was not only relevant to his
concerns; in fact, Tolstoy found it morally pernicious.
As noted in the previous chapter, during his time at Dawn (Zaria) Strakhov wrote
an article titled “War and Peace: a Work by Count Lev Tolstoy” (“Voina i mir.
Sochinenie Grafa L. N. Tolstogo”). The article caught Tolstoy’s attention, and after a
brief correspondence, Tolstoy invited Strakhov to visit him at his home at Iasnaia Poliana
(Tolstoi, PSS 61: 314). The two men finally met in 1871 and began what would become a
lifelong friendship.
Strakhov also became Tolstoy’s link to the scientific world. Through Strakhov, he
was able to keep abreast of recent scientific developments. For not only did Tolstoy read
and discuss Strakhov’s own writings with him, but he also sent requests to Strakhov, who
lived in what was then the capital, Saint-Petersburg, asking him to find, acquire, and then
send articles and books to Tolstoy at his comparatively remote estate. This was a longlasting tendency: as late as 1893, for instance, Tolstoy would write to Strakhov, “Can you
send me Huxley’s speech about evolution and ethics in English, with annotations. I read
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it in Russian in Russian Thought. How stupid” (Tolstoi, PSS 66: 536).83 More often,
though, when Tolstoy wrote to Strakhov about Darwin’s theory, it was to discuss
Strakhov’s own writings on the subject.84 For example, in a letter dated March 3rd, 1872,
Tolstoy congratulated Strakhov on the recent publication of his article “A Revolution in
Science,” writing: “Your most recent article about Darwin is your most wonderful yet.”
(Tolstoy, PSS 61: 362).85
This 1872 letter marks the first time Tolstoy mentioned Darwin’s name in writing
since the publication of War and Peace. Thus, he may have changed his mind about
Darwin’s theory and become an anti-Darwinist only three years after publishing War and
Peace in book form. However, given the fact that Strakhov used his article primarily to
express his anxiety about the moral implications of Darwin’s theory, it is entirely possible
that Tolstoy could share Strakhov’s concerns and still remain a Darwinist. Alternatively,
since Tolstoy said nothing concrete about Strakhov’s article, it is quite possible that he
was still a Darwinist, and his comment was his way of encouraging his new friend in his
journalistic endeavors. In other words, Tolstoy’s views on Darwin’s theory did change
after he met Strakhov, but they may not have changed because of Strakhov.
Regardless, Tolstoy continued to support Strakhov’s increasingly antagonistic
anti-Darwinism. For example, Tolstoy wrote a letter to Strakhov, in 1874, about
Strakhov’s recent article “On the Development of Organisms” (“O razvitii organizmov”),
saying:
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“Не можете ли мне прислать речь Гексли об эволюции и этике по-английски с приме[чаниями]. Я
прочел по-русски в Р[усской] М[ысли]. Как глупо” (Толстой, ПСС 66: 536).
84 To my knowledge, this is the only letter Tolstoy sent to Strakhov asking for works related to Darwin’s
theory.
85 “И статей ваших не было до нынешней прекрасной о Дарвине” (Толстой, ПСС 61: 362)
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I thank you, dear Nikolai Nikolaevich, for sending your article about Darwin. I
consumed it and felt that it was good and filling food. For me this is confirmation
of my obscure, vague thoughts on the subject and an expression of what, as it
were, I would like to express. One thing is surprising. The article you wrote, it
will be read. It is impossible to regard it with contempt and impossible not to
agree with it. But will it change even by a hair’s breadth the current opinion about
some new word uttered by Darwin? Not in the least. (Tolstoi, PSS 62: 51)86
As in the previous letter, it remains unclear what, if any, of the specific criticisms
that Strakhov made of Darwin’s theory Tolstoy shared at this time. The support Tolstoy
showed for Strakhov’s work, however, was unmistakable. That is not to say that Tolstoy
always agreed with Strakhov’s views. For example, during the late 1880s, when Strakhov
undertook the daunting task of defending his late friend Danilevskii’s book Darwinism
against Kliment Timiriazev’s attacks, Tolstoy encouraged Strakhov’s efforts repeatedly
in writing (Tolstoi, PSS 64: 181; 64: 359) But, as becomes clear from an exchange
Tolstoy had with the religious philosopher Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900) in November
of 1894, Tolstoy encouraged Strakhov’s efforts as a general practice, even if he did not
agree with them. Speaking of the falling out Solovyov had with Strakhov over
Danilevskii’s books, Tolstoy said: “I’m very glad that you’re not going to polemicize.
Your relationship to Strakhov, I understand and share it. Mine is almost the same: I value
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“Благодарю вас, дорогой Николай Николаевич, за присылку статьи о Дарвине; я проглотил ее и
почувствовал, что это хорошая и сытная пища. Для меня это было подтверждение моих неясных
мечтаний о том же предмете и выражение того, что как будто хотелось выразить. Одно
удивительно. Напечатана статья, прочтут ее. Отнестись к ней презрительно нельзя и не согласиться
нельзя. Что ж, изменит ли она хоть на волос общее ходячее мнение о каком-то новом слове
Дарвина? Нисколько” (Толстой, ПСС 62: 51).
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the man, but I’m often perplexed by the judgments he makes” (Tolstoy, PSS 66: 283).87
Hence, the fact that Tolstoy read Strakhov’s writings on Darwin and supported that work
does not necessarily entail that Tolstoy’s views were identical, let alone even similar to
Strakhov’s.
All the same, Tolstoy’s writings do suggest that by the late 1870s, he had become
highly critical of Darwinism, and his anti-Darwinism had developed in a way that was
generally similar to Strakhov’s. For like Strakhov, Tolstoy felt a mounting panic in the
1870s as to the moral and spiritual implications of Darwin’s theory.
For example, in his next novel, Anna Karenina (serialized: 1875-1877; published
as a book: 1877), Tolstoy described two protagonists -- the titular Anna Karenina and
Konstantin Levin – who are shown contemplating Darwin’s theory at moments of
spiritual crisis. Though their crises have different causes, their varying success in
resolving them is correlated with their belief about what, if anything, Darwinian theory
means for everyday life. Indeed, as the literary scholar Anna Berman has pointed out,
Levin experiences a crisis of faith as he struggles to reconcile his moral beliefs with the
developments of modern science. He ultimately rejects Darwin’s theory, declaring:
“Where could I have got it? By reason could I have arrived at knowing that I must
love my neighbor and not oppress him? I was told that in my childhood, and I
believed it gladly, for they told me what was already in my soul…Reason
discovered the struggle for existence, and the law that requires us to oppress all
who hinder the satisfaction of our desires. That is the deduction of reason. But
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“Очень радуюсь тому, что вы не будете полемизировать. Ваше отношение к Страхову я понимаю
и разделяю. Мое почти такое же: я дорожу человеком, но недоумеваю часто перед его суждениями”
(Толстой, ПСС 66: 283).
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loving one’s neighbor reason could never discover, because it’s irrational.”
(Tolstoy, Karenina 1142)
With Levin’s carefully reasoned rejection of Darwinian theory comes a spiritual
awakening (Berman 349-350).
Karenina, on the other hand, takes the Darwinian struggle for existence to heart.
During her time in Italy she makes a visit with her lover Aleksei Vronskii to the studio of
an artist named Mikhailov. Accompanying them on their visit is a friend, Golenishchev,
who tells them about the artist’s background, describing it in terms of the changes taking
place within society at large:
“[In] former days the free-thinker was a man who had been brought up in ideas of
religion, law, and morality, and only through conflict and struggle came to free
thought; but now there has sprung up a new type of born free-thinkers who grow
up without even having heard of principles of morality or of religion, of the
existence of authorities, who grow up directly in ideas of negation in everything,
that is to say, savages…In old times, you see, a man who wanted to educate
himself—a Frenchman, for instance—would have set to work to study all the
classics and theologians and tragedians and historians and philosophers, and, you
know, all the intellectual work that came in his way. But in our day he goes
straight for the literature of negation, very quickly assimilates all the extracts of
the science of negation, and he’s ready. And that’s not all—twenty years ago he
would have found in that literature traces of conflict with authorities, with the
creeds of the ages; he would have perceived from this conflict that there was
something else; but now he comes at once upon a literature in which the old
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creeds do not even furnish matter for discussion, but it is stated baldly that there is
nothing else—evolution, natural selection, struggle for existence—and that’s all.”
(Tolstoy, Karenina 675)
Golenishchev thus connects Darwin’s theory with nihilism and its unconditional rejection
of traditional values. Karenina eventually comes to see her discord with Vronskii in
Darwinian terms, with the word “struggle” haunting her increasingly bleak thoughts until
the carriage ride she takes right before committing suicide (Berman 348-349).
Clearly, by the time Tolstoy was writing Anna Karenina he had become keenly
aware of the potential moral danger that a Darwinian worldview based on interminable
struggle represented. He made sure to spell out this threat for his readers in Levin’s and
Karenina’s respective interactions with Darwinism. Such a critique was also sure to be
met with sympathy from Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887), the conservative editor of The
Russian Herald (Russkii vestnik), where Anna Karenina was serialized.
It is worth noting that Kliment Timiriazev (1843-1920), the leading Russian
Darwinist, felt the need to respond to what he believed was Tolstoy’s inaccurate
depiction of Darwin’s theory in Anna Karenina. In a public lecture given at Moscow
University in 1878, a year after Tolstoy had finished the novel (Timiriazev, “Obrazets”
28), Timiriazev criticized Tolstoy frankly:
Instead of justifying and defending [Darwin’s theory], I have to ask the accuser a
question, - a question that, I admit, is extremely impolite in well-mannered
society, even unacceptable, but is, unfortunately, almost always unavoidable
when dealing with Darwin’s opponents and accusers. The question is: have you
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read the book that you so eloquently denounce? And, not waiting for an answer,
one can reply: no, you haven’t read it. (Timiriazev, “Obrazets”45)88
Timiriazev called Levin’s Darwin an “enemy created by his own imagination”
(Timiriazev, “Obrazets” 45)89 after noting that Darwin had, in fact, given an explanation
for how morality could evolve in The Descent of Man (1871). The fact that Timiriazev
even felt the need to respond to a literary depiction of Darwin’s theory speaks to the
cultural capital Tolstoy had accrued by this point.
As he was finishing writing Anna Karenina, Tolstoy experienced a spiritual crisis
of his own, a crisis that ended in his converting to an idiosyncratic Christianity that would
touch every aspect of his thinking, including Darwinism. Although there was a brief
interval following the publication of Anna Karenina when Tolstoy did not write about
Darwin’s theory, by the mid-1880s he revisited it, and the effects of his conversion were
there for all to see.
Tolstoy returned to Darwin’s theory in the book So What are We to Do? (Tak chto
zhe nam delat’?), written from 1884-1886. There Tolstoy criticized the institutions of
science and the Russian Orthodox Church alike for what he considered to be, at the very
least, their complacency in the face of rampant moral turpitude, if not outright complicity
by inaction. When Tolstoy finally brought up Darwin, he did so in connection with the
influence Thomas Robert Malthus had had on the formulation of Darwin’s theory through
88

“Вместо того чтобы оправдываться, защищаться, приходится задать один вопрос самому
обвинителю, -- вопрос, сознаюсь, крайне невежливый, в благовоспитанном обществе даже
нетерпимый, но, к сожалению, неизбежный почти всегда, когда приходится иметь дело с
противниками и обличителями Дарвина, это вопрос: читали ли вы эту книгу, которую так
красноречиво обличаете? И, не дожидаясь ответа, можно ответить: нет, не читали” (Тимирязев,
“Образец” 45).
89 “А так как он этого ничего не знает, то, очевидно, борется против врага, созданного его
собственным воображением, понаслышке, на лету, подхватив одно слово ‘борьба’” (Тимирязев,
“Образец” 45).
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his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798). Tolstoy had nothing but contempt for
Malthus:
A very commonplace English writer, whose books are now almost forgotten and
recognized as the emptiest of all empty ones, wrote a tract upon population, in
which he invented an imaginary law that the means of living does not increase
with increase of population. This sham law the author dressed out with formulae
of mathematics, which have no foundation whatever, and published it. Judged by
the lightness of mind and the want of talent displayed in this treatise, we might
suppose that it would have passed unnoticed, and been forgotten as all other
writings of the same author have been; but it turned out quite differently. The
author who wrote it became at once a scientific authority, and has maintained this
high position for nearly half a century. Malthus! (Tolstoy, What? 188)
The core of Tolstoy’s criticism was that Malthus’ theory lacked empirical support:
The Malthusian theory, -- the law of the increase of population in geometrical
progression, and the increase of means of living in arithmetical progression, and
the natural and prudent means of restraining the increase of population, -- all these
became scientific, undoubted truths which have never been verified, but being
accepted as axioms, have served for further deductions. (Tolstoy, What? 188)
As Tolstoy himself indicated, he would not have cared about Malthus’ theory if it
were not for contemporary Russian scientists’ continued and adamant refusal to admit
that their work had any moral significance. Nor was Tolstoy alone in his criticism of
Malthus. As the Daniel P. Todes has demonstrated, criticizing the Malthusian component
of Darwin’s theory proved to be an almost distinctively Russian response in the
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international reception of Darwin’s theory. Todes suggests that this shared response
stemmed from the basic conditions of life in Russian including its class structure,
political conditions, and the nature of its land and climate. In particular, he noted:
Russia’s political economy lacked a dynamic pro-laissez faire bourgeoisie and
was dominated by landowners and peasants. The leading political tendencies,
monarchism and a socialist-oriented populism, shared a cooperative social ethos
and a distaste for the competitive individualism widely associated with Malthus
and Great Britain. Furthermore, Russia was an expansive, sparsely populated land
with swiftly changing and often severe climate. It is difficult to imagine a setting
less consonant with Malthus’s notion that organisms were pressed constantly into
mutual conflict by population pressures on limited space and resources. (Todes
168)
As for Tolstoy, while he readily admitted that Malthus’ theory of population had turned
out to be widely influential, itself serving as the basis for Darwin’s theory, he could not
sit idly by as it was used to justify iniquities in the name of science: “At first it appears
strange,” he admitted, “that the theory of evolution justifies men in their unrighteousness,
and that the scientific theory has only to do with facts, and does nothing else than observe
facts. But it only seems so” (Tolstoy, What? 189).
Tolstoy’s criticism contrasts sharply with the deterministic views he had laid out
in the second epilogue of War and Peace. In 1869, Tolstoy had championed a philosophy
of determinism that was incompatible with free will. He had declared that all behavior is
determined and that there is no such thing as free will. His discussion of moral
responsibility had come in the context of our apparently conscious experience of having
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free will. Although Tolstoy, to my knowledge, never explicitly disavowed his previous
claims -- about Darwin’s theory only further substantiating the truth of determinism and
being irrelevant to our understanding of moral responsibility until it could be brought to
bear on our understanding of our conscious experience of free will--, the fact that Tolstoy
criticized Darwin’s and Malthus’ theories for moral reasons indicates a radical shift in his
moral philosophy. By the mid-1880s, Tolstoy was worried that Darwin’s theory, based on
Malthus’, was turning from an explanation of behavior into an excuse for immoral
behavior. That is not to say that human behavior had become any less determined
following the publication of the Origin. Rather, knowledge of Darwin’s theory had itself
become a cause with its own effects. Tolstoy was writing So What are We to Do? to
counteract this dangerous tendency.
The book also contains Tolstoy’s most substantial discussion of multiple aspects
of Darwin’s theory. For example, Tolstoy questioned Darwin’s theories of common
descent and the multiplication of species, writing:
And now among all the idle play of ideas of so-called men of science, there also
appeared a similarly arbitrary and incorrect assertion, not a new one at all, to the
effect that all living beings, that is, organisms, proceed one from another; not only
one organism from another, but one organism from any; that during a very long
period, a million of years for instance, not only a fish and a duck may have
proceeded from one and the same forefather, but also one organism might have
proceeded from many separate organisms; so, for instance, out of a swarm of bees
a single animal may proceed. (Tolstoy, What? 194)
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Tolstoy was not simply balking on principle at the idea of common descent; for him it
was a matter of empirical support. He called the idea of common descent “arbitrary”
because, as he pointed out, “nobody has ever seen how one kind of organism is made
from others; and therefore the hypothesis about the origin of species will always remain a
mere supposition, and never will become an experimental fact” (Tolstoy, What? 194).
Without empirical verification, Darwin’s theory of the origin of species, was, as Tolstoy
had said in 1869, “the mere iteration of the question in another form” (Tolstoy, What?
194).
In other words, since no one had observed a speciation event, Darwin’s theory
remained an untested hypothesis. As such, the theory had no more practical relevance
than the solution the Biblical Moses had offered that “the variety of the species of living
beings proceeded from the will of God and His infinite omnipotence” (Tolstoy, What?
194). Darwin’s theory offered only the alternative explanation that “the variety of species
of living beings proceeded by themselves in consequence of the infinite variety of
conditions of inheritance and environment in an infinite period of time (Tolstoy, What?
194-195). Tolstoy saw such an explanation in much the same way that Strakhov had in
“A Revolution in Science” (1872), insisting that it amounted to nothing more than the
assertion that “by chance in an infinite period of time anything you like may proceed
from anything else you choose” (Tolstoy, What? 195).
What had once been a vaguely positive acceptance of Darwin’s theory had
become an unambiguously critical rejection. In 1869 Tolstoy had certainly seemed to
accept many of the components of Darwin’s theory, including the theories of common
descent, the multiplication of species, and gradualism. At the time these components had
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simply been irrelevant to the scientific question of conscious experience that so interested
him. Now, in 1885, Tolstoy’s criticism called into question whether he had, in fact,
accepted them then, in 1869, and for what reasons, since he was to change his mind and
question the evidentiary basis of Darwin’s theory, nearly two decades later.
Ultimately, though, after his conversion Tolstoy’s chief concern became
humanity’s failure to observe ethical norms true to Christ’s teachings. For that reason, his
criticism centered, unsurprisingly, on the practical effects that Darwin’s theory had on
morality. He concluded:
Two unstable theories [those of Darwin and Malthus], which could not stand upon
their own feet, supported each other, and received a show of stability. Both
theories bore in them a sense, precious for the crowd, that for the existing evil in
human societies men are not to be blamed, that the existing order is what ought to
be, and thus the new theory was accepted by the crowd in the sense which was
wanted by them, with full confidence and unprecedented enthusiasm. (Tolstoy,
What? 195)
Before writing his last, substantial criticism of Darwin’s theory, Tolstoy would
publish his novella The Kreutzer Sonata (Kreitserova Sonata) (1889). The passing barbs
he made there at Darwinism would elicit a similar response as his comments in Anna
Karenina had. Now, though, it was not Timiriazev, but his fellow zoologist Il’ia
Mechnikov who came to Darwin’s defense in his “Law of Life: Concerning Several
Works by Prince Lev Tolstoy” (“Zakon zhizni: po povodu nekotorykh proizvedenii gr. L.
Tolstogo ”) (1891).
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Although Tolstoy’s Kreutzer Sonata had led Mechnikov to write the article, “The
Law of Life” was not about the Kreutzer Sonata per se. Published in The Herald of
Europe (Vestnik Evropy), it was a response to what Mechnikov saw as the more general
philosophy of life that Tolstoy had been developing in the years since his conversion.
Though Mechnikov had various objections to Tolstoy’s philosophy, they were reducible
to a single underlying criticism: Tolstoy was ignorant of the very science he so adamantly
opposed.
Fundamental to Tolstoy’s philosophy was an idea of “naturalness.” “‘A bird,’
[Tolstoy] says, ‘ so constructed that it has to fly, to walk, to peck, to think, and when it
does all of this, it is satisfied, happy – then it is a bird. In just the same way man, when he
walks, turns, rises, drags, works with his fingers, eyes, ears, tongue, brain, only then is he
satisfied, only then is he man…’” (Mechnikov, “Life” 238).90 As he turned to discuss
Tolstoy’s insistence that human happiness will come only from a return to a more
“natural” way of living, Mechnikov remarked that Tolstoy’s prioritizing regular manual
labor in his schedule of daily “natural” activities, “obviously, did not leave [himself]
enough time to familiarize himself with a lot of scientific questions, concerning which he
often offers harsh and completely untrue judgments (for example, about Darwinism,
about the uselessness of research, about protoplasm, and much else)” (Mechnikov, “Life”
253).91 In taking too simple a view of the world, Tolstoy had been led astray, Mechnikov
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“‘Птица,’ - говорит он, - ‘так устроена, что ей необходимо летать, ходить, клевать, соображать, и
когда она все это делает, тогда она удовлетворена, счастлива - тогда она птица. Точно так же и
человек, когда он ходит, ворочает, поднимает, таскает, работает пальцами, глазами, ушами, языком,
мозгом, тогда только он удовлетворен, тогда только он – человек…’”
91 “Чересчур продолжительное упражнение мышечной системы, очевидно, не оставило ему
достаточно времени, чтобы ознакомиться со многими научными вопросами, относительно которых
он часто высказывает очень резкие и совершенно неверные суждения (например, о дарвинизме, о
бесполезности исследований, о протоплазме и о мн. др.).”
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maintained, and in his ignorance failed to notice that animal behavior often diverged from
its morphology. Just because a bird has wings does not entail that it should or needs to fly
to lead a “natural” and happy life. Mechnikov called to mind such flightless birds as
ostriches and penguin to show that it makes no sense to insist that they are not really
birds unless they actually take flight. Mechnikov was particularly worried about the
effects of such thinking when applied to humans. He did not agree with Tolstoy, for
example, that being physiologically capable of having children means that women will be
happy only giving birth to and raising children and therefore that all women should
devote their lives to being mothers.
Mechnikov concluded that for such a philosophy as Tolstoy’s to have a chance of
being successfully implemented, the philosopher must have a thorough understanding of
the organism’s nature – its morphology and behavior -- he is trying to modify, an
understanding that comes from such science as Darwin’s theory: “The establishment of
the latter [a preconceived ideal] is not a matter of simple fantasy or whimsy; in order to
chart an ideal that we could realize, a precise knowledge of the nature of the organism
and an adequate portion of initiative are needed” (Mechnikov, “Life” 265).92 Tolstoy had,
thus, for the second time in less than fifteen years, been criticized by a leading scientist
for lacking a basic understanding of the very science he felt the need to so obdurately
criticize.
The last time Tolstoy wrote at length about Darwinism was in an 1893 essay he
wrote partly in response to the T. H. Huxley’s Romanes lecture, “Evolution and Ethics,”
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“Установление последнего [предвзятого идеала] не есть дело простой фантазии или прихоти; для
того, чтобы наметить идеал, который бы был осуществим, необходимо точное знание природы
организма и достаточная доля инициативы.”
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given earlier that year. Tolstoy published “Religion and Morality”(“Religiia i
nravstvennost’”) in Für Etische Kultur (For Ethical Culture), a German Ethical Culture
journal. Its founder, Georg von Gizychki, had written to Tolstoy to commission an essay
that answered two personal questions: “(1) What [Tolstoy understood] by the word
‘religion,’ and (2) [Did he] consider it possible for morality to exist independently of
religion, as [he understood] it” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 131).
The definition of religion Tolstoy gave in response was idiosyncratically broad:
From the most elevated to the most primitive, there is not one single religion that
does not have as its basis the establishment of man’s relationship to the universe
around him, or to its first cause…All religious teaching is an expression of the
religious attitude of the founder when he acknowledged his relationship as a man
(and subsequently that of all other people) to the universe, or its origin and first
cause. (Tolstoy, “Morality” 135)
Using this definition, Tolstoy found three fundamentally distinct types of religion:
“(1) the primitive person, (2) the pagan-social or family-State and (3) the Christian or
divine” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 135). The first, which Tolstoy considered the “lowest,”
entailed the cosmological belief that man exists “for the purpose of attaining the greatest
possible personal well-being, irrespective of the degree of suffering this may cause
others” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 135). The second underlying metaphysical belief asserts that
“the meaning of life [is not] in the well-being of one separate individual, but in the wellbeing of a certain aggregate of people: family, tribe, nation, State, or even humanity (the
Positivist attempt at religion)” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 136). Finally, the third worldview,
Tolstoy vaguely declares, consists in “man no longer recognizing the meaning of life in
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the fulfillment of personal ambitions, or the ambitions of any aggregate of people, but
solely in service to the Will that created him, as well as the entire universe, for the
purpose of achieving not his own aims, but the aims of that Will” (Tolstoy, “Morality”
136). Although numerous religions share a comparable belief, Tolstoy was convinced
that it “received its complete and final expression in true and unperverted form in
Christianity” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 136). By no means, though, did Tolstoy have the
Russian Orthodox Church in mind, which he considered to be one such perversion.
Rather, only such sects as the Russian Dukhobors qualified as “true” Christianity and
belonged on the top rung of Tolstoy’s religious hierarchy.
It follows from Tolstoy’s broad definition of religion that everyone has some
basic religious belief. And morality, according to Tolstoy, is a set of behavioral norms
that follows from trying to maintain such a religious worldview: “morality is the
indication and explanation of those activities which automatically result when a person
maintains one or another relationship to the universe” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 142). By
Tolstoy’s broad definition of religion, then, there is also no such thing as a morality that
can exist independently of religion, nor can there be a person without a religion.
Everyone therefore conforms to some kind of morality. For that reason, even science
itself is guided by morality and therefore religion. Science is therefore fundamentally
religious, because its practitioners observe the moral principles derived from their
worldview. Those principles, in turn, determine what research is worth pursuing:
Science has always been, and always will be, not the study of “everything” as
today’s scientists naively believe (this is impossible, for this is an incalculable
number of objects subject to inquiry), but is merely a study of those things put

129

forward by religion, in strict order according to their degree of importance, from
an incalculable quantity of objects, phenomena and conditions demanding
investigation. (Tolstoy, “Morality” 138)
Tolstoy considered the science of his contemporaries to be “paganism” under the
guise of Christianity because it amounted to “no more than an examination of all those
conditions conducive to man’s greatest well-being, and of all the phenomena in the
universe that can help attain it” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 139). That is, though such scientists
may have thought of themselves as Christians, because of their scientific pursuit of
humankind’s increased well-being, Tolstoy considered them “pagans.” Such pagan
science was irreconcilable with the basic tenets of Christianity, for, Tolstoy insists, “true”
Christianity maintains that “all men are equal and that it is better for a man to give his
own life in service to others than to compel others to serve him, thereby trampling on
their lives” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 146).
Tolstoy asserted that the leading discipline of pagan science, on the other hand,
was the budding field of evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology was in his opinion
rooted in a morality that values well-being above all else. For that reason, he asserts:
No kind of sophism or twists of thought can undermine the simple and clear
proposition that the law of evolution, which lies at the basis of contemporary
science, is based on the general, eternal and unalterable law of the struggle for
existence and the survival of the fittest; a law saying that each person, in order to
attain his own well-being and that of his group, must be one of the fittest and
make sure that his group is the same, so that it is not his group but another, less
fit, that perishes. (Tolstoy, “Morality” 146)
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Tolstoy was, without a doubt, responding to Darwin’s theory, but the immediate reason
for writing this article was not a work Darwin had written. Darwin had died in 1882, but
T. H. Huxley’s recent lecture on the evolution of ethics had appeared in Russian just as
Tolstoy was writing “Religion and Morality” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 147). The appearance
of “Evolution and Ethics” in Russian was not simply fortuitous and therefore incidental
to Tolstoy’s essay. Tolstoy had, in fact, specially crafted his definition of Christianity
with Huxley’s article in mind, so as to avoid what he saw as the ethical pitfalls of
Darwinian theory.
Huxley had argued that although humans undoubtedly have been and still remain
subject to natural selection, for us to succeed at living in societies we must quell the
violent and selfish urges that historically brought our species such great success in our
evolutionary past:
[The] practice of that which is ethically best – what we call goodness or virtue –
involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads
to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it
demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all
competitors, it requires that the individual shall help his fellows; its influence is
directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as
possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. (Huxley,
Ethics 81-82)
Huxley called the measure of how much the “cosmic” process had been replaced by the
“ethical” process “social progress.”
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Tolstoy, however, contended that such a solution, based as it was on the very
pagan science that presupposed the struggle for existence, could not alter our basic
relationship to one another and to the universe; it would only change the scale of the
struggle. For “[if] the law of the struggle for the existence and survival of the fittest is the
eternal law of the living (and it must be recognized as such when man is regarded as an
animal), then this law cannot be infringed upon by any ornate arguments about social
progress, or about an ethical code that is supposed to emanate from it” (Tolstoy,
“Morality” 148). In other words, because pagan science views humans as animals and
participants in the struggle for existence, they will always remain so. Indeed, “[the]
struggle will always remain the struggle, i. e. an activity that fundamentally excludes the
possibility of adopting the Christian morality we profess” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 149). At
best, the progress that such pagan scientists seek will only pit ever-larger groups against
each other, and “the very same struggle and survival of the fittest will continue among
families, clans, and nations” (Tolstoy, “Morality” 148).
Thus, although the pagan religions and Christianity share the goal of reducing the
sum total of human suffering, for Tolstoy the pagan religions cannot lead to genuine
altruism. That is, the members of a group are working to ensure the well-being of the
group only because in doing so they maintain their own, individual well-being. This
conception of human cooperation has recently been called the “veneer theory” because
even what appears to be genuine cooperation is still ultimately motivated by selfinterest. 93 Christianity, on the other hand, is capable of producing truly selfless
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For a contemporary discussion of veneer theory, see Frans de Waal’s “Morally Evolved: Primate Social
Instincts, Human Morality, and the Rise and Fall of ‘Veneer Theory’” in Primates and Philosophers.
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cooperation because, by taking care of others so as to fulfill God’s will, Christians,
according to Tolstoy, avoid even the appearance of self-interest.
Tolstoy is thus no longer interested in the results of human actions alone, but in
the motivations underlying those actions. Tolstoy’s contemporary Piotr Kropotkin (18421921) also rejected Huxley’s claim that humans are not naturally virtuous, in a series of
articles that later became his book Mutual Aid (1902). But unlike Kropotkin, Tolstoy’s
religious theory of moral motivation breaks cooperation down into a combination of
biology and culture, for it depends on which of Tolstoy’s three “religions” one practices.
Hence, Tolstoy does not so much deny the ability of non-Christians to cooperate as he
does disapprove of the underlying utilitarian motives of their behavior. For that reason,
identical actions are not necessarily equally praiseworthy. Indeed, for Tolstoy only
Christians were capable of truly realizing their innate cooperative potential.
By implication, Tolstoy also rejects Darwin’s theory, though according to his
conception of religion, the reality of Darwin’s theory is only relative, because the
struggle for existence would take place only among those whose metaphysical
relationship to the universe sets ultimate store by well-being. That is, by Tolstoy’s
reasoning, if every person were converted to “true” Christianity, the struggle for
existence would somehow be brought to an end and Darwin’s theory would cease to be
true.
Conclusion
Tolstoy’s thinking on the subject would not change after publishing “Religion and
Morality.” Tolstoy continued to hold Darwin in the greatest contempt for the rest of his
life. What had begun as vague admiration for Darwin ultimately ended in unequivocal
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disdain. Initially, Tolstoy had, in his declaration of determinism in the second epilogue of
War and Peace, insisted that Darwin’s theory only added to the growing body of
evidence in favor of determinism, but did nothing to explain humankind’s persisting
sense of free will and therefore had no bearing on the calculation of moral responsibility.
After Tolstoy met Strakhov, though, Tolstoy became concerned about the moral
implications of Darwin’s theory, though his criticisms and Strakhov’s on this topic bear
only a vague resemblance.
As he finished Anna Karenina, the moral crisis and resultant conversion Tolstoy
underwent turned into the primary drivers in his criticism of Darwinism. By the mid1880s he began to lament the insidious potential of science to affect morality adversely,
proclaiming that Darwin’s theory did, in fact, pertain to moral responsibility. For as
Tolstoy maintained, not only did the theory tell humans nothing useful about their place
in the cosmos, but it was also being used as an excuse to act immorally.
The last time Tolstoy wrote about Darwin’s theory in depth marked yet another
turning point, as he began to consider the moral foundations of a Darwinian worldview.
In Tolstoy’s view, a worldview that accepted the truth of the struggle for existence was
uniquely based on enlightened self-interest, whereas belief in “true” Christianity could
give rise to a morality capable of genuine altruism.
The fact that for the last twenty years of his life Tolstoy referred to Darwin’s
theory as the “law of the struggle for existence,” not to mention that he argued that
Christianity could inexplicably bring the struggle for existence to a halt, calls into
question how well Tolstoy actually understood the very science he increasingly and
adamantly criticized. Admittedly, Tolstoy had never explicitly said that he accepted
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Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In fact, it appears that the only time Tolstoy used
the word “selection” in writing was in Anna Karenina. He did, however, write about
Darwin’s various component theories. He brought up the theories of common descent, the
multiplication of species, and gradualism in War and Peace, but rendered no verdict,
saying only that the idea of human evolution would be more palatable if its particular
evolutionary path were known. He returned to the theories of common descent and the
multiplication of species in the 1880s, again pointing out that they lacked the empirical
support needed to make them viable components of humanity’s cosmology. Finally, in
1893, Tolstoy implied that a universal conversion to Christianity would abolish the “law”
of the struggle for existence. Whether Tolstoy actually believed what he wrote or simply
sought to undermine the perceived relevance to morality that Darwin’s theory enjoyed is
unclear. Nevertheless, such scientific authorities as Il’ia Mechnikov and Kliment
Timiriazev felt compelled to speak up about the undue influence they feared a moral
figure such as Tolstoy could have on the public discourse surrounding Darwin’s theory—
particularly given what they saw as his scientific illiteracy (Mechnikov, “Life” 253;
Timiriazev, “Obrazets”45). Indeed, as Timiriazev himself had assured his readers after
the publication of Anna Karenina, he did not think Tolstoy had read, let alone actually
understood, Darwin’s theory (Timiriazev, “Obrazets” 45).
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CHAPTER FOUR
VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV: DARWINIAN IDEALISM, DARWINIAN THEISM
Introduction
Vladimir Vladimirovich Solovyov (1853-1900) is most well known outside of
Russia for his close friendship with the novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky. It is generally
thought, in fact, that Dostoevsky’s characters Alyosha and Ivan Karamazov, from The
Brothers Karamazov (Brat’ia Karamazovy) (Serialized in 1879-1880; published in book
form in 1880), were modeled, in part, on Solovyov (Kostalevsky 66). In Russia, however,
Solovyov is usually considered its premier religious philosopher, known for a mystical
view of the universe and of love that proved vastly influential for a group of Russian
Symbolist writers at the turn of the twentieth century. While by no means a Biblical
literalist, Solovyov looked to the Bible not only for moral guidance but also for cues as to
the origin and nature of the universe. For that reason, it is actually not entirely surprising
that, having come of age in a Russia galvanized by Darwin’s Origin, the mystical
philosopher Solovyov wrote about Darwin’s various theories throughout his career.
Indeed, Solovyov came to admire the English naturalist and his work ardently, though, of
course, he had to make compromises in order to accommodate Darwin’s theories while
also maintaining his commitments to specific religious and philosophical ideas.
With the exception of the historian of science Alexander Vucinich, who conflated
Solovyov’s general criticism of materialism with an opposition to Darwinism (Vucinich
135; 259), scholars tend to acknowledge, if only in passing, Solovyov’s sympathetic
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attitude and general effort to integrate Darwinism into his own work (Soloyov, Sophia
151; Smith 96-99; Matich 62-65). Only the literary scholar David Bethea has, however,
done a study in any detail of how Solovyov used Darwinism in his own thinking. In
particular, Bethea emphasizes the way in which Solovyov built on Darwin’s work to
show how beauty—what initially had only a reproductive function – became something
of aesthetic value, appreciable independently of reproduction. The goal of this chapter is
to fill in a gap in the scholarship as to how Solovyov used Darwin’s theories in his wideranging philosophical writings over approximately thirty years. In particular, I will trace
how Solovyov’s anthropocentrism forced him to downplay, rework, and ultimately
critique the utilitarian nature of Darwin’s theories—all the while perhaps paradoxically
continuing to express his support for the scientist.
1853-1875: The Early Years
Little is known about Solovyov’s early response to Darwinism. He fell under the
sway of positivism and materialism shortly after entering Moscow University in 1869 and
for that reason transferred from the Department of History and Philology to that of
Physics and Mathematics (Kornblatt 13). Describing Solovyov’s infatuation with
materialism, Lev Lopatin, a philosopher and friend, recalled:
There was a time in his life when he was a total materialist… I never met a
materialist with more passionate convictions. This was a typical nihilist of the
1860's. It seemed to him that a new truth had been revealed in the basic premises
of materialism, which had to replace and supplant all previous beliefs, to upset all
human ideals and notions, to create a completely new, happy, and rational life…
Already during this period as a student he was an expert on Darwin's writings. He
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believed with all his soul that through the famous naturalist's theory not only all
teleology, but also all theology and idealistic prejudices would be brought to an
end. (Lopatin 123)94
This materialist phase proved brief: three years later Solovyov submitted a
petition to withdraw from his studies while also applying to take the exit examinations in
the Department of History and Philology. He ultimately managed to receive a degree
from that department in June 1873 without having completed any classes as a student
there (Kornblatt 13). Notwithstanding Lopatin’s reminiscences, the

earliest extant

documents of Solovyov himself recording his thoughts on Darwinism date back only to
1876.
1876: Darwin and Solovyov’s The Sophia
Although Solovyov’s first published work on Darwin’s theory did not come out
until 1889, that publication was by no means the first time Solovyov had written on the
subject. When he first turned his hand to Darwin’s theory, he did so in French, in a
chapter of his book The Sophia, a genre-defying work that Solovyov never finished and
was published only after his death. He wrote “The Second Dialogue: The Cosmic and
Historical Process” during a month-long stop he made in Sorrento, Italy, in March of
1876. He was on his way back to Russia after having spent nearly a year conducting
research at the British Museum in London. While this period in Solovyov’s life is
94

“Была пора в его жизни, когда он был совершенным материалистом…Я никогда потом не
встречал материалиста, столь страстно убежденного. Это был типический нигилист шестидесятых
годов. Ему казалось, что в основных началах материализма открывается та новая истина, которая
должна заменить и вытеснить все прежние верования, перевернуть все человеческие идеалы и
понятия, создать совсем новую, счастливую и разумную жизнь... Еще в эпоху своего студенчества
отличный знаток сочинений Дарвина, он всей душой верил, что теорией этого знаменитого
натуралиста раз навсегда положен конец не только всякой телеологии, но и всякой теологии,
вообще всяким идеалистическим предрассудкам” (Лопатин 123).
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generally known to literary scholars as the time when he did research into Gnostic
philosophy and searched for manifestations of a mystical female force he named the
Divine Sophia, he also spent time during this period meeting, among other people, the
British naturalist, co-discoverer of natural selection, and budding spiritualist Alfred
Russel Wallace (1823-1913).95
Solovyov’s first mention of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection
comes in the midst of a discussion on the nature and origin of the universe. Solovyov
describes the universe as the result of a cosmic struggle between Satan and what
Solovyov calls, using Gnostic terminology, the “Demiurge,” or the God of the Hebrew
Bible. According to Solovyov, the resulting conditions of the universe made the Earth
inhabitable, facilitating “organic development” or evolution. Correspondingly, the
“World Soul” produced the first “living soul” or “an organism in the true sense of the
word” (Solovyov, Sophia 151). The initial conditions on Earth were, however, by no
means perfect or unchanging, and as they changed and became more favorable over time,
the old “types” were – metaphorically speaking – abandoned by the World Soul in favor
of new ones. Such is Solovyov’s explanation of the fossil record. The more enduring
forms would, on the other hand, continue to be developed using “all natural means,”
forms that the Demiurge had chosen, through unbroken natural law, to house a soul
(Solovyov, Sophia 151).

95

Aside from the fact that the meeting took place, nothing is known about it. Indeed, all Solovyov wrote in
a letter to his parents from London, dated September 20 1875, was: “As for Englishmen, I met the famous
zoologist Wallace, which gives me the pleasure of being in a real village: He lives about forty versts from
London” (“Из англичан познакомился со знаменитым зоологом Wallace'ом, что доставляет мне
удовольстие бывать иногда в настоящей деревне, - он живет верстах в 40 от Лондона”.) (Solov’iov,
Pis’ma 11).
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In one passage that Solovyov had crossed out but remains legible, he insisted that
every soul is the issue of a single creation event. Organisms’ bodies are what Solovyov at
one point evocatively called “rough drafts” or temporary dwelling places (Solovyov,
Sophia 152). All of the organisms that died and the species that went extinct did not have
souls unique to them, but rather as conditions came to favor “more perfect organisms,”
these souls transmigrated to those organisms, completing just one of many such
transmigrations
In yet another such passage, Solovyov explains that the souls themselves also
evolve as they ascend each new rung on the “cosmogonic ladder” (Solovyov, Sophia
151). The “zoological step represented by fish,” for example, “exists because there are
souls whose character is best expressed by the organism of the fish. But fish of a certain
previous geological period were only temporary dwellings for the ichthyomorphic souls
that animate today’s fish” (Solovyov, Sophia 152). Solovyov even granted that the fishes
of his own day would likely continue to evolve.
Foremost among the mechanisms of evolution that Solovyov accepted was natural
selection or what he also called the means of “[becoming] capable of being the seat of the
most elevated souls” (Solovyov, Sophia 152). He did not, however, accept that natural
selection was the only mechanism of evolutionary change. Nor was Solovyov inclined to
accept that “the organic world follows an uninterrupted development departing from a
single source, a single root” (Solovyov, Sophia 152), though the misgivings he had were
a matter of principle and not based empirical findings. “Nature,” he insisted “is not
obligated to follow a direct line, when it could disperse life in various different
directions” (Solovyov, Sophia 152). In denying that there had to be a single, shared origin
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of life from which all current organisms are descended, Solovyov did not oppose the idea
that today’s organisms evolved from a shared ancestor, only a theory of universal
common descent.
Solovyov also broke with Darwin on the subject of human evolution, maintaining
that “the goal of the cosmic process is the realization of the soul and of God in the
soul….the production of a perfect organism. Man is such an organism” (Solovyov,
Sophia 152). He deviated even further from Darwinian orthodoxy when he then declared:
“But an individual human is not Man: Man is Humanity. The human organism is not the
organism of an individual man, which is only the perfection of the animal organism; the
truly human organism is the social organism” (Solovyov, Sophia 152-153). Solovyov
would not, however, go so far as to claim that humans are exempt from the workings of
natural selection.“[The] cosmic battle,” he wrote, “must repeat itself in the human world”
(Solovyov, Sophia 152). Solovyov even shared with Darwin a similar sentiment that such
strife could be overcome by what Solovyov called “the power of love” (Solovyov, Sophia
157). Darwin himself had maintained in the Descent that as societies grow and smaller
groups unite to form larger groups, “the simplest reason would tell each individual that he
ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation,
though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an
artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and races”
(Darwin, Descent 147).
Thus, Solovyov incorporated various parts of Darwin’s theory into his own
worldview of theistic evolutionism. Explicitly, he adopted Darwin’s theory of the
multiplication of species, natural selection, and evolution as such, and while he did accept
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a theory of common descent, he did not accept descent from a single origin, nor did he
accept Darwin’s theory of gradual evolution or “uninterrupted development” (Solovyov,
Sophia 152). As we will see shortly, Solovyov’s variegated take on Darwinism would go
largely unchanged in the years to come, even as he turned from questions of cosmology
to those of aesthetics and ethics. In particular, his anthropocentrism would remain a
fixture that dominated his thinking. Yet, as Solovyov wrote about Darwinism in greater
depth, beginning with “Beauty in Nature” (“Krasota v prirode”) (1889), the trade-offs
that he had to make in order to maintain his belief in the unconditional value of
humankind would reveal an abiding strain of anti-utilitarianism in Solovyov’s thinking,
one that clashed at times with the Darwinian views he continued to find so intriguing.
1889: Sexual Selection and Aesthetics
Solovyov had long been a regular contributor to conservative publications. But his
ties with conservative circles frayed somewhat following a lecture Solovyov gave in
1881. Responding to Tsar Alexander II’s assassination, Solovyov publicly called upon
Alexander II’s successor, his son Alexander III, to demonstrate Russia’s true Christian
nature by having mercy on his father’s assassins and commuting their death penalties to
exile in Siberia. The new Tsar rejected what was seen as inappropriate meddling;
Solovyov lost his job at Moscow University; and he became disillusioned with
conservatism, ceasing to publish in conservative journals (Kornblatt 19) Hence years
later, when he published “Beauty in Nature” in 1889, it was in the inaugural edition of the
newly founded liberal journal Questions of Philosophy and Psychology (Voprosy filosofii
i psikhologii).
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The goal Solovyov set for himself in writing “Beauty in Nature” was clear-cut: to
articulate a theory of natural aesthetics, which he intended later to form the bedrock for a
general philosophy of art. Crucial to his aesthetic theory were the claims that beauty has
an objective existence, regardless of whether there is a subject present to behold it, and
that beauty cannot be defined in terms of its material utility. For that reason, Solovyov
argued that the study of beauty and its nature was not within the purview of the natural
sciences; only the study of the origin of “aesthetic feelings belongs to the sphere of
biology and psycho-physiology” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 33). The study of beauty itself
belongs rather to philosophy. It is worth noting though that Solovyov was quick to
distance himself from both the positivist-utilitarians and the abstract metaphysicists, two
prevalent schools of philosophical thought on art.

The former, he felt, sought to

downplay the intrinsic value of beauty, preferring instead to focus how it was used, while
the latter’s program was relativistic and therefore, Solovyov thought, incapable of telling
the difference between beauty and ugliness (Solovyov, “Beauty” 34).
When Solovyov spoke of beauty, he understood it in the sense of an abstract,
metaphysical, Platonic Idea. He considered a particular object of beauty to be just an
instantiation of that ethereal Idea; how beautiful the object is depends on the degree to
which its material form did “not negate the universal, but [gave] it a place in itself…”
(Solovyov, “Beauty” 39). As Solovyov turned to particular examples to illustrate what
precisely obstructs or facilitates the expression of beauty, a distinct hierarchy emerges.
He compares an intestinal worm and a diamond, noting that while a worm is a living
organism, a diamond is made up of inorganic matter. Of the two, Solovyov believes that
organic matter is intrinsically more beautiful because of its greater complexity: “In a very
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simple organism we find an aggregate of a greater number of particular parts and a
greater unity of them than in the most perfect stone” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 40). However,
when the diamond is compared with other minerals, Solovyov contends that it is more
“perfect” than its rivals: “a diamond is an object perfect in its kind, for nowhere does
such a force of strength or impermeability unite with such radiance; nowhere does one
meet such a striking and subtle play of light in such a solid body” (Solovyov, “Beauty”
40). The worm, on the other hand, is relatively simple: “Even though a worm is already,
according to the chemical composition of its tissues, a body more complex than a
diamond, the organization of this body is most simplified and meager” (Solovyov,
“Beauty” 40). What emerges is then a hierarchy of relative organizational complexity or
what Solovyov variously calls “complexity,” “differentiation,” or “heterogeneity.” That
is, even though the worm is intrinsically more complex than the diamond, when the
diamond is compared with other minerals, it is relatively more complex than the worm is
in comparison with other animals and the diamond is therefore more beautiful.
Given the anthropocentric worldview he laid out in 1876, it should come as no
surprise that Solovyov placed mankind at the peak of this hierarchy of natural beauty
(Solovyov, “Beauty” 66). But he also had to confront the fact that the animal kingdom is
not made up exclusively of ever more beautiful organisms, as his hierarchy would
predict. He was therefore, forced to reconsider how strong the correlation is between
these two variables – beauty and complexity - and ultimately reformulated it, concluding
that it is just the “potentiality” of “new and more perfected embodiments of the all-unity
idea in beautiful forms” that is revealed “on each new stage of universal development,
with each new living extension and complexity of natural existence” (Solovyov,
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“Beauty” 55). An increase in complexity is thus positively correlated with an increasing
potential to be beautiful, though this potential is not always realized.
All that remained for Solovyov to do then was to demonstrate how his hierarchy
could explain the existence of ugliness. To do so, he used what had become a favorite
example: the intestinal worm. Its form, Solovyov declared,
is a direct expression, or the embodiment laid bare, of two fundamental animal
instincts – the sexual and the alimentary in all their immeasurable insatiability.
This is clearest of all in those intestinal worms that feed with all their essence,
with the entire exterior of their body through endosmosis (sucking), and thus do
not display any organs, apart from the sexual; and these display a striking contrast
with the extreme simplification of all the remaining organization in their powerful
development and complex structure. (Solovyov, “Beauty” 56)
Thus, ugliness is manifested when morphological and behavioral features associated with
eating and reproducing are not just conspicuous, but also somehow out of harmony
relative to the organism’s general degree of development. Solovyov considered the
worm’s sex organs overdeveloped because for its relatively simple organization, they
seemed too complex and, more importantly, obvious. He is repelled by the unadulterated
animalistic quality -- or what he calls the “excessive development of material brutality” -of the intestinal worm’s body (Solovyov, “Beauty” 59). Such a response was, of course,
predictable; Solovyov did, after all, maintain from the outset that beauty could not be
understood in terms of utility. He found the intestinal worm’s sex organs grotesque
precisely because they were recognizable as such.
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Solovyov brought up Darwinism throughout the essay, though he did not discuss
it in any length until the end. Once, for example, he referred in passing to the theory that
current beauty is an indicator of a formerly adaptive trait that is no longer useful: “In a
bold application of Darwinism, it is possible to extend this understanding of former utility
very far, and to count not only monkeys and seals, but very likely even oysters as our
ancestors as well” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 32). Thus, over a decade after his earlier writing
on Darwinism Solovyov still seemed to accept some kind of theory of common descent.
He also made it clear that he still opposed an inerrant Biblical literalism, holding that the
world was not created perfect and unchanging. Indeed, it cannot be doubted, he wrote,
that “the organic world is not a product of so-called spontaneous creation…for in such a
case it would have had to display absolute undisturbed perfection and harmony not only
in the whole, but also in all of its parts” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 50). The fossil record as a
catalogue of extinction events was all the proof Solovyov needed to be sure of this
(Solovyov, “Beauty” 51). He described it in evocative language reminiscent of his 1876
writings:
We see here manifest signs of an internal struggle, jolts and convulsive
concussions, blind and groping motions; an unfinished draft of unsuccessful
creations –so many monstrous results and miscarriages! All these paleozoa, these
antediluvian oddities: megatherms, plesiosaurs, ichthyosaurs, pterodactyls –
could they be perfect and direct creations of God? (Solovyov, “Beauty” 51)
And as he had done before, he allotted humans a special place in the universe:
The biological goal itself, moreover, appears two-fold: on the one hand, organic
types are stages (in part transient, in part permanent) of a general biological
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process that arrives at the creation of the human body from primitive mold; but,
on the other hand, these types can be regarded as members of a universal
organism, having an independent significance in the life of the whole. (Solovyov,
“Beauty” 50)
Thus, although the universe was not created perfect, with specific organisms inhabiting it,
the appearance of humankind is one of the two goals towards which the action of
unbroken natural law is directed. For that reason, he called the emergence of humans a
“retarded [zamedlennoe] and painful birth” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 51).
As Solovyov finally turned to Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, he praised the
“great” Darwin, in whom he made the surprising claim of having found a fellow
champion of his theory of the non-utilitarian, objective existence of beauty:
At a time when many rectilinear minds attempted to reduce human aesthetics to
utilitarian bases in the interests of a positivistic-scientific worldview, the greatest
representative of this very worldview in our century [Darwin] showed the
independence of aesthetic motive from utilitarian goals even in the animal
kingdom, and upon this positively based an authentically ideal aesthetic for the
first time. (Solovyov, “Beauty” 51)
This alleged contribution alone, Solovyov insisted, would be enough to “immortalize the
name of Darwin,” even if “he were not the author of the theory of [the] origin of species
by natural selection in the struggle for existence”(Solovyov, “Beauty” 51). This
idiosyncratic interpretation of Darwin’s body of work was indeed Solovyov’s own
invention.

147

Solovyov then gave a fairly uncontroversial sketch for his readers of how sexual
selection works, stating:
The life of an animal is determined by two major interests: to maintain itself by
means of nourishment and to perpetuate its form by means of reproduction… the
cosmic Artist makes this sexual attraction not only for perpetuation, but also for
the adornment of given animal forms. Individuals of the energetic sex, males,
pursue the female and struggle with one another on account of her; and here it
turns out, says Darwin, despite all foreknowledge, that the capacity to entice the
female in different ways has in certain cases a greater significance than the
capability to defeat other males in open struggle. (Solovyov, “Beauty” 61-62)
To be sure, in making such unabashed reference to divine influence in the evolutionary
process, Solovyov makes it clear that he has no pretensions to being a strict
methodological naturalist as Darwin was. By no means did Solovyov limit his worldview
to beliefs that were scientifically testable. All the same, he did recognize the importance
of both intersexual and intrasexual competition to sexual selection.
It was, rather, in how he understood the relationship between natural and sexual
selection that Solovyov departed most notably from Darwinian orthodoxy. He certainly
appreciated the role that beauty plays in reproduction, for he noted that “Almost all
[birds] base their conjugal success on the display of one or another aesthetic attribute”
(Solovyov, “Beauty” 64). But Solovyov sought to cast the idea of “utility” solely in
terms of defense and survival. Drawing on the same examples Darwin had used in his
Descent of Man, Solovyov, in effect, reformulated natural selection by omitting the
logical and empirical connection between survival and reproduction. Noting, as he does,
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for example, that the males of certain tropical butterfly species have particularly beautiful
wings, though the females do not, Solovyov concludes that this disparity alone “shows
that the beauty of wings cannot serve the utilitarian goals of defense in the struggle for
existence (through the likening of an insect to the flower on which it sits, and so forth);
females are no less in want of such a defense than males” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 63). He
is, however, willing to admit that there is sometimes a link between utilitarian and
“aesthetic-sexual” goals:
[In] many specimens it is noted that precisely the lower exterior of the wings, i.e.,
that which is turned outward in the sitting, most dangerous position, is completely
the color of the plant on which the butterfly lands (obviously for the sake of
defense); while the upper exterior, which the flitting male shows to the female
during courtship, is painted and drawn with such freakish elegance that it cannot
have any relation to the goals of defense. (Solovyov, “Beauty” 63)
Solovyov was ultimately unconcerned by this, though, and left it to his readers to
discover in Darwin’s work “still many other particular evidences that show beyond doubt
the predominant action of a purely aesthetic factor here” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 63-64).
He concludes his analysis of sexual selection with a discussion of what is now
called “Fisherian” or “runaway” selection.96 “In many specimens,” Solovyov noted, “the
complex adornments of males not only cannot have any utilitarian significance, but are
directly harmful, for they develop [to the] detriment [of] their agility – and interrupt their
ability to fly or run and betray them to their pursuing enemy…” (Solovyov, “Beauty” 6465). However, because such instances support only his non-Darwinian belief in the non96

For more on Fisherian selection, see Ronald Fisher’s “Sexual Reproduction and Sexual Selection” in his
The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930).
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utilitarian nature of beauty and not his belief in its objective existence, he shows finally
that different organisms often share a sense of beauty:
The purely contemplative susceptibility of certain birds to the beauty of colors is
proven by the fact that they pay attention and admire bright colors not only
similar to themselves, but wherever they might find them, for example, on
women’s dresses or hats. Diligent adornment of nests by certain birds – for
example, hummingbirds, which put the finishing touches on them with the most
nuanced taste – also undoubtedly proves the presence in birds of an objectiveaesthetic sense. (Solovyov, “Beauty” 65)
That is, if beauty is not itself the product of evolution and does not have a utilitarian
value, the fact that both humans and birds find similar objects beautiful makes sense only
if beauty exists independently of its beholders. Solovyov says nothing, though, of the
relative quality of their capacities to appreciate beauty, only that the capacity to
appreciate beauty is, in general, a product of evolution and that both birds and humans
share a general sense of beauty.
Thus, after outlining the generalizations underpinning his hierarchy of relative
organizational complexity, Solovyov turned to Darwinism for further support. The
intestinal worm is a specimen of such extreme ugliness, Solovyov had maintained,
precisely because its external morphology is so blatantly useful to survival and
reproduction. Solovyov contended that Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, in effect,
supported this claim by showing that not only do beautiful traits not increase an
organism’s chances of surviving, but also sometimes, in fact, reduce them. It does not, for
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that reason, make sense to view these traits as serving such utilitarian goals as defense or
survival.
It is worth noting Solovyov’s paradoxical praise of Darwin for discovering natural
selection. For in reworking Darwin’s theory of sexual selection to support his own claims
about the objective and non-utilitarian existence of beauty, Solovyov obscured the
importance that Darwin had given to beauty and reproduction in natural selection. That
is, natural selection, by definition, relates not only to survival in the struggle for existence
– what Solovyov describes as “defense” – but also ultimately to reproduction. There can
be no natural selection and therefore no adaptive evolution without both differential
survival and reproduction.
It was not for nothing, though, that Solovyov clung to such an idiosyncratic
understanding of Darwinism. For if beautiful objects are, as Solovyov declared, the
objective instantiations of the Idea of beauty and their beauty does not depend on an
individual’s subjective evaluation per se, then Solovyov can only grant that an
organism’s capacity for appreciating beauty is subject to evolution. Otherwise, if
organisms find objects beautiful only because seeing them as beautiful is somehow useful
in the struggle for existence, then beauty is neither objective nor non-utilitarian. Such are
the compromises that Solovyov had to make in order to both maintain his idealist
philosophical commitments and be a Darwinian. Indeed, as noted earlier, Michael Ruse
has noted that such failures to share all of Darwin’s conclusions about the evolutionary
process were common to the leading proponents of Darwinism at the time. Neither
Thomas Henry Huxley nor Alfred Russel Wallace – both dear friends of Darwin and
ardent, self-styled Darwinians – accepted all of Darwin’s various theories. Huxley, for
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example, was unconvinced about the efficacy of natural selection. Writing of his
disappointing attempt to characterize the word “Darwinian” in his seminal book The
Darwinian Revolution, Ruse said: “Different people believe very different things, and the
same people believe different things at different times – and yet rally under the same
banner… In the end, I had to be satisfied with some mushy sociological notion. A
‘Darwinian’ was someone who thought of himself as a Darwinian, or some such thing”
(Ruse, “Punctuated Equilibria” 120). Determining whether one was a Darwinian at this
time was, in effect, a sociological issue of self-identification.
Thus, Solovyov’s specific beliefs about Darwin’s various theories had, on the
whole, changed little since 1876. He still believed in an imperfect, though created, world,
where evolution was directed inexorably towards the emergence of humans through
unbroken natural law. Now, though, when Solovyov justified his anthropocentrism, he
did so in terms of relative organizational complexity. He also still accepted that species
went extinct and that new species arose and continue to arise, though he remained
skeptical as to universal common descent. The most significant development in his
thinking on Darwin’s various theories came in his discussion of natural and sexual
selection. For although Solovyov still adamantly praised Darwin for his discovery of
natural selection, the way he spoke of sexual selection suggests that either he did not
understand its relation to natural selection in the same way Darwin himself had or he
deliberately ignored it.
Had he adhered to the concepts of sexual and natural selection, as Darwin had
articulated them, Solovyov would have risked leaving the justification of his
anthropocentrism open to question. For admitting the utilitarian importance of beauty to
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selection would make the place humans occupy at the top of his hierarchy of complexity
and the potential beauty that that position entails into products of evolution and would
therefore no longer be guaranteed.
A Response to “Beauty in Nature”
In 1895, over half a decade later, a series of articles appeared in what might be
considered a belated response to “Beauty in Nature.” Most significantly, the religious
philosopher Vasilii Rozanov (1856-1919), an admirer of Solovyov, published “What
Does Nature’s Beauty Express?” (“Chto vyrazhaet soboiu krasota prirody?”)97 in Russian
Review (Russkoe obozrenie). Rozanov was ambivalent about “Beauty in Nature,” for
while he shared Solovyov’s predilection for teleology, Rozanov found grounds for
criticism as well. First, he claimed that Solovyov, in fact, hewed too closely to an
orthodox interpretation of Darwin’s theory (Rozanov 4). After describing the
utilitarianism running through Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Rozanov writes: “In
the field under consideration, in the field of the phenomena of beauty, Mr. Solovyov
finds it convenient to repeat precisely this train of thought and here almost repeating
Darwin, makes the mistakes we mentioned as very crude, and wanted to correct them”
(Rozanov 4).98 It is worth remembering that Solovyov’s understanding of natural and
sexual selection, as noted above, were remarkable for their unorthodoxy.
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It was later republished as “Beauty in Nature and Its Meaning” (Krasota v prirode i ee smysl’)(Rozanov

1).
98

“В данной рассматриваемой области, в области явлений красоты, г. Вл. Соловьев находит
удобным повторить этот именно круг мысли, -- и здесь-то, почти повторяя Ч. Дарвина, он и впадает
в те ошибки, о которых мы упомянули, как об очень грубых, и хотели бы их поправить” (Rozanov
4).
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Ironically, because he believed that Solovyov’s Darwinism did not deviate from
Darwin’s own views, Rozanov then criticized the Darwinian notion of female choice at
the center of sexual selection so as to make an opening to build on Solovyov’s theory of
beauty (Rozanov 8). In place of sexual selection, Rozanov advanced a vague notion of
“life energy” as the true source of beauty: “[beauty] appears everywhere and invariably
where life energy undergoes a rise in its exertion” (Rozanov 9).99 Evolution and the
resulting changes in “life force” that it produces are driven, according to Rozanov, by an
external, teleological force. “When the source of the effect lies ahead or after it [the
effect] – we call it a goal…Thus, it is not a cause, hidden in the depths of time that is the
moving principle of the whole organic process, but – a goal, lying in the future, unknown
to us…” (Rozanov 13).100 Thus, for Rozanov – not unlike Solovyov--, evolution has a
purpose. For that reason, an organism’s evolution represents progress and the organism
becomes more and more “evolved” as it comes closer fulfilling this evolutionary purpose.
Such progress consisted of increasing complexity: “All things being equal, the greater
the quantity of life energy contained in every organism (compared with other organisms),
the more evolved its organic form, that is, the more numerous and diverse its functions
and the more distinct and exclusive each of them is” (Rozanov 11).101 In other words, “1)
the complexity of organization and 2) the abundance of diverse functions (those no
resembling one another), performed in that organization can serve as an undoubted
99

“[Красота] повсюду и неизменно явлеяется там, где жизненная энергия повышается в своем
напряжении” (Rozanov 9).
100 “Когда источник действия лежит впереди или после его – мы называем его целью…Таким
образом – не причина, скрытая в глуби времен, есть двигжущее начало всего органического
процесса; но -- цель, лежащая в будущем и нам еще неизвестная….” (Rozanov 13).
101 “При равенстве прочих условий, количество жизненной энергии, заключённой в каждом
организме, тем более (в нем сравнительно с другими организмами), чем развитее его органическое
сложение, т. е. Чем многочисленнее и разнообразнее его функции и чем отчетливее и
исключительнее каждая из них” (Rozanov 11).
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criterion of the degree of the exertion of life energy on all rungs of the plant and animal
world” (Rozanov 11).102 Ironically, for all his criticism of Darwin here and elsewhere
Rozanov’s conception of increasing morphological complexity as evolutionary progress
bears a striking resemblance to the notions of evolutionary progress Darwin (and Herbert
Spencer) articulated.103
Ultimately, complexity ties together Rozanov’s notions of life energy and beauty:
“Negligible beauty, on the lower rungs of organic development, grows in proportion as
this development is pushed ahead in time and forms transition from simpler to more
complex, that is, become bearers of higher life exertion, of a greater amount of organic
energy” (Rozanov 16).104 Hence, beauty is not for Rozanov, as David Bethea maintains,
“the fact that pulls us forward in nature’s plan” (Bethea, “Modernism” 132); rather,
beauty is only a measure of complexity, life energy, and evolutionary progress. Rozanov
thus expanded on Solovyov’s hierarchy of relative organizational complexity, reducing
morphological complexity further to a vague notion of “life energy.”
1892-1894: The Meaning of Love
Solovyov did not discuss Darwin’s theory in depth again until the publication of
his 1897 book The Justification of the Good (Opravdanie dobra), though he did casually
mention “selection” in a series of articles he wrote between 1892-1894 that would
eventually be collected in a short book titled The Meaning of Love (Smysl liubvi). He
102

“Таким образом, 1) сложность организации и 2) обилие своеобразных (одна на другую не
похожих) функций, в ней совершающихся, может служить несомненным критериумом степени
напряжения жизненной энергии на всех ступенях растительного и животного мира” (Rozanov 11).
103
For more on Darwin’s and Spencer’s notions of evolutionary progress, see: Michael Ruse’s Monad to
Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology.
104 “Незначительная на низших ступенях органического развития, красота возрастает по мере того,
как это развитие подвигается по времени, и формы из более простых переходят в более сложные, т.
е. становятся носителями высшего жизненного напряжения, большого количества органической
энергии” (Rozanov 16).
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wrote, for example, of the “providential selection of procreators” (Solovyov, “Love” 89)
and that “sexual competition and selection.. [serve] the procreation of more perfect
organisms” (Solovyov, “Love” 91). The reasons that he wrote the articles, however, were
predominately religious, for in them Solovyov maintained that the purpose of sexual love
in humans is not the reproduction of the species, as many at the time supposed, but
ultimately the unification of humankind through the power of God’s grace. Created as a
sexually reproducing species in God’s image – with males and females–, humans had,
Solovyov declared, to achieve unity in love in order to put those halves together and
reconstruct the whole of God’s image. By the word “love,” however, Solovyov did not
mean the act of sex itself. His own idiosyncratic notion entailed, rather, the act of
recognizing in another person the unconditional value that, Solovyov claimed, humans, in
their unmitigated egoism, instinctually confer only on themselves. This unconditional
value is underwritten by God.
The Meaning of Love thus reminds us that Solovyov is first and foremost a
religious philosopher. His worldview is not limited by science; rather, his
anthropocentric, religious and philosophical beliefs constrain the science he accepts.
Hence, Solovyov understands the meaning of sex here, as in “Beauty in Nature,” in a way
that upholds the idea that humans have intrinsic value.
1897: Darwin and Morality
Solovyov’s return to Darwin’s theory in the opening chapter of The Justification
of the Good (1897) was marked by a palpable change in his attitude to Darwin. Indeed, as
Solovyov turned to the topic of morality and the work Darwin had done on the subject in
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his “The Primary Data of Morality,” Solovyov still showed great respect for Darwin.
Now, though, he took frank exception to certain aspects of Darwin’s work.
Convinced that the success of observing a moral teaching depends on its being
rooted in mankind’s moral nature, Solovyov turned to demonstrating that humans have an
innate capacity for moral behavior. He maintained that this capacity – whether the
product of evolution or creation –is what distinguishes humans from animals (Solovyov,
Good 25). Darwin, Solovyov noted, also believed that the vast difference in innate “moral
sentiment” separated man from the animals. But Solovyov thought that Darwin went too
far in his theorizing and got “carried away by his desire –within certain limits a legitimate
one – to fill up the ‘immense’ distance by intermediary links,” leading him to make one
basic error:
He regards all human morality as in the first instance social, thus connecting it
with the social instincts of animals. Personal or individual morality has, according
to Darwin, merely a derivative significance, and is a later result of historical
evolution. He maintains that the only virtues that exist for savages are those that
are required by the interests of their social group. (Solovyov, Good 26)
Solovyov took issue here with Darwin’s idea that morality is an adaptation, that in
facilitating cooperation among individuals within a group, morality increases the chances
that the individual members of the group will survive. Morality is therefore not absolute
and unchanging. Such moral behavior is considered good because it improved its
adherents chances of survival, not because morality is inherently so. Of course, social
interactions played a crucial role in Solovyov’s philosophy, as seen in The Meaning of
Love, but the power of morality is, for Solovyov, backed by religion and acting morally is
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a means to a religious end. The fact that Darwin was interested in showing that animals
also display moral behavior likely upset Solovyov because it challenged his
anthropocentrism. For, taken together, Darwin’s claims that morality is an evolved social
adaptation and that both humans and animals exhibit such behavior fly in the face of
Solovyov’s assertion that humans occupy a special place in the animal kingdom.
To disprove Darwin’s contention that morality is an adaptive social phenomenon,
Solovyov turned to a moral sentiment he believed had no social purpose: shame. In
particular, Solovyov was interested in the shame associated with sex because, he was
convinced, animals do not experience it, but “the most savage and undeveloped man is
ashamed of –i.e. recognizes as wrong – and conceals a physiological act which not only
satisfies his own desire and need, but is, moreover, useful and necessary for the
preservation of the species” (Solovyov, Good 26). For Solovyov’s argument, it was
important to show that a sense of shame is species-typical among humans; otherwise, not
only are humans not special for their capacity to create and follow moral norms, but the
variation in moral norms among humans could be explained as having its origins in the
adaptive value of cooperation, and morality would therefore have no absolute foundation.
Thus, Solovyov criticized Darwin, who, he claims, baselessly denied that “savages”
possess a sense of shame. He concludes:
It is obvious that it would not be necessary for Darwin to use such unconvincing
indirect arguments in support of his view could he produce any trustworthy facts
to show the presence of even rudimentary modesty among animals. But there are
no such facts, and shame undoubtedly remains, even from the external and
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empirical point of view, the distinguishing characteristic of man. (Solovyov,
Good 28)
Having a sense of shame is important for Solovyov not only because it separates
humans from the animals, but also because of what this sensation reveals about human
nature. By feeling shame associated with sex when sex is seen as an act of material,
animal existence, we humans show that we are something “other and higher” and
therefore partly immaterial (Solovyov, Good 29). Solovyov even criticizes Darwin for
failing to discuss sexual shame in The Descent of Man, though as Solovyov himself
claims, a sense of shame could have no utilitarian or adaptive value (Solovyov, Good 2930). Rather, Solovyov contends that sex itself is inherently shameful. A sense of shame
therefore serves as a “reminder” that our spiritual human dignity is “safe in the depths of
our being” (Solovyov, Good 31).
From a sense of shame, Solovyov then moves on to feelings of pity and reverence.
Unlike shame and its indication of man’s relation to material, animal nature, Solovyov
associates a sense of “pity” – for him construed as sympathy or compassion - with man’s
relationship to his fellow man (Solovyov, Good 32). Solovyov acknowledges that
scientists agree that a sense of “pity” is not unique to humans (Solovyov, Good 32), but
he does not yield to the scientific consensus that this sense is what we would now call
“sociobiological.” Paradoxically, he asserts, “In its essence…[the sense of pity] is an
individual moral state, and even in the case of animals it is not reducible to social
relations, much less so in the case of man. If the need for a social unit were the only
foundation of pity, that feeling could only be experienced towards the creatures that
belong to one and the same social whole” (Solovyov, Good 33). Here Solovyov accuses
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Darwin of denying, without empirical support, that “savage peoples” have a sense of pity
that transcends group membership, that their sense of pity is limited to interactions with
the group. As noted earlier, however, Darwin himself maintained that only an “artificial
barrier” prevented humans from extending their sympathies to humanity as whole
(Darwin, Descent 147). Ultimately, Solovyov appears to be as concerned here about the
evidence as he is the moral implications, for he declares: “To accept Darwin’s contention
unconditionally would be to admit that a human savage cannot attain to the moral level
sometimes reached by dogs, monkeys, and even lions” (Solovyov, Good 33). Again, as
was the case with a sense of shame, Solovyov wants to emphasize that a sense of pity is if
not unique to humans, is, at least, species-typical among them.
Unlike a sense of pity, a sense of what Solovyov calls “reverence” relates to what
humans recognizes as “higher” than themselves (Solovyov, Good 34). Drawing on an
example Darwin provided of “religious devotion,” Solovyov notes that this sense is found
in animals and is seen in the way that a dog relates to its master (Solovyov, Good 35). In
humans, a sense of reverence is more highly developed and serves the higher purpose of
forming “the moral basis of religion, and of the religious order of life” (Solovyov, Good
34).
“The fundamental feelings of shame, pity, and reverence,” Solovyov concludes,
“exhaust the sphere of man’s possible moral relations to that which is below him, that
which is on a level with him, and that which is above him” (Solovyov, Good 35). All
other feelings are therefore only variations of these three or result from interactions
among them (Solovyov, Good 36). With this knowledge, Solovyov considers it our duty
as humans to put these feelings on a rational foundation by elaborating on their value and
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justification and developing them into ethical principles. The Justification of the Good is
Solovyov’s own attempt to fulfill that duty.
In conclusion, although Solovyov began his book with the stated goal of simply
demonstrating that humans in general possess innate moral tendencies, so as to legitimize
the attempt he makes in The Justification of the Good to raise such moral intuitions to the
level of ethical principles, as he did so, he also made subsidiary claims about the genesis
of moral sentiments and how human moral development compared with that of the
animals. Thus, Solovyov used a sense of shame and pity to support his claim that
morality is not an evolved, social adaptation, whereas his claims that a sense of shame is
unique to humans and a sense of reverence is more highly developed in humans served to
emphasize the differences between humans and animals.
Solovyov had long sought to emphasize such differences. But whereas previously
Solovyov had only praised Darwin, once Solovyov turned to the topic of morality in The
Justification of the Good, he was forced to confront his disagreements with Darwin
directly.

In

particular,

Solovyov

criticized

Darwin’s

conclusions

about

the

sociobiological nature of morality so as to claim that the human senses of shame, pity,
and reverence are universal in humans. Solovyov could thus claim that there is some nonutilitarian, absolute, and, perhaps, spiritual or immaterial basis to morality.
Again, while Darwin was a methodological naturalist and limited his claims about
human morality to the natural world, Solovyov was not and therefore did not. Darwin’s
work was valuable to him because it supported his belief in an innate human morality;
but he also was wary of it because it left open the possibility that not all humans share the
same moral sentiments or that they will not extend to everyone alike. Because of his
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belief in inherent human worth and the power of love to bring humanity together, this
possibility was unbearable.
Ultimately, the most significant development in Solovyov’s thinking on Darwin’s
theory since he had published “Beauty in Nature” was his discussion of morality. Here
Solovyov, with his discussion of “pity,” joined an emerging Russian scientific tradition
that focused on the understudied role of “mutual aid” or “altruism” in evolution. As
Todes has shown, Russian mutual aid theorists were usually also critics of the Malthusian
picture of intraspecific competition that Darwin painted. Among the scientists who
subscribed to a theory of mutual aid at one time or another were: Il’ia Mechnikov,
Nikolai Nozhin, Karl Kessler, and Piotr Kropotkin (Todes 104-105). Given that Solovyov
did not present a sense of pity as an alternative to intraspecific struggle, it is unsurprising
that he did not bring up Malthus. His brief contribution sticks out because, instead of
depicting a sense of pity as alternative to struggle, Solovyov cast it as one of multiple
innate moral sentiments. Other than his general discussion of morality, Solovyov gave no
indication that his views on Darwin’s various theories had changed since 1889. This was
the last time he wrote on Darwin’s thought.
Conclusion:
At a time when the religious response to Darwinism in imperial Russia was
uniformly hostile, Solovyov proved a unique exception. The first so-called “religious”
criticism of Darwin’s work did not appear until 1885, over twenty years after the first
Russian translation of the Origin was published. These early critics were not Church
officials speaking on its behalf, but such presumed Christian writers as Danilevskii,
Strakhov, and Rozanov; their anti-Darwinist writings – Danilevskii’s Darwinism, in
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particular – received praise from ecclesiastical figures in the thick journals.

Their

criticism focused chiefly on the role that chance played in natural selection. The most
prominent and competent Church critic of Darwinism, Sergei Glagolev (1865-1937),
made his critical debut to what would prove to be a prolific career, in the 1893. It was an
article on evolutionary ethics; Glagolev, similar to Tolstoy, maintained that true mutual
aid could not follow from the Darwinian struggle for existence (Kline 313-327).
Like his critical compatriots, Solovyov also implicitly opposed the role
that chance played in Darwin’s theory of natural selection, but rather than rejecting
Darwinism altogether, Solovyov reconceived of natural selection as a teleological
mechanism. His revision of the theory thus ensured the appearance of humans through
unbroken natural law – what Solovyov called “providential selection” in The Meaning of
Love – without resorting to direct divine intervention.
In conclusion, brief though his adolescent phase as a materialist was, Solovyov
rather surprisingly turned out to be a lifelong Darwinist, albeit a rather idiosyncratic one.
What began as a short-lived period of infatuation with utopian perceptions of
Darwinism’s practical potential gave way to a lasting worldview bringing together
Darwinism, philosophical idealism, and theism that Solovyov applied to an ever-broader
range of subjects such as cosmology, aesthetics, and ethics.
As Solovyov ranged from one field to the next, his views on Darwinism, by and
large, did not change. In the intervening years between 1876, when he wrote “The
Second Dialogue,” and 1889, when he published “Beauty in Nature,” Solovyov still held
fast to a belief in an imperfect and changing world – what Ernst Mayr called “evolution
as such”--, and in the multiplication of species. He also continued to accept a theory of
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non-universal common descent. The rate of evolution, however, did not come up in
“Beauty in Nature,” and, for that reason, Solovyov’s later thoughts on Darwin’s theory of
the gradual nature of evolution remain unknown.
The most substantial change in his thinking during this period involved the nature
of natural selection. In 1876, Solovyov had written frankly that while he did not consider
it the only mechanism of evolution, he did accept natural selection. But what Solovyov
meant by “natural selection” was, in fact, a divine teleological instrument that worked by
forming species capable of housing ever more “elevated” souls: humankind. Humans
were both the goal of evolution and subject to it, emblems of evolutionary progress
created through unbroken natural law. This vision of teleological and anthropocentric
evolution remained with Solovyov through the years.
It was in 1889, as Solovyov turned his efforts to aesthetics, that the
inconsistencies in his understanding of natural selection finally became apparent. The
theory of beauty that Solovyov set out was predicated on the claim that beauty
objectively exists; it is the instantiation of the metaphysical Idea of beauty and does not
depend on its utility for its existence. The examples Solovyov used to explain what made
an object beautiful form an undeniable pattern: as an object of beauty increases in
intrinsic complexity, so does its potential for beauty. It should come as no surprise that
Solovyov placed humans at the top of this hierarchy of organizational complexity. Also
telling is his account of ugliness, for in explaining why an ugly object elicits revulsion in
its observer, Solovyov reduced it to the object’s having an appearance that fails to
conceal its utilitarian qualities. Thus, when he turned to Darwin’s theory of sexual
selection for support, claiming that Darwin himself did not believe that beauty was
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utilitarian or relative, but objective, he ran into difficulties. The logical structure of
Darwin’s intertwined theories natural and sexual selection showed signs of strain as
Solovyov tried to make them fit his idealistic mold. Solovyov decoupled natural and
sexual selection by redefining utility to mean qualities related only to defense and
survival, and he glossed over the importance of survival to reproduction and, therefore,
the importance of reproduction – and of beauty’s role in it – to natural selection.
Solovyov pointed instead to what is now called “runaway” selection, contending that
because ornamentation can evolve to the point of stymying an organism’s chances of
survival, such beauty itself cannot be utilitarian.
By this point, of course, Solovyov realized that the argument he had marshaled
bolstered only his claim that beauty is not utilitarian. In order to support his hitherto
unproven assumption that beauty is objective, Solovyov noted that humans and birds find
the same objects beautiful and therefore must share a sense of beauty. Then, in detailing
instances of beauty that are disadvantageous to survival, Solovyov was able to claim that
beauty is not utilitarian. Furthermore, Solovyov argued that if beauty is not utilitarian,
then the fact that both birds and humans find the same objects beautiful becomes
incomprehensible, unless the beauty both organisms perceive exists independently of
them: unless, that is, it is objective.
The issue of utility still loomed large as Solovyov turned his hand to questions of
ethics and morality in The Justification of the Good. The greatest difference between
humans and the animals, Solovyov now declared, was in the development of their moral
capacities, and he was quick to point out that the “great representative of evolutionary
theory” himself had said as much (Solovyov, Good 25). Solovyov disagreed with
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Darwin, however, on the nature and origin of human morality. For while Darwin
maintained that morality was an evolved social behavior, Solovyov could not stand the
thought of a morality born of material utility. Such a morality, Solovyov feared, would
not be universal in humans, and thus would not categorically separate them from the
animals. Rather, this morality would be variable among human populations and relative
to its social utility.
Solovyov set about proving that morality was neither social nor utilitarian by
finding a moral sentiment he believed to have no social purpose: shame, and particularly
shame associated with the act of sex. He contended that because shame failed to have any
effect on the human birth rate, its purpose was, rather, to remind humans that they are
something “other and higher” than their material nature. Solovyov next turned to the
sense of “pity” or what is now called “altruism.” Solovyov admitted that pity was a
“social instinct,” but he did not accept that pity was reducible to social relations. This
was evident, he explained, in humans’ capacity for showing compassion to individuals
that are not members of their social group, including members of different species. He
concluded his analysis with a cursory discussion of the human sense of “reverence.” In
surveying our basic moral sentiments, Solovyov sought to emphasize that human
morality was not by nature utilitarian. He thereby implied a moral continuity among
disparate human populations.
In the end, he could not as a religious philosopher totally accept Darwin’s various
theories and had to make compromises in order to reconcile his religious and
philosophical commitments. Central to those commitments was an intractable
anthropocentrism that lay at the heart of Solovyov’s idealist aversion to the utilitarian
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assumptions underlying the Darwinian principles of natural and sexual selection. This
aversion ultimately took the form of a longstanding anxiety about sexuality, as seen in
“Beauty in Nature” and “The Meaning of Love” ; Solovyov returned to a similar line of
thinking in “The Primary Data of Morality,” claiming that the sense of sexual shame has
no utilitarian value, but reminded humans of their “other and higher” nature. Solovyov
may have been able to accept that humankind was descended from the lower animals, but
his anthropocentrism would not let him believe that humans were only animals.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Strakhov, Tolstoy, and Solovyov all knew one other. Although they came to be
part of a shared social circle, they came from different backgrounds and developed
distinct worldviews, characterized by varying degrees of religiosity. They also all formed
different opinions about Darwinism, and those views varied throughout their lives.
Nevertheless, they often shared certain underlying interests and concerns about Darwin’s
theories, even if they justified them differently. They all cared about the theory primarily
as it applied to humans, in particular, to the meaning of human life, morality, and ethics.
Tolstoy and Strakhov worried about the implications of the struggle for existence
for the meaning of life. For Tolstoy, the struggle justified selfishness and undermined the
belief that humans have an innate capacity for love. Strakhov, on the other hand,
maintained that the struggle, together with the random variations that determine survival,
threw into question the notion that human life has intrinsic worth. Thus the nonteleological implications of the struggle for existence drove Strakhov’s anti-Darwinism,
whereas they posed no difficulties to Solovyov. He simply built a teleological element
into his understanding of natural selection, thus making the emergence of humans seem
inevitable and satisfying his own anthropocentric worldview.
Despite the fact that Solovyov largely accepted Darwin’s ideas while Tolstoy
ultimately rejected them, both Russian thinkers did share certain moral reservations about
Darwinism. In particular, as they began to consider the idea of morality as an adaptation,
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in the 1890’s, they were both struck by how its adaptive roots changed the underlying
basis of morality. For a man who wanted the world to be redeemed by selfless giving, the
thought that morality, when understood as an adaptation, turns acts of kindness and
cooperation into nothing more than self-interest in disguise, was abhorrent to Tolstoy.
Solovyov shared this concern, for while the Darwinian idea of an innate morality lent
credence to Solovyov’s ethical project, the fact that Darwin understood morality as an
adaptation had troubling implications. Indeed, as an adaptation, morality was not absolute
and did not entail that all humans shared the same morality. Virtuous behavior only came
to be considered such because of its survival value to local environmental conditions, not
because it was inherently good.
Finally, Solovyov, Strakhov, and Tolstoy all opposed evolutionary ethics or what
is now often called “social Darwinism.” Although Solovyov never said so, the fact that he
opposed the idea of morality as an adaptation, but advanced the idea of an innate morality
that he would ultimately use as the basis for an ethical theory, suggests he would have
opposed using the idea of morality as an adaptation to build that ethical theory. Tolstoy
and Strakhov, on the other hand, made their opposition explicit. Indeed, in his 1862
article “Bad Signs” Strakhov maintained that while humans do have innate differences,
these differences have no bearing on human moral worth, whereas Tolstoy briefly
criticized using Darwinism to excuse social inequalities as unavoidable.
Central to these concerns was the notion of heredity. Indeed, the inheritance of
variations beneficial in the struggle to survive and reproduce was an explicit assumption
of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. But even Darwin’s most adamant supporters
acknowledged that Darwin’s lack of a tenable theory of heredity was a serious defect of
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Darwin’s general theory and that the discovery of the mechanism of inheritance was
paramount to the theory’s lasting success. Despite the Darwinian and German biologist
August Weismann’s resounding success in 1888 with showing that mice whose parents’
tail was cut off did not inherit a shortened tail, the debate over the inheritance of acquired
characteristics continued largely unabated outside of scientific circles, into the 20th
century. In Russia, the fact that the debate was not definitively settled for society at large
left room for the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics that was at the
center of the emerging Marxist-Leninist program at the end of the 19th century. The
program’s goal was to improve humankind, to produce new humans – later called “Homo
Sovieticus” – through revolution and the subsequent restructuring of social conditions.
With the rediscovery of Mendel’s work “Experiments in Plant Hybridization”
(1866) at the turn of the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of the field
of genetics, many of the concerns that dominated Strakhov’s, Tolstoy’s and Solovyov’s
thought were given new life in Russia. For example, the writer and physician Mikhail
Bulgakov (1891-1940) wrote his novella Heart of a Dog (Sobach’e serdtse) in 1925
(published only under different political circumstances in 1968) as the debate about
eugenics reached a fever pitch. It was the tale of an eminent Moscow biologist and
fervent

eugenicist,

professor

Philip

Philippovich

Preobrazhensky

(literally:

“transformation” or “transfiguration”), who one day takes a stray dog “Sharik” home to
use in an experimental operation. He removes Sharik’s pituitary gland and testes,
replacing them with those of a deceased man named Klim Chugunkin. Over time,
Sharik’s

form

and

behavior

become

increasingly

human,

ending

in

what

Preobrazhensky’s student and assistant Dr. Bormenthal calls “complete humanization”
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(Bulgakov 60). In fact, Sharikov – the name the dog-turned-human is given – takes on all
the disagreeable characteristics of his organ donor Chugunkin.
Exasperated, Preobrazhensky, at one point, asks Bormenthal a rhetorical question
about who Sharikov is and explains: “‘Klim Chugunkin…-- that’s what it is: two arrests,
alcoholism, “divide everything,” my hat and two chervontsy gone…-- a boor and a
swine’” (Bulgakov 104). The results of Preobrazhensky’s experiment thus demonstrate
that both behavior and form have a material and heritable basis. In other words, humans
are not tabulae rasae; their behavior is not determined solely by environmental factors as
the Marxist Soviets maintained. The picture Bulgakov has drawn with Sharik and
Chugunkin is largely one of biological, not environmental, determinism.
To be sure, through his science fictional transformation Sharik made an enormous
Lamarckian leap up the evolutionary ladder from dog to human, but to Preobrazhensky’s
chagrin, his experiment showed him only the brain area that determines “the aspect of the
given human individual…and not the human aspect generally” (Bulgakov 104). He
considered the experiment a failure, for as a eugenicist, he sought to effect the
“improvement of the human species” (Bulgakov 104), not to modify one person at a time.
For that reason, he rejects Bormenthal’s proposal to perform another operation and
replace Sharikov’s transplanted organs with those of a genius, complaining: “‘Tell me,
please, why is it necessary to manufacture Spinozas artificially when any peasant woman
can produce them at any time? Didn’t Mme. Lomonosov bear her famous offspring out in
Kholmogory?’”(Bulgakov 103). He failed to discover the fundamental cause and material
basis of human behavior needed to manipulate and improve it. Ultimately, when
Preobrazhensky can no longer stand Sharikov’s antics and tries to make him move out of
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his apartment, Sharikov threatens Preobrazhensky’s life. This leads Preobrazhensky and
Bormenthal to reverse the operation and turn Sharikov back into a dog.
Like Chekhov’s “The Duel,” Heart of a Dog is by no means an indictment of
eugenics as a whole. Rather, it is a critique of the current limits of the science, something
that can, at least in principle, be overcome. In fact, Bulgakov’s focus on the heritability of
behavior conforms to the premises of eugenics, though the core of his criticism lies
elsewhere, with the Marxist emphasis on the environment. Though Chekhov and
Bulgakov clearly had different beliefs about human nature, their particular responses
reflect the extreme conclusions that evolutionary ethicists and eugenicists drew from the
science of the day. Hence, as the historical pendulum swung from the overriding societal
preoccupation with the heritability of human behavior that Chekhov had critiqued in “The
Duel” to the Soviets’ uncompromising belief that such behavior is determined
exclusively by the environment, in spite of the emphasis in genetics on heritability,
Bulgakov sides with biological determinism in Heart of a Dog.
In many ways, Bulgakov’s novella was a return to the evolutionary ethics that
Royer appeared to champion in the introduction to her translation of the French edition of
the Origin. Indeed, both the evolutionary ethicists and eugenicists relied on the
assumption that traits are, in general, highly or completely heritable and therefore subject
to minimal, if any, environmental influence. Whereas the Soviets’ Marxist attempt to
improve the human lot by changing our social environment was, to their minds, doomed
to failure, the evolutionary ethicists and eugenicists were eager to take on the role of
“breeder” and themselves direct the course of human evolution. In so doing they sought
use Darwin’s theory so as to improve the genetic quality of the human species by culling

172

the harmful and undesirable traits from the population, and consequently reduce suffering
and realize their utopian vision of humanity.
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